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INTRODUCTION 
During the last fifty years, Western societies have become increasingly 
multicultural and have progressively adopted models of cultural autonomy for 
accommodating diversity. These models are extraneous to the Western conception of 
rights, which is entangled in the nation-State model. In October 2008, UK Minister of 
Justice recognized the jurisdiction of Islamic Courts as arbitrators in cases of marriage 
and divorce; their rulings have to be scrutinized by British courts in order to test their 
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compatibility with British legal standards. In 1990, the Hungarian Parliament passed a 
law that guarantees representation to national and ethnic minorities, in both local and 
national political bodies. In the 1960s, the Netherlands established complex social 
system, known as verzuiling, which provided different “pillars” of social action for 
Protestant, Catholic, secular citizens. This model is still considered an effective solution 
for the integration of Muslim citizens. During the last five years, many European 
countries have created consultative organs for political representation of Muslim 
minorities, including migrants and nationals, such as the Consulta Islamica in Italy, the 
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in France, and the Diyanet in Turkey and 
Germany. These means of group-differentiated rights show a gradual shift of European 
legal systems toward models of minority protection uncommon in the Western tradition. 
Western legal systems have long addressed the question of minorities as the 
response of the nation-State to claims advanced by national groups. But the nation-State 
model, as it has been known since the Peace of Westphalia, has faced severe crises 
during the 20th century. The revival of non-national identity has challenged the ability of 
the nation-State to organize an effective social space for minority groups. Minority 
rights have so far been considered as intrinsically connected to the concept of nation, 
insofar that a group “incorporated in a State” is entitled to differentiated rights if “it 
differs from them in race, language or religion” in order to “preserve the characteristics 
which distinguish [it] from the majority” and to “satisfy the ensuing special needs.”1 
                                                 
1 This definition of minority rights is one of the few general hints we can find in literature on minority 
rights. The definition was given by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the period of 
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The solution to the problem of national minorities has long been territorial autonomy, 
for three reasons mainly. First, territorial autonomy is a form of self-determination that 
implies the preservation of States’ integrity and, consequently, guarantees States’ 
sovereignty. Secondly, territorial autonomy is an appropriate solution for a world in 
which clear borders define States’ jurisdiction over a defined territory. Therefore, 
guaranteeing a different jurisdiction to a territory in which the population is ethnically 
different is an effective legal response to those ethnic claims that are limited to certain 
territories. Lastly, for almost one century, territorial autonomy has been the result of 
transnational agreements between States that aim to protect their kin-nationals living in 
neighboring lands. Specifically, these agreements stem from the imitation of the 
constitutive elements of a State—territory, population, and jurisdiction—that are 
replicated and conceded to a lower level of government.2 
Recent changes in world society caused by globalization, immigration, and 
inter-connectedness pose new challenges and require new solutions. The differences 
between national minorities are blurring together with national borders, under the 
                                                                                                                                               
flourishing of minority rights during the 20s and 30s of the 20th century. See, Minority Schools in Albania 
(1935), PCIJ Ser. A/B, no. 64, 17. Even the OSCE High Commissioner for national minorities has never 
defined what a minority is because this would imply to crystallize possible future development of the 
concept. Moreover, this would imply that those States that are not likely to concede differentiate rights 
would abide so strictly by this definition, in order to exclude one or the other group. However, the 
definition of the PCIJ has been subsequently employed in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 
27) and used as a frame of understanding in the work of the Council of Europe. See, Yearbook of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, “Text for the Proposal to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning Persons Belonging to National Minorities,” (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 389-391. 
2 For instance, the South Tyrol autonomous region in Italy has a population, a territory, and a jurisdiction; 
these elements make of South Tyrol a special legal system within the Italian legal system. Its autonomous 
territory is an imitation of the State on a lower scale. 
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pressure of globalization and supranational integration processes, which connect States 
to several spheres and levels of jurisdiction. Peoples are not immune to these changes, 
above all because mobility and international ties are shaping States as multicultural 
societies without territorially defined features. In other words, the remarkable changes 
in the world put Western societies before a great challenge, in that 
owing to contemporary migrations, from the South of the planet and 
from the East of the Continent, Western European society faces a huge 
challenge on its capacity to find practical and political solutions and on 
its very theoretical and ideological traditions. Is it possible to issue a 
defence of equality that is able to save the world of differences? Is it 
possible to answer the demands and requests originating from the diverse 
collective identities (ethnical, cultural, and social)?3  
For these reasons groups gather around other poles of identity, which have to be 
taken into account by liberal democracies that mold politics of inclusion aiming to 
enforce policies of social equality and justice. In Eastern societies, an effective solution 
to similar problems has long since been found: the millet system that has developed 
under Ottoman rule and its contemporary adaptations throughout the Middle East—
including Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Pakistan. I argue that 
contemporary millet systems can teach important lessons on the accommodation of 
minority claims in the West, which at least once should look eastward. 
1. THE STATE OF ART 
In order to focus on the research topic, it is necessary to frame the issues related to 
minority protection in a perspective of political theory first, and then in a legal 
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perspective. It is fundamental to define the reasons why States should protect minorities 
through an overview of the main debate in political theory with specific reference to 
cultural autonomy. After having addressed the theoretical issues, the analysis will focus 
on the legal aspects of cultural minority grounded in constitutional law theory. 
The debate in political theory on the issues of minority protection has mainly 
two streams: a liberal-nationalist one and a liberal-accommodationist one. According to 
the former, national minorities are entitled to group-differentiated rights, while other 
minorities, especially new minorities, are entitled to the basic level of protection 
provided by anti-discrimination law. According to the latter, all minorities are entitled 
to group-differentiated rights, which are conceded in different levels of protection as the 
result of political negotiation. 
The debate in constitutional theory mirrors the mainstreams of political debates. 
While some scholars support the minimum level of protection—i.e., anti-discrimination 
standard—others support different means of group-differentiated rights. In the latter 
perspective, problems arise in terms of constitutional arrangements for those minorities 
that are not linked to a specific territory, thus eluding the territorial autonomy model. I 
argue that there is no need to find new solutions to these problems, while instead it is 
necessary to look at other experiences, in order to adapt existing solutions to similar 
problems. Indeed, the circulation of models, as a result of comparative perspective, is an 
easy and effective means of dealing with emergent problematic situations. 
                                                                                                                                               
3 Gualtiero Harrison, I Fondamenti Antropologici dei Diritti Umani, (Rome: Meltemi, 2002), 36-37. 
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1.1 Semantic issues4 
Before analyzing the political and legal debates, it is essential to address some semantic 
issues related to expressions such as minority and autonomy.  
The term minority refers to a group of people resident in a certain State that 
shares ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural characteristics, and differs from the 
majority of the population. The concept of minority has long been connected to 
territorial and temporal factors. However, the contemporary debate on minorities 
includes also those groups that are not connected to a specific territory, or those groups 
that identify as their determinant pole of identity only one specific aspect of diversity 
and not language, ethnicity, religion, and culture as a whole. 
To give some distinctions, national minority has been defined as 
an indigenous and permanent settlement within a particular area of a 
nation-state’s sovereign territory of a minority group whose members are 
citizens of that state and who, despite (indeed, to some extent, precisely 
because of) their citizenship, manifest, also implicitly, a determination to 
continue to belong to their own community, while at the same time 
resisting attempts by the majority to assimilate them.5 
Specifically, the resistance to assimilation results in a “relation of linkage to a nation 
different from the one in which the minority group is actually living” and with which it 
                                                 
4 The semantic issues will be briefly treated in that I intend only to define the terminology that will be 
used in the dissertation. These notes to do not attempt to provide any comprehensive analysis of the 
terminological problems connected to the topic of this analysis. 
5 Roberto Toniatti, Minorities and Protected Minorities: Constitutional Models Compared, in: Michael 
Dunne and Tiziano Bonazzi (eds.), Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies, (Keele, UK: Keele 
University Press, 1994), 199. This definition mirrors the one given by an Italian influential scholar, 
Capotorti, whose definition of minority has been included in several international documents, see, 
Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, (New York: UN, 1979). 
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shares “the memory of common historical origins.”6 In other words, national minorities 
are those groups that have a homeland abroad, which is defined as kin-State, while the 
State in which they reside is defined as hosting State. 
Those minorities which do not have a homeland of reference are commonly 
known as ethnic minorities, defined as “communities that are characterized by a 
cultural, linguistic, or religious identity of their own.”7 Still, the spatial factor is 
determinant, in that national and ethnic minorities are concepts used in the literature 
with specific reference to a certain territory—for example, the Hungarian minority in 
Romania is a national minority, since it has a homeland abroad, Hungary; while instead, 
the Basque community is an ethnic minority, since it has no homeland abroad, but 
nevertheless it is territorially defined. By contrast, the communities of migrants or other 
communities that gather around single factors of diverse identity that are not connected 
to a specific territory are defined respectively as “new minorities” and “diffuse 
minorities.”8 For example, the Moroccan community in Italy is a new minority, while 
the Jewish community in France is a diffuse minority and, specifically, a religious 
minority.9 
Definitions serve to delimit concepts and to define room for communication and 
intellectual exchange, but one cannot consider them so strictly that they cannot be re-
organized when confronted by overlapping and complex social situations. For example, 
                                                 
6 Valeria Piergigli, Lingue minoritarie ed identità culturali, (Milano: Giuffrè, 2001), 62. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Roberto Toniatti, Minorities and Protected Minorities: Constitutional Models Compared, in: Michael 
Dunne and Tiziano Bonazzi (eds.), Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies, 199. 
9 In Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, however, Jews are traditionally considered as an ethnic 
minority, since in many cultures religion and ethnicity are considered inseparable aspects of identity. 
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the Moroccan community may be considered as both a new minority and a religious 
minority, given that it is mainly composed of Muslims, and this depends on the legal 
status that a State is willing to concede to that group. Moreover, definitions are also 
connected to social or political perception. For instance, the German-speaking 
community in South Tyrol is usually referred to as a linguistic minority, although it has 
long relied on Austrian support in claiming collective rights for historical and political 
reason; hence, it could be considered a national minority with Austria as its kin-State. 
In this analysis, the term “cultural minority” includes both diffuse minorities and 
new minorities. In other words, I will refer to cultural minority as a diverse group with 
no spatially-defined allocation inside a certain State. 
The term autonomy refers to a set of “differentiated rights” that aim to “preserve 
the characteristics which distinguish [a minority] from the majority” and to “satisfy the 
ensuing special needs.”10 Autonomy for national and ethnic minorities, defined as 
territorial autonomy, may have different forms and degrees, including separate political 
bodies, systems of political representation, different educational programs, and different 
schools. For cultural autonomy, we intend other means of group-differentiated rights 
that aim to protect cultural minorities. Autonomy, in this latter sense, is “the means 
through which an authority, subject to another superior authority, has the power to 
establish, independently from that superior authority, those specific functions that have 
                                                 
10 See reference n. 1. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 11 -
been attributed to it by the superior authority, in order to pursue the general interest of 
the whole population that is subject to it.”11 
Moreover, an essential distinction is to be traced between territorial autonomy 
and cultural/personal autonomy. Territorial autonomy refers to the whole population 
residing in a specific territory; thus, the set of differentiated rights becomes a specific 
jurisdiction over a certain territory, and its residents. By contrast, cultural or personal 
autonomy is a set of differentiated rights that are accorded to a specific group only, 
independently of the territory that group is resident in. 
1.2 Cultural rights and cultural autonomy 
Multiculturalism is a typical feature of contemporary societies that “refers to the 
existence of linguistically, culturally, or ethnically diverse segments in the population of 
a society or State.”12 This peculiarity characterizes societies as human organizations of 
multiple identities,13 and may be described as “ a ‘mosaic’ of several bounded, 
nameable, individually homogeneous and unmeltable minority uni-cultures, which are 
pinned onto the backdrop of a similarly characterized majority uni-culture.”14 Diversity 
generates conflicts in terms of equality between majority and minority groups and in 
terms of justice oriented to the inclusion of diverse groups in social life. These conflicts 
challenge States’ commitment to manage diversity. The main challenge lies in the 
necessity, on the one hand, to promote equality as the basic principle of modern liberal 
democracies15 and, on the other, to avoid the disrupting effects of separate institutions 
along ethnic boundaries. In other words, 
                                                 
11 Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
(Padova: Cedam, 2008), 140, citing Tim Potier, Conflict in Nagorny-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. A Legal Appraisal, (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001), 54. 
12 Conrad William Watson, Multiculturalism, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 2. 
13 Christos Tsironis, Multiculturalism and Education: Dysfunctionality and Challenges in Europe, in 
Arnaldo Nesti (ed.), Multiculturalismo e pluralismo religioso fra illusione e realtà: un altro mondo è 
possibile? (Firenze: Firenze University Press, 2006), 305-308. 
14 Steve Vertovec, “Multiculturalism, Culturalism and Public Incorporation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
vol. 19, n. 1 (1996), pp. 49-69, at 50. 
15 Nicola Matteucci, Alexis de Tocqueville. Tre Esercizi di Lettura, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990), 304. 
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there is a tension between the respect for diversity or individuality and 
the recognition of natural right. When liberals became impatient to the 
absolute limits to diversity or individuality that are imposed even by the 
most liberal version of natural right, they had to make a choice between 
natural right and the uninhibited cultivation of individuality. They chose 
the latter …. Liberal relativism has its roots in the natural right tradition 
of tolerance or in the notion that everyone has a natural right to the 
pursuit of happiness as he understands happiness; but in itself it is a 
seminary of intolerance.16 
In contemporary political thought, the commitment to manage diversity and, 
specifically, to protect minorities, is considered a concretization of the equality 
principle, which is grounded in democratic political and constitutional thought. Liberal 
societies that do not recognize the right to diversity and focus only on the protection of 
individual rights are somehow “guilty”17 of indifference towards cultural, ethical, 
linguistic, religious, and gender diversity, thus preventing all citizens from enjoying 
their rights and exercising their right to self-determination. Charles Taylor claims that 
the main problem of plural societies lies in 
the awkwardness [that] arises from the fact that there are substantial 
numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that 
calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal 
with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic 
political principles.18 
If in the first decades of the 20th century, protection of minorities has ensued from a 
perspective of conflict-resolution and conflict-prevention; after World War II and the 
spread of the human rights doctrine, protection of minorities has been also considered a 
development of fundamental rights. Although the conflict-resolution and -prevention 
rationales for protecting of minorities are still viable in many situations—for instance, 
in cases in which the protection of minorities aims to avoid the spread of violence, as 
the cases of South Tyrol, Basque territories, and Eastern Europe after the fall of the 
Soviet Empire,—the main rationale provided for the protection of groups is that it is a 
duty of liberal democracies. Contemporary liberal democracies depart from the 
neutrality model, according to which a State “remains neutral in the good life, and 
restricts itself to ensuring that however they see things, citizens deal fairly with each 
other and the state deals equally with all,”19 while, instead, liberal democracies should 
adopt policies of inclusion of diverse members and diverse groups.  
                                                 
16 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 5-6. 
17 Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 61. 
18 Ibid., 63. 
19 Ibid., 57. 
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The aim of liberal democracies should be “citizenization,” which is a set of 
political and legal arrangements that aim “not to suppress… differential claims, but to 
filter and frame them through the language of human rights, civil liberties, and 
democratic accountability.”20 Once taken for granted that protection of minorities is a 
development of equality and justice, several problems emerge in relation to the way 
minority groups should be protected. 
On these issues, there are two main perspectives: a liberal nationalist and a 
liberal-accommodationist. According to liberal nationalists, only national groups would 
be entitled to group-differentiated rights, while other ethnic or cultural groups, 
including migrants, should be excluded from special rights that stem from the 
institutionalization of diversity.21 According to liberal-accommodationists, these claims 
suffer from incoherence, in that “it becomes contradictory to privilege one source of 
identity versus other social identities, such as religious and familial attachments, since 
these other attachments may be equally important sources of identity.”22 The way in 
which minority protection has so far been conceived is entrapped in the nation-State 
model, by virtue of which national minorities, living in territories along borders of 
neighboring kin-States, have to be territorially protected. But the increasing importance 
of loyalties and poles of aggregation other than the nation should push liberal 
democracies out of the sovereigntist trap, in order to overcome obstacles of a 
                                                 
20 Will Kymlicka, “Multicultural Odysseys,” Ethnopolitics, vol. 6, (2007), pp. 585-597, at 587. 
21 See Will. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 65-6. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 14 -
“methodological nationalism that needs to be complemented thoroughly by ideas about 
non-territorial forms of group rights.”23 
The further development of liberal democracies would be the recognition of 
cultural rights as collective rights.24 In other words, liberal democracies should consider 
as viable targets of protection other-than-national identity poles as well; consequently, 
they should accommodate cultural claims through non-territorial solutions. The debate 
on cultural rights covers mainly two issues: the necessity to protect cultural rights and 
the problems posed by illiberal cultures.  
As for the necessity to protect cultural rights, the main liberal-nationalist claim 
is that cultural rights belong to the individual realm; thus, there is no need to tackle 
them with cultural claims, in that civil rights protection, in the form of anti-
discrimination law, is an effective protection.25 However, “the individual right to culture 
stems from the fact that every person has an overriding interest in his personal identity, 
that is in preserving his way of life and in preserving traits that are cultural identity 
                                                                                                                                               
22 Steven C. Roach, Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights, and Globalization, (Aldershot England: 
Ashgate, 2005), 37. 
23 Oliver Schmidtke, “Bound by National Categories? The Promises and Limitations of Kymlicka’s 
Multicultural Odysseys,” Ethnopolitics, vol .6, n. 4 (2007), pp. 613-617, at 616. 
24 This is the case, for example, of those States that recognize organized Churches and, to certain extents, 
their jurisdictions. It is the case of the concordats and similar legal instruments by virtue of which, 
Churches have limited jurisdiction on specific areas within the legal systems of the States. See, Carlo 
Cardia, Ordinamenti religiosi ed ordinamenti dello Stato. Profili giurisdizionali, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2003). 
25 Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory, vol. 20, n.1 (1992), pp. 105-
139. 
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components for him and other members of his cultural group.”26 Thus, there is no 
reason why a liberal democratic State should protect national identity and, 
simultaneously, reject cultural identity claims. Objections would arise with respect to 
the illiberal traits of some groups, such as religious or cultural restraints, which conflict 
with liberal democratic principles. This opposition arises primarily with reference to 
religious minority protection in two respects: internal restrictions and State-religion 
relations. 
With regard to internal restrictions, which are defined as “powers wielded by a 
group to maintain unchanged its customs and practices,” in order to “prevent members 
from adopting other cultural features or leaving the group,”27 it has to be recognized 
that liberal democracies have to first protect general human rights. Thus, liberal 
democracies have to discourage illiberal practices and, then, have to maintain cultural 
protection as long as cultural communities leave room for personal self-
determination28—the so called right to be left alone. However, the core-problem 
concerns coercive practices: while States should deny the right to autonomy to those 
communities that foster coercive practices to the detriment of their members, there is no 
tenable argument why they should per se deny protection, if not for their own 
protection, to those communities which are illiberal in nature: “while coercive cultures 
                                                 
26 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social Research, vol. 61, 
n.3 (1993), pp. 491-510, at 507. 
27 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 35. 
28 Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in Joseph Raz (ed.), Ethics in the Public Domain: 
Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 160-165. 
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are probably also cultures that do not foster the independence of some of their members, 
nor afford them opportunities that liberals deem adequate, the converse is not 
necessarily true.”29 
With regard to State-religion relations, problems arise in terms of the level of 
protection to be accorded to religious groups, without jeopardizing the secular principle 
which characterizes liberal democracies. The danger lies in the threat that organized 
religious groups would pose to pluralism and accepted liberal secular principles. A 
recent example is the violent manifestations of political Islam. This fear, which stems 
from century-long struggles, in the West, to divide Church from the State, could be 
mitigated by two arguments. 
First, threats to liberal democracy stem not only from religious movements but 
also from secular violent or illiberal movements such as “totalitarianism, scientism, 
professionalism, and bureaucratic administration.”30 Secondly, a liberal democratic 
society should be open to dialogue with several voices that equally understand the 
necessity of compromise between culture identity and overarching democratic values, 
and between legitimate autonomy claims and reasonableness and civility.31 Moreover, it 
should be considered that “practical interactions in everyday life among people of 
                                                 
29 Monique Deveaux, “Cultural Pluralism From Liberal Perfectionist Premises,” Polity, vol. 32, n. 4 
(2000), pp. 473-497, at 489. 
30 Veit Bader, Secularism or Democracy? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 97-98. 
31 Ibid., 117. 
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widely divergent religious beliefs and practices teach practices and ethos of toleration, 
at least under appropriate and decent regimes of toleration.”32 
If we assume that minority protection is a development of human rights 
doctrine, which is a founding element of liberal democratic thought, we have to admit 
that all minorities should be protected in virtue of the right to identity and culture. Since 
the protection of minorities has so far been conceived in terms of nation-State and 
national groups identity, new claims of ethnic and cultural revivals should be addressed 
by States in order to elevate the level of protection from mere anti-discrimination to 
substantive group-differentiated institutionalization. The threats of the illiberal character 
of minorities and of State-religion relations in case of religious minorities should not be 
addressed in terms of jeopardy of the liberal tenets; on the contrary, States should 
identify those cultural or religious practices that harm the members of a certain group 
and exclude them from protection, while they should consider a wide range of poles of 
identity as the basis for protecting groups. 
The aim is to foster an inclusive society in which the accommodation of 
diversity creates room for interaction and decent self-determination, which would lead 
to active cohabitation with the effect of mutual influence between liberal democratic 
principles and traditional cultural practices. The next section regards the way in which 
such issues should be addressed from a legal perspective. 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 119, see also Michael Walzer, On Toleration, (New Have: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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1.3 Constitutional accommodation of cultural minorities 
The approaches of States toward group identity are mainly two: the neutral, or diversity-
blind approach, and the proactive, or promotional approach.33 
According to the diversity-blind approach, the State is indifferent to identity 
issues and guarantees equality by simply implementing the principle of non-
discrimination. This is the embryonic stage of equality, in that individuals are 
guaranteed full access to rights independently of identity issues, but they are not 
guaranteed their full explication when the exercise of their rights involves collective 
moments. For sake of clarity, it is necessary to give an example: an Occitan speaker in 
France is guaranteed equality in access to public offices, in that the law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of linguistic identity, but she/he is not guaranteed the full 
explication of her/his identity as an Occitan speaker in that the State does not recognize 
collective rights such as education in a minority language, media broadcasting, and 
toponymy. The flaw of such systems consists in preventing those members of their 
society, who bear different identity features, from preserving their minority identity and 
developing it alongside with the majority one. 
In the latter approach—the promotional one—it is the State itself that takes care 
of the promotion of diversity through various legal solutions. To clarify by another 
example, one can think of a German speaker in Northern Italy: not only she/he is 
guaranteed non-discrimination on the basis of her/his linguistic-ethnic identity, but also 
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full cultural rights are recognized, which are typically enjoyable in community with 
others, such as the right of education in the native language, or the right of information 
in the native language through media. 
As for the instruments of managing diversity, they can be divided in two groups: 
one group enlists instruments by virtue of which specific rights are conferred to specific 
groups, while the other enlists instruments by virtue of which groups are recognized as 
constitutive elements of society and are delegated functions typically pertaining to the 
central government.34 
To the first group belong for example the legal instrument of positive actions, 
whereby the legislator intervenes by commanding the preferential treatment of specific 
disadvantaged groups (women for instance), in order to remove those obstacles that 
prevent the enjoyment of substantive equality, besides formal equality. 
To the second group belong for instance self-government arrangements, 
whereby specific recognized groups are given the authority to manage certain functions 
otherwise pertaining to the State. This form of promoting diversity is the most 
developed, in that it envisages a set of rights specifically conceived for collective 
enjoyment. Groups are given powers in order to exert their rights on issues of particular 
                                                                                                                                               
33 Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
39-66. 
34 Ibid., 139-60. From a political theory point of view, methods of managing diversity can be divided in 
two groups: those that tend to eliminate differences, such as forced assimilation or, ultimately, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing, and those that manage differences, such as autonomy (territorial or non-territorial) 
and promotional integration. Compare, Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally 
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relevance. For example, Italy has identified, on the basis of territoriality, the German-
speaking group in the region of Trentino Alto-Adige/Südtirol and has, consequently, 
developed a form of territorial autonomy, whereby cultural issues are managed by the 
group itself. These means of group-differentiated rights, collectively enjoyed, have so 
far been territorially devised in that the object of protection has been national 
minorities. However, if the need to protect cultural minorities as both a liberal 
democratic aim and a means of conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution,35 then, the 
contemporary challenge is to find devices of specific self-government arrangements for 
diffuse communities, which is cultural autonomy. 
The concept of cultural autonomy relies on the personality principle, “the idea 
that autonomous communities are organized as sovereign collectives whatever their 
residential collocation within a multicultural state.”36 Ultimately, through the 
institutionalization of diversity and the consequent full determination of group identity, 
the constitutional allegiance by different groups to one State is guaranteed.37 The core 
issue is how the institutionalization of diversity can be constitutionally designed. At 
                                                                                                                                               
Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts, in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (eds.), Citizenship 
in Diverse Societies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 12-18. 
35 Steven C. Roach, Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights and Globalization, 91; see also John McGarry, 
Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon, Integration or Accomodation? The enduring debate in conflict 
regulation, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies—Integration or 
Accomodation?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 41-88. 
36 Efraim Nimni, “National-Cultural Autonomy as an Alternative to Minority Territorial Nationalism,” 
Ethnopolitics, vol. 6, n. 4 (2007), pp. 345-364, at 346. 
37 James Tully, Strange Multiplicity, Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 197-8. 
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least, three aspects of social life are covered by institutionalization: associational life, 
political representation, and autonomy of the individual. 
With respect to associational life, several legal means can be identified, which 
aim all to grant autonomy to the cultural collective sphere. These include separate 
schools or specific educational courses; autonomous organizations that provide for 
cultural or religious services; separate associations of political aggregation at the 
national level (labor unions or political parties on ethnic or religious basis). 
With respect to political representation, legal means to grant political 
representation of minorities include gerrymandering and bound seats in the legislative 
or executive bodies. These means, however, are proper of a national distribution 
throughout the territory of a country, thus other means would fit better the cultural 
autonomy model, such as specific bodies of representation of cultural minorities at both 
the local and national levels. Moreover, special procedures could be set, including veto 
powers on vital issues concerning minority interests and consultative procedures that 
co-opt minority representatives in the decision-making process. 
With respect to autonomy of the individual, the possible solutions are more 
controversial. The Western legal tradition is based on the link between law and 
territory: individuals are subject to certain legal systems in that they are resident in a 
territory over which that legal system has jurisdiction. This is the heritage of Roman 
law, which only during a brief period (roughly, from the IX to the XI centuries) has 
accepted the principle of legal personality, because of legal barbaric influences that 
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imported the personality model in virtue of which individuals are subject to the law of 
the nation they belong to. Other legal systems, in history, such as the Islamic legal 
tradition and Ottoman law, and, currently, many Middle-East legal systems, have 
accepted the principle of legal personality as a constitutional peculiarity. In these 
systems, individuals, mainly in matters of family law, are subject to the legal system of 
the ethno-religious community they belong to.38 Since traditional and religious laws 
share often illiberal prescriptions, it is highly improbable that a liberal democracy can 
accept them as part of State’s jurisdiction. However, there are other available 
possibilities. 
Religious and traditional laws could be applied by judicial bodies with functions 
of arbitration bodies in specific matters. The emergence of non-judicial solutions to 
disputes, from arbitration to conflict-management in family disputes or minor crimes, is 
an example of adoption of alternative systems of justice. These alternative means of 
dispute-settlement may, indeed, include traditional or religious law as well, provided 
that a judicial authority scrutinizes the compatibility of the non-judicial results with 
basic constitutional principles.39 This does not imply a changeover in the Western legal 
                                                 
38 “The affiliation to a personal legal system is determined by race, origin, or religion. The legislation and 
the institutions of such systems are not linked to a specific territory of their own. They can have 
jurisdiction, as do the Islamic legal system, over several territories… one territory can even be the 
platform of different legal systems that entangle over it,” Académie de Droit International de La 
Haye/The Hague Academy of International Law, Recueil Des Cours, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1968), 74: 83-4. 
39 This is the case of UK, where in October 25, 2008 the sole proviso of Jack Straw’s Ministry of Justice 
authorized Islamic Courts to deal with family law disputes on condition that the Islamic ruling is 
scrutinized by a British Court in order to test the compatibility of the decision with human rights 
standards recognized by common law jurisprudence. The controversy on the application of Islamic law in 
Britain originates from a declaration of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, in February 
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tradition that tie up citizenship, law, and territory; simultaneously, it would certainly be 
a watershed in the concept of sovereignty, which is not, or no more, to be intended as 
the dominion of a State over a territory and its resident population, but has to be 
oriented towards social, political, and legal pluralism. 
Personal/cultural autonomy is a form of self-government which is indeed 
recognized by international law,40 but what makes States reluctant to grant cultural 
autonomy is the loss of sovereignty defined as “the entitlement to rule over a bounded 
territory.”41 The nation-State has traditionally been restive to concede autonomy to 
certain territories in order to prevent such autonomy from developing in a different legal 
system in the country.42 If the multicultural challenge requires overcoming the 
“sovereigntist trap,” the legal response to multiculturalism requires overcoming the 
legal centralism that has long characterized nation-States. 
Legal pluralism is defined as a characteristic of those legal systems in which the 
sources of law are not centered in the State, but include beyond the State, which 
                                                                                                                                               
2008 in which the prelate considered that the application of Islamic law in Britain would be unavoidable. 
This position was shared by Lord Chief Justice Philipps and, eventually, rejected by the government that 
argued that the application of Islamic law would marginalize Muslim citizens. On the controversy and its 
developments see, http://www.rights.no/publisher/publisher.asp?id=52&tekstid=2104 
40 Article 27 of the 1966 UN Civil and Political Rights Covenant states: “In those States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 
their own religion, or to use their own language.” 
41 David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity and Stanford University Press, 2006), 295. 
42 In this case, I refer to asymmetric federalism defined as a combination of different legal systems within 
the territory of one State by virtue of which some territories have more autonomy than other and can 
wield a more autonomous jurisdiction on the population there resident. 
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remains the main law-maker, other “norm-generating communities”43 as well. Legal 
pluralism concerns many branches of law, such as private and business law—recent 
developments of lex mercatoria and the circulation of decisions in European 
Community law could be valid examples—and has always been a peculiarity of certain 
legal systems such as the ones of colonial and post-colonial States. As for constitutional 
law, the legal pluralism paradigm could be an available response to those challenges 
that emerge from a fragmented society,44 which is divided in “social fields” many of 
which “capable of generating rules and coercing or inducing compliance to them.”45 In 
such systems the State would not lose its fundamental capacity of generating 
overarching norms; rather, the State would devolve portions of law-making power to 
certain communities for specific purposes and within defined limitations. The purposes 
would clearly be the protection and the exercise of cultural rights for the well-being of 
the community members; the limitations would certainly be the respect for the 
fundamental constitutional principles and the protection of weak categories within the 
communities from internal restrictions (for instance, gender equality within religious 
autonomous communities etc.). Legal pluralism would then lead to recognize cultural 
minorities as communities capable to produce law that would be applied to its members 
within the limits imposed by the respect of human rights and the fundamental 
constitutional principles of a State. In this logic, legal pluralism may be considered a 
                                                 
43 Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick Alexander Macdonald, “What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” 
Canadian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, n. 1 (1997), pp. 25-46, at 34. 
44 Gavin W. Anderson, Constitutional Rights after Globalization, (Oxford: Hart, 2005), 45-49 and 54-59. 
45 Sally E. Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law and Society Review, vol. 22, (1988), pp. 869-896, at 878. 
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value which has to find a just institutionalization in a context of “mild law,”46 composed 
of statutes, rights, and articulations of the principle of justice. 
Moreover, the three aspects of protection entail two different levels of 
enjoyment of rights. While the protection of associational rights ensures the collective 
enjoyment of cultural rights, they can be, nevertheless, individually enjoyed. The other 
aspects, political representation and autonomy of the individual pertain, instead, to the 
collective sphere of rights. In other words, the first aspect of protection provides groups 
for instruments whereby individuals can collectively enjoy certain individual rights such 
as linguistic, cultural, or religious rights. For example, the right to language may be 
individually or collectively enjoyed: individually, by exercising the freedom of 
speaking, learning, or reading one’s language and, collectively, by organizing 
educational programs in a certain language. By contrast, the second and third aspects of 
protection provide groups for instruments that enable the enjoyment of rights that are 
collective in nature, including special political rights, which entail the actual 
involvement of minority groups in the decision-making process; and individual 
autonomy, which implies the possibility of being subject to a particular jurisdiction by 
virtue of one’s identity. 
In legal theory studies, these issues have been in-depth analyzed, while in 
political theory studies, historical examples of cultural autonomy and legal pluralistic 
models have been provided. This dissertation aims to concretely analyze contemporary 
                                                 
46 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Il Diritto Mite, (Milano: Einaudi, 1992). 
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cultural autonomy models. Specifically, it focuses on Middle-East legal systems, which 
have adopted the cultural autonomy model of the Ottoman Empire, known as millet. 
The dissertation also focuses on the developments of some European legal systems that 
show a shift toward cultural autonomy and the necessity of protecting cultural 
minorities. Further research is necessary to compare contemporary millet systems in 
order to provide the Western lawyer for available legal solutions to the multicultural 
challenges of Western societies. Moreover, these Eastern solutions are to be compared 
with Western ones, in order to draw an available model of protection based on cultural 
autonomy and compatible with liberal democratic principles. 
2. THE MILLET SYSTEM AS A MODEL 
Among the group of instruments proper of promotional legal systems, of particular 
interest is the millet system, developed in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of 
the 19th century and still applied, in modernized versions, in several States of the Near 
and Middle East. 
The millet system is a 
very controversial technique of differential promotion of groups that 
makes legal systems which adopt it resemble multinational systems (in 
that it stably institutionalizes groups), although they structurally 
distinguish themselves from these, in that the institutionalization is 
limited to certain purposes. It is the creation of a system of “pillars” that 
provides for separated and, ultimately, self-governed communities for 
different groups, in sectors such as education or personal status.47 
                                                 
47 Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
52. 
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This system has developed in the Ottoman Empire after the reforms during the 
nineteenth century, which tried to modernize the Empire and prevent its desegregation 
under nationalist pressure. Pluralism is a typical feature of the world of empires, which 
created various legal instruments for coping with the problems of administrating 
different peoples with different identities. Furthermore, it has survived the disjointing of 
the Ottoman Empire and is still constitutive part of the legal systems of Israel, Lebanon, 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and other countries. It is even applied in Iraq for the nation-
building and institution-building processes. The millet represents one of the first 
attempts in history to solve the problems of minority right protection, and is one of the 
most structured devices in terms of rights and autonomy. 
2.1 The Ottoman millet 
From the 15th century, the non-Muslim subjects under Ottoman rule had been subject 
within a double jurisdiction: they were subjects of the Empire, thus had to comply with 
Sultan’s law, called kanun, and they were non-Muslim subjects, thus they were subject 
to their religious law. This means that not only were they let free to practice their own 
cult, but they had to comply with their religion’s law in certain areas of legal 
disciplines. Non-Muslim subjects were organized in partially autonomous bodies to 
which they were submitted to. These bodies “in some ways replaced the direct authority 
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of the Sultan’s government, even though the locus of ultimate authority was never in 
doubt.”48 
By an act of the Sultan, to whom the legislative power appertained, the 
recognized other-than-Muslim groups were: the Greek-Orthodox, the Gregorian-
Armenian, and the Jewish one. These three millets49 dialogued with the Sublime Porte 
through their chiefs, who were, respectively, the two patriarchs and the Gran Rabbi, 
nominated by the members of the millets and then confirmed by the Sultan. These three 
groups were tolerated and guaranteed protection because of their faith, in that they were 
peoples of the book (ehl-i kitab), while they had to accept the domination of the Turks 
and the payment of the cizye,50 the tax that infidels should pay, according to Islamic 
law, to the Muslim government in order to be granted protection inside Muslim 
societies. 
In such an organization the subjects of the Ottoman Empire were identified on 
the basis of their religion and always in virtue of their religious identity they were 
subject to a certain jurisdiction, so that “each group constituted a millet within the 
empire” and “membership in the millet automatically followed lines of religious 
                                                 
48 Roderick H. Davison, Reform in The Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1963), 12. 
49 Millet is the Turkish version of the Arabic word millah, which is to be translated as ethno-religious 
group. Each group constituted a millet. 
50 See Cater V. Findley, The Turks in World History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 65-66; 
and Bat Ye’or, Miriam Kochan, and David Littman, The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam—
From Jihad to Dhimmitude, (Cranbury NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996), 69-98. 
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allegiance.”51 The differentiation of peoples on the basis of religion was the main 
criterion of differentiation of the Ottoman subjects and has survived modernization until 
contemporary times throughout the Middle East, where religion and ethnicity have 
become a sort of indissoluble binomial name for identity classification. It has to be 
considered that “in contrast to the modern idea of territorial nationalism in Europe, 
Middle Eastern peoples have articulated their collective identities and organized their 
political lives around other ideas.”52  
The millet system had radically changed during the 19th century by virtue of the 
reforms known as Tanzimat. It develops through three main steps: two edicts of the 
Sultan, Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane and Hatt-ı Hümayun, which had substantially reformed 
the economic and social constitutions of the Empire, and the Constitution of 1876, 
which had definitely changed the shape of the Porte. The reforms brought into the 
Empire new concepts, which had recently developed in Europe. The main purpose of 
the reforms was to bring equality among Ottoman citizens, irrespectively of their 
religion, by creating a new pole of loyalty that would attract and fuse the different 
identities, so far separated, into a new concept of nationhood, which is known as 
Osmanlılık, “Ottomanism”. This concept was the ideological basis of the reforms, 
“whose essential feature became… the equality of all subjects within the empire, 
                                                 
51 Roderick H. Davison, Reform in The Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, 13. 
52 Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East—A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, (Jefferson 
NC: McFarland, 2002), 9. 
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regardless of origin, religion, or ethnicity. Tanzimat reformers aimed to inculcate an 
Ottoman identity and loyalty within the empire.”53 
The set of reforms introduced by the edicts changed dramatically the shape of 
the Empire. Not only the principle of equality was formally stated, but it was enacted 
through a set of provisions that granted the substantial enjoyment of the collective rights 
of the religious communities by the representation in both local and central 
governments and by the arrangement of a pluralistic model in the judicial system. Such 
an organization constituted a real novelty in the history of law for several reasons. First, 
it developed the principle of legal personality of Islamic tradition by eliminating the 
discriminatory provisions of the shari’a that put the non-Muslim in a subordinate 
condition. Secondly, the reformed millet system resulted in a balanced arrangement 
between collective and individual rights on the one hand, and societal unity on the 
other. The complex system of differentiation on the basis of collective membership is 
balanced by constant points of contact among collectivities in the system. Thus, this 
degree of division, which is necessary for a real protection of groups, does not 
challenge, at least in theory, the supra-group and supra-national loyalty to the State, in 
that it avoids the formation of sub-State systems, which would jeopardize the unity of 
the State. 
The 1876 constitution was the last step of the reform era and constituted a real 
novelty in the attempt to modernize an Empire ruled by an absolute monarch and 
                                                 
53 George Walter Gawrych, The Crescent and the Eagle—Ottoman Rule, Islam, and the Albanians 1874-
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characterized by the institutionalized subordination of non-Muslim subjects according 
to the Islamic tradition. It is worth noting that this attempt was directed to reinvigorate 
the structure of the Empire in order to restrain nationalistic demands, which had then 
become increasingly violent, by granting the largest range of autonomy to minorities 
and by creating an integrated and pluralistic society that should have found in 
Ottomanism a unitary factor of identity. Although much advancement entered into the 
general administration of the Empire, the result of the reforms was the creation of 
“independent national sovereignties, instead of the equality of a brotherhood of different 
races and creeds within one empire.”54 
The Ottoman rule succeeded in shaping a legal institution that could guarantee 
to the non-Muslims a form of autonomy conceived first as subordination functional to 
the dominion of Islam and then as the possibility of national and religious self-
expression in a pluralistic society. The general purpose of the reform was to form a 
society in which everyone could enjoy self-determination according to her/his national-
religious identity in a solidarity inter-connection that should have ultimately granted 
effective loyalty to the State. Substantially, the aim was to create a unitary society in 
which each group could enjoy full rights avoiding assimilation. 
The positive evaluation of the real accomplishments of this system are 
challenged by many authors, who argue that, actually, the millet system was structured 
in such a way that perpetuated the Islamic rule over non-Muslim communities and the 
                                                                                                                                               
1913, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 16. 
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Turkish rule over non-Turkish peoples.55 Surely, the actual implementation of the millet 
was not in line with the principles grounding it, but what is of real interest is that it 
survived the fall of the Empire and is still applied in many Middle-East legal systems. 
This implies that there are contemporary legal systems that opt for regulating plural 
identities through separated and differentiated communities and that somehow arrange 
points of contact among their constitutive groups. These connections constitute a 
common solidarity that serves as the ultimate identity, which finds expression in the 
loyalty toward the State, the precondition of which is the freedom of personal 
realization and communal self-determination. 
The reformed millet system has been a comprehensive model of protection 
under the three aspects of cultural rights: associational rights, political representation, 
and personal autonomy. Contemporary millet systems tend to privilege one aspect at the 
expense of the others, which is why the dissertation analyzes three Middle-East legal 
systems that cover all three aspects: Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq. 
2.2 Contemporary millet systems 
In chapter 2, the dissertation analyzes Lebanon, which is an example of political-
confessional pact that institutionalized not only associational and personal autonomies, 
but also political representation. Indeed, Lebanon is based on a paradigm of political 
                                                                                                                                               
54 Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876, 408. 
55 Benjamin Braude, Foundation Myths of the Millet System, in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis 
(eds.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 1:69-88; 
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confessionalism, whereby power-sharing runs through ethno-religious lines; different 
religious communities are united by a syncretic nationalism that is designed to keep the 
societal basis united.56 
After the civil war during the 1980s, Lebanon emerged in the 1990s as a 
renewed confessional democracy called taifiya, understood as a communalism 
expressed at the social level by people’s religious affiliation, at the institutional level by 
public-recognized religious associations, and at the political-administrative level by 
ethnic power-sharing.57 Some authors claim that, by virtue of ethno-religious power-
sharing, religious conflicts turn into political conflicts and vice versa; thus, real 
democracy cannot be stabilized.58 On the contrary, others assert that the millet system is 
so embedded in the Lebanese political and legal tradition that any constitutional reform 
will inevitably be grounded in the confessional paradigm.59 Besides historical and 
political debates on Lebanon and its ethno-confessional power-sharing, the lesson 
Lebanon teaches is that political representation may serve as a means for managing 
diversity. 
                                                                                                                                               
Wilhelm Baum, Die Türkei und ihre christlichen Minderheiten—Geschichte-Völkermord-Gegenwart, 
(Klagenfurt: Kitab, 2005), 39-73. 
56 See, Pierre Rondot, “Lebanese Institutions and Arab Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History, 
vol. 3, n. 3 (1968), pp. 37-51. 
57 Nawwaf Salam, Options for Lebanon, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 80-2. 
58 See, Volker Perthes, Der Libanon nach dem Biirgerkrieg. Von ta'if zum gesellschaftlichen Konsens?, 
(Baden- Baden: Nomos 1994), 132-5. 
59 Antoine Nasri Messarra, Le Pact Libanais. Le Message d’Universalite et Ses Contraintes, (Beirut: 
Beirut University Press, 1997), 152-5. 
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Chapter 3 analyzes the Israeli legal system, as the only consolidated democracy 
of the Middle-East that has adopted the millet system and has constitutionally 
institutionalized it. Israel’s 1948 Declaration of Independence states that it “will ensure 
complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of 
religion, race or sex;” and that “it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, 
language, education and culture.”60 In order to enact the principle of equality, Israel has 
adapted the millet system by guaranteeing associational autonomy and personal 
autonomy to ethnic and religious communities. 
The millet system has been deployed to guarantee the actual participation of all 
groups to the common good and the protection of non-Jewish minorities.61 Israel 
recognizes fourteen religious groups—including Sephardic Jews, Ashkenazi Jews, 
Sunni Muslims, Druze, Baha’i, and several Christian confessions,—and each one has a 
religious court with exclusive jurisdiction over family law matters such as marriage and 
divorce. However, shari’a courts have jurisdiction also over matters of personal status 
in other aspects of family law covered by Islamic law, such as endowment, alimony, 
and affiliation. Religious judges act as public officials and, as such, they are paid 
salaries by the State. They are nominated by the President of Israel on the basis of lists 
provided by the Nominations Committee within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
                                                 
60 An official translation of the Declaration of Independence is available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishmen
t+of+State+of+Israel.htm 
61 Martin Edelman, Courts, Politics, and Culture in Israel, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
1994), 119-130. 
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which coordinates the activities of religious communities with parliamentary statutes 
and governmental actions.62 
Religious laws applied by religious courts have been constantly harmonized 
with secular standards by statute provisions and by the judicial review of the Supreme 
Court.63 Moreover, religious communities have separate local administrative organs, 
such as the Jewish Councils, the Muslim trusts (wakfs), the Christian-Protestant 
Councils, and the Catholic Prelates. These organs act, locally, within ethnically 
homogeneous communities and protect religious interests of their members. They are 
linked to local civil authorities in order to pursue communal religious interests and are 
coordinated and funded directly by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.64 
In addition, Israel recognizes three main ethno-linguistic groups—the Jewish, 
the Arab, and the Cherkessk,—with separate schools or educational curricula in which 
education is carried out in Hebrew, Arab, and Cherkessk respectively. The only 
minority, in legal terms, would be the Cherkessk, since Hebrew and Arab both have the 
status of official languages throughout Israel’s territory. Political representation is 
guaranteed by the pure proportional electoral system, including parties organized on 
ethnic basis. 
                                                 
62 Henry E. Baker, The Legal System of Israel, (Jerusalem, London & New York: Israel Universities 
Press, 
1968), 208. 
63 Aharon Layish, Women and Islamic Law in A Non-Muslim State: A Study Based on Decisions of the 
Shari’a Courts in Israel, (New York: John Wiley, 1975), 132-133. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 36 -
Finally, chapter 4 analyzes contemporary Iraq. Specifically, the analysis focuses 
on the accommodation of ethnic representation at local levels and on the proposals of 
adapting the millet system to the Iraqi legal system. Iraqi society is extremely 
diversified, although the majority of the population is ethnically Arab, and religiously 
Shiite Muslim. The 2005 constitution recognizes both Arab and Kurdish as official 
languages, and guarantees the use of Turkmen and Assyrian in the provinces in which a 
significant part of the population belongs to these minorities. Moreover, at the 
beginning of November, 2008, the national parliament passed the “Provincial 
Assemblies Law” on the representation of members belonging to ethnic or religious 
minorities at the local legislative and executive bodies. The law establishes one seat for 
Christians in three provinces (Baghdad, Nivehe, and Basra) and one seat each for 
Yazidis, Sabeans, and Shabaks in the other provinces of the State.65 
While the constitution ensures the respect of cultural, religious, social, political, 
and electoral rights, it devolves their implementation to a national law, which has not 
yet been drafted. At this stage, many national and international civil associations, 
including the Minorities Council of Iraq, play an active role in the proposal of a 
coherent law for the protection of minorities. Among the different proposals, Kurds, 
Sunni Arabs, and minorities call for cultural autonomy in order to establish effective 
                                                                                                                                               
64 Daniel J. Elazar, Israel’s Compound Polity, in Ernest Krausz and David Glentz (eds.), Politics and 
Society in Israel, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1985), 61-63. 
65 Leila Fadel, “Iraqi minorities ‘insulted’ by new provincial assemblies law,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3 
November 2008; available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20081103/wl_mcclatchy/3090934 
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protection of their rights.66 After the rejection of their proposal for a consociational 
democracy in favor of the majority principle advocated by the Shiites, minority groups 
have gathered around the idea of cultural autonomy, although the main focus has long 
been the electoral process and political representation.67 
From the analysis of the Iraqi case, two main considerations arise. First, it shows 
that, in a post-conflict environment, it is unlikely that a State accepts all claims of 
minority groups, while, instead, it may be more likely to deal with them after the phase 
of normalization. Secondly, Iraq shows that both territorial and non-territorial models of 
autonomy may coexist in the same system. 
These insights highlight the extreme complexity of contemporary millet systems 
and stress how the employment of this model aim to accommodate complex diversity in 
non-territorial ways, in order to guarantee equality and to manage ethnic and religious 
conflicts. In Europe, there are at least three examples of non-territorial accommodation 
of diversity, which show the changing forms of minority protection toward non-
territorial models. Chapter 5 analyzes selected European legal systems that have 
adopted forms of non-territorial protection, including the Netherlands, Hungary, and 
UK. 
                                                 
66 Faleh A. Jabar, The Constitution of Iraq: Religious and Ethnic Relations, Minority Rights Group 
International, Micro Study Series, December 2005, available at http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=957 
67 See John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, Iraq’s Constitution of 2005, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), 
Constitutional Design for Divided Societies—Integration or Accomodation?, 359-66. 
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In the Netherlands, the societal system is divided in three pillars: Protestant, 
Catholic, and secular. Social actions, such as media activities, labor unions, and the 
educational system are divided through these pillars, which gather members on the basis 
of identity. This system, called verzuiling, represents a “process of articulation of the 
society in groups, which arises due to the tendency of single communities (religious, 
ethnic, and social) to create their own political, cultural, educational or syndical 
organizations patterning separated ‘bodies’ inside a society.”68 
In Hungary, national minorities are protected through a system of representation 
in local and national political bodies. The Hungarian constitution defines minorities on 
a temporal and substantial basis: as for the first aspect, minority groups are required to 
be resident in the Hungarian territory for at least a hundred years, while for the second 
aspect, minority groups have to share features of cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious 
diversity. In this way, minority groups are given voice in the decision-making process, 
by holding particular rights and wielding particular powers in matters of their interest.69 
In the UK, Islamic religious courts recognized by the State can serve as 
arbitrator courts in matters of family. The jurisdiction of these Islamic courts is 
voluntary and the application of Islamic law is subject to the scrutiny of British courts, 
which have to analyze the compatibility of the rulings with British jurisprudence. This 
mechanism guarantees a partial personal autonomy, in that people may chose to file 
                                                 
68 Vittorio Cotesta and Massimo Pendenza, Europei Mediterranei, (Roma: Liguori, 2004), 22. 
69 Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
141-2. 
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petitions with Islamic courts, pursuant to their faith and will, but the application of 
religious law is subject to the judicial review of secular law, which will specifically 
focus on the respect of human rights standards. 
Arguably, these examples show a shift towards methods of minority groups’ 
protection ensuing from a cultural autonomy model, traditionally unknown to the West. 
It has been argued that in Europe those societies that organized themselves in order to 
be divided in autonomous groups have consciously and actively constructed a common 
nationality patterned on pacification and negotiation among them.70 Indeed, it is 
inherently different to build a society that aims to protect minorities, than to concede 
autonomy in order to keep some groups under the yoke of a majority, as the case of the 
Ottoman Empire until the reforms of the 19th century. 
3. THE MILLET SYSTEM AS A MODEL FOR EUROPE 
A legal solution has to be found in order to balance group protection and social 
cohesion. Legally, States face two main challenges. The first lies in finding a 
mechanism that can guarantee social cohesion among divided groups. If national 
cohesion could be assured by negotiation, then the social link among groups has to be 
institutionalized by letting groups pursue their interests. Comparatively, the Ottoman 
experience shows that differentiated groups can live together in autonomous 
organizations, while the Western experience shows that guaranteeing autonomy through 
                                                 
70 Nico Randeraad, Het geplooide land, in J.C.H. Blom and Jaap Talsma (eds.), De verzuiling voorbij—
Godsdienst, stand en natie in de lange negentiende eeuw, (Amsterdam: Spinhuis, 2000), 135-150. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 40 -
mechanisms of ‘voice’ may assure social cohesion. Again, a solution was found in the 
reform era of the Ottoman Empire by guaranteeing political representation in 
administrative and judicial bodies. The second challenge is properly connected to the 
rule of law. In this respect, States have to guarantee human rights standards as well as 
minority rights. This implies, specifically in the case of protection of individual 
autonomy, that liberal democracies have to reconcile the rule of law with traditional and 
religious laws. States need to balance human rights standards and minority group rights, 
and this entails a great challenge to the rule of law vis-à-vis competing jurisdictions that 
are potentially illiberal. 
An adapted version of the millet system guarantees both effective protection of 
cultural minorities and social cohesion. The three aspects of the millet system—
associational autonomy, political representation, and personal autonomy—grant both 
full self-determination of groups and social cohesion through political participation and 
social interaction. 
Historical studies of the millet system have already been done, as have political 
and legal studies on the theoretical aspect of cultural autonomy and legal pluralism. 
Further focus on contemporary millet systems is needed, in order to analyze whether 
cultural autonomy is an effective means of protection of minorities, and, specifically, 
whether models that have been developed for religious minorities can be adapted to 
other cultural and ethnic minorities (chapters 2, 3, and 4). Given the shift of some 
European countries toward non-territorial models of autonomy (chapter 5), this study 
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argues (chapter 6) that an adaptation of the millet system for liberal democracies 
enables effective protection of cultural minorities in terms of associational autonomy, 
political representation, and personal autonomy. 
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This chapter examines the Lebanese millet71 in terms of personal autonomy, 
associational rights, and political representation. I argue that the millet arrangements in 
Lebanon created a context of conflict growth because of the lack of social connection 
among the social groups and because of its rigidity in the representation system. 
Moreover, I show that the millet system still has a potential with respect to minority 
protection, but not with respect to multinational polities. 
After a brief overview of the ethno-religious composition of Lebanon, this 
chapter analyzes those historical stages that led to the adoption of the millet 
arrangements.72 
1. The religious composition of the Lebanese society 
Lebanese society is constituted by a large variety of religions, confessions, and 
ethnicities that constitute separate sub-social groups. This characteristic has radicalized 
through history, legal provisions, and international arrangements, so far that 
                                                 
71 The institution “millet”, of Ottoman origin, has been legally and historically analyzed in the first 
chapter. To recall its definition, the millet system is a form of cultural autonomy whereby a State 
concedes forms of self-government to groups as for personal status and cultural rights, and at the same 
times it guarantees their political representation. 
72 Indeed, “by dividing history into transformational sequences, a researcher can understand why groups 
in power prefer and use certain socio-legal forms and institutions and neglect others.” Jane F. Collier and 
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“divisiveness has come to define that which is Lebanon.”73 Seventeen religious groups 
are officially recognized. The main division among citizens is determined by religion 
that defines three groups: Christians, Muslims, and Jews. These three groups are 
divided in sub-groups that are called sects. 
Christians include Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants. Catholics are divided 
into Maronites, Romans, Armenians, Syriacs, Chaldeans, and Latins. Orthodox include 
Greeks, Armenians, Syriacs, and Nestorians. Protestants, Arab or Armenian, are not 
recognized as separate sects though they keep different churches and institutions.74 
Muslims include Sunnis, Shi’is, Druzes, Alawites, and Ismaelites. Jews are 
recognized as one single community.75 All sects but the Nestorians are independent 
from a legal point of view, with judicial bodies or religious authorities that manage the 
affairs pertaining to personal status.76 A different situation exists for Jews, who are 
officially recognized as a group and thus given autonomy for personal matters, but are 
                                                                                                                                               
June Starr (eds.), History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology, (Ithaca 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 10. 
73 Thomas Collelo and Harvey Henry Smith (eds.), Lebanon a Country Study, (Washington DC: Federal 
Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1989), 76. 
74 Christian sects are not as closed as one may infer. Several inter-religious marriages are celebrated while 
children keep the faith of the father. Obviously, this does not exclude inter-sectarian conflict, which adds 
up to the general inter-religious conflict. 
75 David Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook, (Phoenix: Oryx Press, 
1998), 249-50. 
76 Nestorians do not have an independent judicial body given their small representation. 
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not recognized as a constituent group. Consequently, they are denied any rights in 
political representation.77 
The predominant sub-group among the Christians is the Maronite, while the 
predominant sub-group among the Muslims is the Sunni. Certain sub-groups are either 
discriminated against, for historical and religious reasons, or isolated for their under-
representation. This is the case of Isamilites and Alawites, who are considered heretic 
sects within Islam; similarly, Nestorians and Protestants are a small proportion of the 
population, and often isolated from other sub-groups.78 These divisions create situations 
of inter-group conflict, such as between Sunnis and Shi’is, as well as inter-faith 
cooperation, such as between Christians and Druses. As Collelo and Smith emphasize, 
“sects should not be viewed as monolithic blocs, however, since strife within 
confessional groups is as common as conflict with other sects. Even so, the paramount 
schismatic tendency in modern Lebanon is that between Christian and Muslim.”79 The 
following section examines the constitutional historical process that determined the 
Lebanese polity. 
                                                 
77 After the creation of the State of Israel, the great part of Lebanese Jews fled from persecution and 
denial of rights, as their brethrens from other Arab or Islamic countries. Lebanese Jews fled to Israel, 
Italy, Brazil, and USA. Those who remained face conflict and discrimination from both Christian and 
Muslim sides, while they strive for identity, defining themselves as Arabs of Jewish faith and inside the 
Jewish world distinguishing themselves as Levantines. See, Kirsten E. Schulze, The Jews of Lebanon: 
Between Coexistence and Conflict, (Brighton: Sussex Academy Press, 2001). 
78 See, Joseph Chamie, “Religious Groups in Lebanon: A Descriptive Investigation,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 11, n. 2, (April, 1980), pp. 175-187. 
79 Thomas Collelo and Harvey Henry Smith (eds.), Lebanon a Country Study, 76. 
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2. Historical insights 
2.1 The Late Ottoman Era 
When Lebanon fell under the control of the Sultan, the Ottomans introduced the millet 
system, and recognized autonomy to various Christian groups, the Jewish group, and 
the Muslim group. Later in the 19th century, the Porte introduced several changes and 
reforms80 that aimed to stabilize ethno-religious relations in power politics, which 
nevertheless did not prevent inter-religious rivalries.81 
These reforms re-settled the lines of allegiance and the forms of access to power 
and resources. “The system which followed… is referred to as the ‘communal order’, 
where communal membership (rather than kinship and status) became the basis of 
political cohesiveness.”82 Moreover, this new political order was assured by 
                                                 
80 See Chapter 1, the section “Historical Millet.” 
81 It has been argued that Ottoman rulers did not understand the social structure of Lebanon, which was 
based, according to them, on a feudal system of allegiances and only secondary on a religious system of 
affiliation. In 19th century’s Lebanon, “feudal political allegiance was not based on religious or ethnic 
considerations, nor were allegiances, and/or ethno-religious identifications important factors in shaping 
the Politics of the Princedom before the end of the Eighteenth century. While secularism was not 
consciously held as a social value, in practice feudal institutions were based on a secular spirit… Political 
loyalty cut across sectarian lines, and man’s allegiance was first to his feudatory […] whether they were 
of his religious affiliation or not… The social make-up of a feudatory house was usually characterized by 
several cohesive elements: descent from one male ancestor, same religious affiliation, same general social 
class, and, finally, the historical bond of clan unity in opposition to others groupings of political 
opponents.” See, Enver M. Koury, The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System, (Beirut: 
Catholic Press, 1972), 19-20. In this sense, the Lebanese feudal case constitutes an unicum in history, 
since it is different from the European feudal system, in which religion played almost no role given the 
fact that homogenous groups lived together, and it is different from other Eastern feudal systems, in that 
Christians, though autonomous, were not full citizens. See, Iliay F. Harik, “The Iqta’ System in Lebanon: 
Comparative Political View,” Middle East Journal, vol. 19, n. 4, (autumn 1965), pp. 405-421. Moreover, 
Feudal or tribal allegiances are relevant in Lebanese contemporary history as well, where the recourse to 
power is not only directed through communal membership, but also re-allocated within the communities 
through an ancient tribal order. 
82 Enver M. Koury, The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System, 25. 
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international intervention, with France siding the Christians and Great Britain siding the 
Druze, and Austria and Prussia defending their interests in the region.83 The new system 
was called mutassarifiya and was based on autonomous governorship of local councils 
composed of representatives of confessional groups. Moreover, it consisted of two main 
features: a Christian president and a mixed government.84 
Subsequently, on 6 September 1896, the Organic Statute, a document signed by 
the Sublime Porte and European Powers (France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and 
Prussia), further specified the principle of power-sharing. These arrangements were 
valid until the fall of The Ottoman Empire.85 The Statute determined that the President 
should be a Christian, and that the Council would be composed of four Maronites, three 
Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni, one Shi’i. Moreover, the 
Lebanese territory was divided into seven districts, three of them with Christian 
governors, and the other with a Druze governor, a Greek-Orthodox, a Greek-Catholic, 
and a Muslim one respectively.86 At this time, the institutionalization of power-sharing 
was established by an international agreement, causing shift in allegiance from tribal 
authority to ethno-religious forms of loyalty. 
                                                 
83 Caesar E. Farah, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1930-1961, (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2000) 740-4. The Concert of Europe finally institutionalized the new political balance in the 
Protocol signed on 9 June 1861. 
84 Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 8. 
85 See, Joseph Abu Nohra, L’Evolution du Système Politique Libanais dans le Context des Conflicts 
Régionaux et Laocaux (1840-1864), in Dana Haffar Mills and Nadim Shehadi (eds.), Lebanon a History 
of Conflict and Consensus, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), 41-4. 
86 Enver M. Koury, The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System, 55-56. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 48 -
2.2 The French Mandate 
By the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and its territories 
were divided into different areas under Western rule. France was given the Mandate to 
Syria and Lebanon.87 The French tried to shape Lebanese institutions on the model of a 
European State.88 This was an attempt to Europeanize Lebanon by introducing a 
constitution in 1926 and a civil family law code. 
With regard to the constitution, adopted in 1926, it was designed to balance the 
principle of confessional communitarianism with the principle of individualism.89 In 
other words, “it was hoped that Lebanese society could move from Confessional 
                                                 
87 France retained power on Syria and Lebanon in virtue of a mandate by the League of Nations, 
following the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between Great Britain and France that partitioned Middle 
East into areas of influence. Specifically, the Mandate was conferred after the San Remo Conference, and 
later formalized in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. See, Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: A 
Political History Since the First World War, (London: University of California Press, 2005), 35-44. See 
also Christopher M. Andrew, Alexander Sydney Kanya-Forstner, The Climax of French Imperial 
Expansion 1914-1924, (London: Stanford University Press, 1988), 83-236. 
88 For a comprehensive work on the years of the Mandate see, Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syrian and 
Lebanon under the French Mandate, (London: University of Oxford Press, 1958). See also, Philip S. 
Khoury, “Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists during the French Mandate”, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 13, n. 4 (1981), pp. 441-69. Some authors, such as Longrigg (Stephen Hemsley 
Longrigg, Syrian and Lebanon under the French Mandate), challenge the imperialist claim, by arguing 
that French policies were based on a humanitarian agenda. When France decided to include within the 
borders of Lebanon southern territories mainly inhabited by Muslim, the precarious ethno-religious 
equilibrium was altered, fomenting both Arab nationalism and Armenian concerns after the genocide. 
See, Enver M. Koury, The Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System, 57. 
89 On the one hand, the principle of confessional communitarianism was concretized in the equal 
representation of confessional groups both in political organs and in public employment, as stated in 
article 95. On the other, the principle of individualism was enshrined in article 7 that guaranteed equality 
before the law. Moreover, the principle of equal representation clashes with the principle of meritocracy 
stated by art. 12. The system thus created a social and political confusion, which supported “a clientele 
system of relationships, where a community seeks its voice through their local family clan or head of 
their particular religious body.” David D. Grafton, The Christians of Lebanon—Political Rights in Islamic 
Law, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2003), 101. About Ottoman and later Arab clientele system, 
called intisab, see Haim Gerber, State, Society and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative 
Perspective, (Albany: SUNY, 1994), 145-147. 
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Republicanism to a state where political parties represented the individual.”90 The 
problem of representation of religious groups was not directly solved by the 
constitution; however, it was solved by an agreement that became a constitutional 
convention, whereby 
sectarian tensions were reduced by providing that for each parliamentary 
seat competition would be intra- and not inter-confessional. The 
distribution of parliamentary seats, and for administrative posts, was to 
be in a ration of six (Christians) to five (Muslims). The actual 
distribution was made final after the census of 1932.91 
With regard to family law, the French first reorganized the family court system, and 
then tried to introduce civil marriage through a series of provisions that opposed the 
autonomous jurisdiction of religious courts. 
General civil courts were established, composed of French and Lebanese 
officials. These courts had jurisdiction over local religious courts in matters of family 
law and could overrule their decisions. Consequently, French administration tried to 
reduce the jurisdiction of religious courts, causing a revolt among religious leaders. In 
order to sedate the revolts, the French had to recognize the full jurisdiction of religious 
courts on family law matters, and even on apostasy.92 
                                                 
90 David D. Grafton, The Christians of Lebanon—Political Rights in Islamic Law, 100. 
91 David C. Gordon, Lebanon: a Nation in Jeopardy, (Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm, 1983), 20. On the 
census of 1932, the actual only census ever done in Lebanon, see Rania Maktabi, “The Lebanese Census 
of 1932 Revisited: Who Are the Lebanese?” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 26, n. 2, 
(November, 1999), 219-241. The main problem of the census is that no party has interest in knowing the 
actual proportion of each sub-group in the population since everyone fears disruptive claims in the 
political representation system. 
92 David C. Gordon, Lebanon: a Nation in Jeopardy, 99. The French had to recognize Muslim jurisdiction 
on apostasy, which led to the extension of ulemas’ power over criminal law matters related to religious 
offenses. 
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Moreover, statutes on civil marriage were introduced, in the pursuit of the 
general goal of secularization of Lebanon,93 which had to be withdrawn after a few 
weeks from the promulgation, in order to placate the enraged religious leaders. In 1930, 
the jurisdiction of Christians and Muslim courts was recognized, by arrêté n. 6, which 
eventually extended the same powers to Jewish courts.94 
2.3 The National Pact of 1943 
The National Pact is the basic constitutional act, autonomously implemented by those 
Lebanese who shaped the contemporary features of the Lebanese institutional order. At 
the beginnings of 1940s, Lebanon was conceded independence by the French, and 
different forces and factions came to an agreement for peaceful coexistence through a 
clear definition of institutional features of the State.95 
                                                 
93 In 1923, arrêté n. 261 introduced civil marriages, giving jurisdiction over family law matters directly to 
the general courts. (The laws and statutes during the French Mandate were called arrêté). 
94 David D. Grafton, The Christians of Lebanon—Political Rights in Islamic Law, 100. The same attempt 
to uproot confessional autonomy and enlarge civil jurisdiction over personal status was led in the late 
1930s by another series of statutes. Again, the revolts and the protests of both religious leaders and people 
made it clear that the effort to make of Lebanon a secular nation-State dramatically failed. 
95 The three main forces that participated in the draft of the document were: Lebanists, Arabists, and 
Rationalists. See, Kais Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate, (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2003), 207-210. Lebanists, headed by Christian groups, advocated for independence of 
Lebanon from other Arab countries; Arabists, headed by Sunni Muslims, advocated for a more national 
and Islamic identity of the State, while rationalists, a mixed group composed of Christians, Muslims, and 
Druze, stood in the middle advocating for complete Lebanese independence, free of both imperialist and 
theocratic influences. The rationalist force eventually prevailed. The group that participated to a lesser 
extent to the negotiations and to the draft of the document was the Armenian group. Though communist 
and Catholic Armenians directly and actively engaged in the negotiations, Orthodox Armenians as well as 
the recent Armenian communities that settled in Lebanon after the genocide tended to “pursue intra-
Armenian political confrontations” that “could hardly be stretched to the point of contributing to 
challenge the pillars of a political order that ultimately benefited the community. This perceived 
predominance of Armenian concerns resulted in recurrent accusations of non-commitment, of insincerity, 
if not of disloyalty, from sectors of the Lebanese and Syrian political spectrum.” Nicola Migliorino, (Re-
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In 1943, Christians, Muslims, and Druze came to an agreement called al-mithaq 
al-watani, whereby the main constitutional principles of the State were fixed. The 
document was not included in the constitution; however, its importance lies on the 
consideration of this agreement as a “constitutional shroud” both for the institutional 
arrangement and the social balances between the communities. 
With respect to external relations, the main point of conflict between Christians 
and Muslims concerned the relations to the West and to the other Arab countries 
respectively.96 The pact stated that Lebanese people identify with Arab identity and 
considered Lebanon as a bridge between Arab and Western countries.97 This pact was 
the result of negotiations between the main forces of Lebanon and was defined “the 
legacy of the cultural traditions of the peoples of the Book which are focused on 
covenants and pacts.”98 
With respect to internal relations, the parties concluded two agreements on 
institutional arrangements. The first one established that the Presidency of the State 
would be held by a Christian-Maronite, the Premiership by a Sunni Muslim, and the 
                                                                                                                                               
)Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria: Ethno-Cultural Diversity and the State in the aftermath of 
a Refugee Crisis, (Oxford: Bergahn, 2008), 93. 
96 On the one hand, Christians were backed by Western powers and thus Muslims feared of foreign 
imperialist intervention; on the other hand, Muslims were backed by other Arab countries—particularly 
those countries pursuing pan-Arabist geo-political goals—and thus Christians feared of anti-Christian 
influence in Lebanese politics. 
97 Muslims consequently abandoned their aims of re-unification with Syria. Pierre Rondot, “Lebanese 
Institutions and Arab Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 3, n. 3, The Middle East, 
(July, 1968), pp. 37- 51 at 47-50. 
98 Hassan Saab, The Rationalist School in Lebanese Politics, in Leonard Binder, Politics in Lebanon, 1 
(New York: Wiley, 1966), 275. Muslims accepted this situation on the basis of legal scholars’ 
interpretations of shari’a. 
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Chamber of Deputies by a Shi’i Muslim. The second one established that the electoral 
system would be proportional, but maintaining a Christian majority of six to five 
Muslims.99 
Essentially, the Pact preserved the balance between the communities in the 
parliamentary representation that was introduced during the French mandate and 
created a formal tradition whereby each confession was represented by 
holding a specific governmental post and therefore no community was 
shut out of the formal power structure. This system has become known 
as political confessionalism. In addition… various cabinet posts and top 
civil positions were designed to specific confessions.100 
Notwithstanding the will of the constituent peoples of Lebanon to create a system of 
balances and a peaceful political arena, a decade after the signing of the National Pact, 
another civil war broke out. Arguably, both internal old cleavages among the several 
groups and foreign interventions—following the logic of the Cold War—pushed 
different interests to a conflict stage.101 After national reconciliation, Lebanon went 
through a sort of golden period, signed by social prosperity, economic growth, and 
                                                 
99 The Pact challenged directly Islamic law, in that it created a state in which the power was held by a 
Christian majority—that was estimated on the basis of the 1932 census—ruling over a Muslim minority. 
This case was historically unknown and thus legally unregulated. Lebanese Sunni and Shi’i legal scholars 
adjusted the vacuum iuris through interpretations of Islamic law, whereby the possibility of creating an 
Islamic State was out of question, thus Muslims should honor the Lebanese nation as long as it would 
permit Muslims to abide by Islamic principles and laws. Ibid., 108-112. However, the idea of creating an 
Islamic state never vanished, and returned in the 1960s with the Islamist claims of the al-jamiya al-
islamiya group, and in the 1980s with the political activities of the Shi’i group Hezbollah. See, Fuad I. 
Khoury, Secularization and Ulama Networks Among Sunni and Shi’a Religions Officials, in Halim 
Barakat (ed.), Toward a Viable Lebanon, (London: Croom Helm, 1988). 
100 David D. Grafton, The Christians of Lebanon—Political Rights in Islamic Law, 107. To give an 
example of other important official posts, according to the Pact the Minister of Defense was to be Druze 
to balance the power of Maronite representative in head of the Army. 
101 See, Kamal Suleiman Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, (Beirut: Caravan, 1976). 
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tourist development.102 In the 1980s, Lebanon relapsed in the tragedy of civil conflict 
due to Palestinian presence in the South and, later, to foreign intervention and 
occupation by Syria and Israel.103 
2.4 Taif Agreements 
A new Pact was proposed to put an end to the conflict, which radically changed the 
principle of representation. According to the proposal, issued by the Sunnis, the 
principle of ethnic division of major official posts was to be maintained, but the 
distribution of parliamentary seats would be equal between Christians and Muslims. 
Moreover, it called for a total de-confessionalization of all other official posts. This 
proposal is known as the Constitutional Document,104 which actually envisaged little 
reform, and stressed the importance of equal representation. 
The reforms introduced by the Taif agreement set a new order without 
repudiating constitutional traditions. The three major official posts were guaranteed to 
Christians, Sunnis, and Shi’is, as they had always been. Moreover, confessional groups 
were guaranteed autonomy in personal status matters. Besides, the ethno-religious 
                                                 
102 It is in this period that Lebanon became known as Switzerland of the Middle East, and Beirut as Paris 
of the East. 
103 Again, historical debate on the causes of the civil war is large and not free from political stances. Thus, 
it is preferable not to refer to the debate on the grounds of the war. First of all, it is not of direct interest to 
the object of this study; secondly, it is not my aim to take political stance on Lebanese politics and 
Lebanese history in particular, nor on Middle Eastern politics in general. 
104 The representatives of the different parties retrieved the principles of the constitutional document 
during the negotiations that brought to the Taif Agreement. After only one month of negotiations in Saudi 
Arabia, the conflicting parties achieved an agreement on the future of Lebanon. The stabilization would 
be guaranteed by Syrian and Israeli withdrawal from the territory, while the internal balance would be 
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representation was established to be equal in the parliament. Finally, the agreement 
introduced the principle of administrative decentralization, which aimed to improve the 
management of resources and the inter-communal life of citizens.105 
The Agreement laid down the final institutional structure of Lebanon and the 
last reforms to the Lebanese contemporary millet system. However, given the last 
political turmoil from Cedar Revolution of 2005, it is highly probable that new reforms 
will be introduced and new proposals will be soon advanced, which will inevitably 
change Lebanese polity. The following sections analyze the Lebanese millet system in 
terms of personal autonomy, associational rights, and communal representation, in light 
of the constitutional history that has been now described. 
3. PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
Personal autonomy defines a sub-system of law governing personal status, which is 
systemically connected to the general legal system of a State, but naturally different 
from it in terms of sources, application, and even principles.106 In millet legal systems, 
States provide for autonomous areas of law in which personal status matters, such as 
marriage, divorce, alimony and palimony, and custody, are regulated by a corpus iuris 
that is substantially different from the one governing the other branches of law. 
                                                                                                                                               
guaranteed by different reforms of the institutional bodies. See, Kamal Suleiman Salibi, Crossroads to 
Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, 163-164. 
105 Suleiman Tukieddine, An Independent Judiciary for a Better Justice, in Nawaf Salam (ed.) Options for 
Lebanon, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 26-37. 
106 For a larger discussion on autonomy and personal autonomy see chapter I. 
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This sub-system is characterized by a difference in the nature of the applicable 
law, in that State law generates from a legislative process, while autonomous family law 
generates from traditional law or religious law. In the former, the legal authority is not 
the State, rather a council of elders, who interpret traditions; in the latter, legal authority 
is represented by religious legal experts who interpret sacred law. In terms of sources, 
traditional and religious laws differ from State law, in that they stem from cultural 
heritage and religious books, and not from acts adopted by established procedures. 
Although each law is expression of a certain culture and although some legal systems 
may include religious norms and may be religiously or traditionally inspired, State law 
still differs for the very fact that the State is the ultimate authority of the legal system; 
whereas, traditional and religious legal orders identify the ultimate authority in a 
transcendent entity, whose will is interpreted by a person or a group of persons that are 
considered repositories of wisdom.107 
Again, this sub-system is characterized by the degree of autonomy conceded by 
the general legal system. Mainly, in two ways the can be connected: one legislative and 
one judicial. Legislatively, the parliament may sanction certain regulations and 
                                                 
107 Consequently, the difference is also in principle, in that usually States do not completely incorporate in 
the legislative process the cultural logic of a certain tradition or a certain religion. The question involves 
aspects of legal anthropology and legal theory. See, for instance, Rodolfo Sacco, Diritto Africano-
Trattato di Diritto Comparato, (Torino: UTET, 1995); Norbert Rouland, Legal Anthropology, (Standford: 
Standford University Press, 1994), 48-55. From a sociological-legal point of view, Gurvitch gives a 
hierarchical definition of these legal systems: State law is the supreme legal order, in which social laws 
developed by groups may find place, and finally inter-personal law established by contracts. Gurvitch 
further develops his theory of legal sociology by classifying different polities according to the kind of law 
they adopt, see Georges Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, (London: Routledge, 1973), 173-174, 203-211, and 
236-238. 
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disapprove others; while judicially, the courts may scrutinize the decisions of traditional 
or religious authorities. 
In Lebanon, personal autonomy is regulated by largely autonomous legal sub-
systems, which have a judicial connection to the general legal system that at any rate is 
quiescent in that the connection procedure has never been triggered. 
3.1 The sub-system of status personae 
Both constitutional law and statutory law regulate the legal sub-system concerning the 
status personae. Since the first Lebanese constitution approved in 1926, personal 
autonomy was introduced as a principle of the Lebanese legal system, and it has never 
been object of constitutional reform. Statutory law recognizes religious laws in 
application of the constitutional principle of personal autonomy. The constitutional 
provisions will be first analyzed and then the statutory enactments. 
3.1.1 The Constitution 
The 1926 constitution frames the issue of religion under a section dedicated to the rights 
and duties of the citizen. Specifically, art. 9 is dedicated to the freedom of conscience, 
first elaborated as freedom of religion, then as personal autonomy. 
Art. 9 states that “there shall be absolute freedom of conscience,”108 then it 
directly refers to God, committing the State to protect religion as a founding value of 
                                                 
108 The English version of the Lebanese constitution is accessible at 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/le00000_.html, accessed in March 4th, 2010. The same source was 
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Lebanese society and legal principles. It states that “in rendering homage to the Most 
High [the State] shall respect all religions and creeds.” By the wording of the provision, 
which refrains from using a specific expression in referring to God, the State takes both 
a sacred and an official commitment. Firstly, it takes a sacred commitment, in that it 
commits to respect all religions and creeds in front of God, by using a neutral 
expression such as “the Most High” able to include all faiths. Indeed, 
The State… officially believes in the existence of God and it undertakes 
in its acts to realize the general commandments, common to the three 
great monotheistic religions, while abiding by an absolute neutrality with 
regard to confessions… without ever preferring one of them to detriment 
of the others.109 
Secondly, it takes and official commitment to respect freedom of religion as a particular 
aspect of freedom of conscience. The article specifically refers to freedom of religion as 
part of freedom of conscience, giving then a particularly privileged understanding of 
this principle in light of the Lebanese constitutional arrangements. The article then 
explicates the scope of protection: individual freedom and collective freedom. 
As for individual freedom, art. 9 establishes that the State “guarantees, under its 
protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not 
disturbed.” The expression “religious rites” is remarkable, because the article drafts a 
plain protection of religion at different levels. First of all, the State protects religions 
and creeds, equally honoring all of them, and then it commits to protect the exercise of 
                                                                                                                                               
used for the following quotations of the constitution. A printed version of the constitution was published 
in Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 12, n. 2 (1997), pp. 224-261. 
109 Edmond Rabbath, La Constitution Libanaise—Origines, Textes et Commentaires, (Beirut: Publications 
de l’Université Libanaise, 1982), 96. 
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religious rights by carrying out religious rites. This aspect pertains to the individual 
domain, considered as the possibility by individuals to live their lives pursuant to 
religious rites and traditions. 
As for collective freedom, art. 9 establishes that the State “also guarantees that 
the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect 
they belong, is respected.” On the one hand, the article designs the constitutional basis 
for the foundation of a legal sub-system concerning personal status—i.e., the possibility 
of being subject to the legal system of one’s religion. On the other hand, the article 
establishes that the State has to take account of religious groups’ interests with respect 
to both collective and individual rights. From a collective point of view, it means that 
the State will protect group interests in societal and political life. From an individual 
point of view, it means that the State protects even those individual rights that one can 
enjoy in virtue of her/his belonging to a specific group. 
The drafters of the constitution aimed to 
constitutionalize the customary law that governs Lebanese communities, 
whose existence, structure, and collective life result from a peculiar 
morphology, denominated in sociological terms communitarian regime 
and, in political terminology, confessionalism.110 
Ultimately, article 9 sets general norms for the protection of religious freedoms that 
include a wide range of rights, both individual and collective, guaranteeing direct 
commitment of the State to its sacred task to protect religion as a collective 
                                                 
110 Ibid. 
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phenomenon and religious groups interests. However, the article is programmatic in its 
structure, since it does not enucleate groups, nor does it set principles for the enactment 
of personal autonomy. It is thus necessary to look at the application of the principle of 
personal autonomy in order to understand the development of the legal sub-system. 
3.1.2 The statutory enactment 
Art. 9 was enacted by Decree n. 60/L.R. promulgated in 13 March 1936. The decree 
restated the principle of personal autonomy pursuant to each sub-group religious legal 
tradition, as well as the importance of associational rights of religious groups. 
Moreover, the decree called for the development of a civil law system of family 
law. This legal sub-system, which actually never came into existence, would have been 
applied to those people who did not want to be subject to religious law or who could not 
get married because of a religious prohibition. This legal sub-system would have been 
applied to a hypothetical secular group within Lebanese society. 
Furthermore, articles 5 and 6 of the decree established a procedure of approval 
of religious legal sub-systems. Hence, by retaining the right of endorsement, the 
government would scrutinize the compatibility of the single legal sub-systems with 
constitutional norms and principles.111 However, because of reluctance and opposition 
                                                 
111 Insofar, the procedure was designed to reduce possible negative effects resulting from the application 
of religious law, and for the same reason, the High Commissioner advocated for the adoption of a secular 
family law code. However, the statute met the harsh opposition of the Muslim community, and therefore 
the Islamic millet was excluded by the procedure of endorsement. After a series of clashes and 
negotiations, Decree n. 53/L.R. adopted in March 30th, 1939 officially exempted the Muslim millet from 
the burdensome procedure. 
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by the communities to abide by the procedure, the State opted for direct recognition of 
the legal sub-systems. 
Decree 146/L.R., adopted on 18 November 1938, first recognized the three 
religious groups: Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Annex 1 of the Decree enumerates 
several confessions as religious sub-groups enjoying legal autonomy.112 According to 
this decree, “each community is recognized the moral and legal personality, on 
condition that their organization, their jurisdictions, and their legislation is object of a 
legislative act.”113 
It took more than twenty years to set up the single legal sub-systems and to 
regulate them as part of the Lebanese system,114 while religious authorities continued 
administrating family law matters within their communities.115 
                                                 
112 Thus, within the Muslim group, five sub-groups were recognized, which were called ‘communities’: 
Sunnis, Shi’is, Druses, Alawites, and Ismailites. Christians were divided in ten Patriarcats, the Maronite, 
the Roman, the Armenian Catholic, the Syriac, the Chaldean, the Greek, Armenian Orthodox, the Syriac 
Orthodox, and the Nestorian; while the Latin Catolic group was named “Latin Church”. The Jewish 
community was divided into three Synagogues: the Alep, the Damas, and the Beirut. 
113 Edmond Rabbath, La Constitution Libanaise—Origines, Textes et Commentaires, 101. 
114 Only after Lebanon’s independence, Jews and Christians submitted their codes, and they were 
guaranteed autonomy by the endorsement law of April 2nd, 1951. Muslims submitted their codes only 
after the first endorsement law, and they were guaranteed autonomy by legislative decree n. 18 adopted in 
January 13th, 1955. As it will be analyzed the vicissitudes of the Muslim community are quite 
complicated since their legislation underwent an internal reform in 1967 and, in the same year, the State 
recognized a separate statute of autonomy to the Shi’i community. The Druze community had to fight to 
achieve independence as a separate community from Muslims, since they are considered a heretic sect, 
and therefore they could not find protection under the Muslim millet. Only in 1962, the Druze community 
becomes independent by two state laws adopted in July 13th. 
115 The initial reluctance to draft codes and to follow the procedure was arguably due to the reasonable 
concern that State authorities would have interfered with the internal logics, traditions and ultimately with 
the internal interests of the groups. Mainly, the staple matter of concern was the intent by the French 
administration to render Lebanon a Western-like society with secular law dominating the system. This 
would have dramatically diminished religious authorities powers in inter-communitarian affairs as well as 
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The recognition of the legal sub-systems has increased the complexity of the 
legal frame-work, the basis of which is constituted by the recuperated Ottoman civil 
family law, largely based on shari’a, as general Lebanese law on family matters. Art. 3 
of Legislative Decree n. 242, adopted in 4 November 1942 revived the forgotten and 
never adopted Ottoman Family Law of 1917, which did not “break free of the 
conceptual rules of Islamic family law.”116 This law is Islamic law, though partially 
modified, enacted by the State, to be applied to the Muslim sub-group as well as to the 
cases that do not fall under a legal sub-system for lack of jurisdiction. 
The following sections analyze how the single sub-systems were approved and 
their relations with the general system. 
3.2 Problems and conflicts 
The problematic aspects of the millet arrangements are fundamentally of two: conflicts 
between the sub-systems and the general legal system, and problems among the sub-
systems due to the enactment of religious norms. 
With regard to conflicts between State law and sub-groups laws, considerable 
problems originate from State’s role and degree of intervention, whereby differences 
emerge between Christian and Jewish legal systems on the one side, and Muslim legal 
systems on the other. 
                                                                                                                                               
their fundamental importance in intra-communitarian affairs and, ultimately, in the general political life 
of Lebanon. 
116 June Starr, Islam and the Struggle over State Law in Turkey, in Daisy Hilse Dwyer (ed.), Law and 
Islam in the Middle East, (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1990), 79. 
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“For Christians as well as for Jews, family law is essentially the outgrowth of 
religious doctrines.”117 Moreover, State’s intervention is totally inexistent with respect 
to the formation of religious courts, their functioning, and their application of the law, 
since “Christian and Jewish religious courts are formed and dissolved by religious 
authorities, while the expenses incurred are met by the funds… held in common by each 
religious sect.”118 The abstention of the State has created independent and extraneous 
jurisdictions, whereby “family law matters have been appealed to religious courts 
outside the country,”119 bypassing completely the State legal and jurisdictional system. 
The situation is essentially different for Muslim law which is “religious law 
legislated by the State,” in virtue of the adoption of the Family Code of 1942, largely 
based on the shari’a. Therefore, the parliament has the authority to legislate on family 
law matters, by changing, modifying, or enacting directly Muslim law, in that it is the 
law of the State. Moreover, “Moslem religious courts are established and dissolved by 
the Parliament, and as such, they are part of the political system of the State.”120 This 
odd situation created by the double nature of the law, secular and religious at the same 
time, was typical in the Ottoman Empire, where the ruler—i.e., the Sultan—was the 
leader of the Muslims and the head of the State, wielding both political and religious 
powers. This legal characteristic of religious family law sub-systems enacted by the 
                                                 
117 George M. Dib, Law and Population in Lebanon, 13. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. Similarly, the budget for the judicial system expanses, including judges’ income is part of the 
State’s budget. 
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State is typical of other Muslim States, where Islam is the official religion of the State 
or where the majority of the population is Muslim. In such cases, the State “is able to 
introduce progressive changes into [its] system of family law, as for example the 
abolition of polygamy and the raising of minimum marriage age.”121 However, Lebanon 
is not an Islamic State and no authority has been able to introduce any major change. 
Those modifications that were accepted were already set by the Ottoman code 
concerning mainly divorce, which brings us to the next aspect of the question. 
With regard to conflicts among sub-groups, the main problematic matters are 
two: inter-religious marriages and children born out of these relationships, and the 
termination of marriages. Inter-religious marriages are usually prohibited, with some 
exceptions in Christian law (for men and women alike) and in Islamic law (for men 
only). Both Christian and Muslim traditions command that the children born out of 
mixed marriages should be educated in the respective religions. The dramatic situation 
is lived by children born out of a Muslim father and of a Christian mother: they are 
automatically recognized as Muslim and could incur in apostasy, if they decide to 
follow their mother’s religion. Any Muslim who decides to convert to another religion 
lives the same dramatic situation, in that conversion is considered apostasy in Islam and 
                                                 
121 George M. Dib, Law and Population in Lebanon, 14. It is the case, for instance, of Morocco, where in 
February, 2004 a new Family code was been adopted bringing radical changes to Muslim family law by 
limiting polygamy, introducing judicial scrutiny in repudiation, recognizing women the right to initiate 
divorce procedures, and by reforming the general language of family law with the elimination of any 
degrading reference to women in the wordings of the provisions. See, Human Rights Education 
Associates, “The Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana)”, February 5th, 2004 
www.hrea.org/moudawana.html. 
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punished with death.122 This is not directly recognized by Lebanese law, but however 
often times respected by Islamic sub-groups, constituting cases of honor killings.123 
Divorce is the second problem, since it exists only in the form of repudiation in 
Muslim law, and is highly limited by Christian laws. In this respect, the 1942 Family 
Code introduced the validation of repudiation by a judicial act.124 This novelty was 
introduced in the Shi’i statute as well.125 Christian laws strictly regulate cases of 
divorce, and, especially in Catholic law, it is really difficult to comply with the 
requirements that entitle a couple to terminate a marriage. Lebanese law does not 
intervene in these legal systems at all. 
3.3 Minority protection or rule-of-law? 
Two are the ways through which the sub-systems connect to the general legal system: 
one is administrative, that is the registration of marriages, and the other is judicial, that 
is the scrutiny of religious courts decisions by the Court of Cassation. 
                                                 
122 David D. Grafton, The Christians of Lebanon—Political Rights in Islamic Law, 175-8. 
123 Honor killings are not caused only by apostasy, but also by other behaviors considered shameful, such 
as premature sexual relationships, homosexual intercourses, and even rapes. See, for the case of Lebanon, 
and about women in specific, Mirna Lattouf, Women, Education, and Socialization in Modern Lebanon: 
19th and 20th Centuries Social History, (Boulder CO: University Press of Amrica, 2004), 22-26. 
124 This is an example of modification of Islamic law introduced by the Ottoman code (articles 108-109). 
The judicial procedure may be initiated by women as well. 
125 George M. Dib, Law and Population in Lebanon, 28. Art. 337 of the Shi’i Community law of July 
16th, 1962 enumerates the cases in which a woman can ask for divorce, which are: impotence of the 
husband, contagious disease, full loss of mind, and continuous absence of the husband. These four cases 
give legitimacy to women to ask for divorce, and they are borrowed by Greek Orthodox law, which is 
among Christian laws the most permissive in terms of termination of marriages. 
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As general rule, marriages and divorces have to be registered in a list held at the 
offices of the Ministry of Interior in virtue of the “Registration of Personal Status Law,” 
adopted on 7 December 1951. People have to notify marriages and divorces within a 
month from the date of celebration to the Ministry of Interior, who will verify the 
validity of celebration vis-à-vis law requirements (including legitimate authority and 
free will of the persons). In this way, the government can control the acts of religious 
authorities supervising polygamy among Muslim groups. However, this procedure is 
highly weak, in that it establishes a control after the conclusion of marriage or divorce 
and, moreover, it is limited only to administrative questions. A more effective scrutiny 
would be the judicial control over religious courts acts, which is the possibility to 
challenge the decisions of the religious courts in front of the Court of Cassation. 
However, the jurisdiction is limited to monitoring the respect of public order.126 Hence, 
a huge judicial sector still remains outside the scope of the concept of the 
rule of law because it is confined to religious laws and courts. This 
segment of the judiciary falls outside any judicial control and any criteria 
for a just trial, in its modern sense.127 
This “apart judicial polity” is perpetuated by the structure of the millet system also with 
respect to associational rights and of political representation, which will be analyzed in 
the next sections. 
                                                 
126 In honor of the mandate of article 9 of the constitution, the judicial system provides for this procedure 
of control of public order requirements but not of scrutiny of the decision itself. 
127 Suleiman Takieddine, An Independent Judiciary for a Better Justice, in Nawaf Salam (ed.), Options 
for Lebanon, (Oxford: The Center for Lebanese Studies, 2004), 34. 
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4. Associational rights 
Associational rights are structured in constitutional and statutory provisions that 
constitute communal autonomy. In Lebanon, communal autonomy has developed under 
three aspects: associational, cultural, and political. 
4.1 Associational autonomy 
The constitutional institutionalization of associational rights is rooted in two articles: 
article 9, which has been previously analyzed, and article 10. They refer to two 
overlapping aspects of communalism, which are the associational and the cultural. 
With respect to associational rights, communalism is encapsulated in the last 
part of article 9, which states that the State “guarantees … religious interests of the 
population, to whatever religious sect they belong.” This provision was enacted for 
granting each community the possibility to organize its internal affairs independently 
from other communities and from the State, which resulted in the constitution of 
separate social bodies. The enacting legislation consists of one general decree, adopted 
under the French Mandate, and of the other decrees and laws recognizing the single 
communities. 
Article 14, of decree n. 60, adopted on 13 March 1936 establishes that once the 
communities are recognized, they become legal bodies with the authority to “organize 
and administrate freely their affairs, in the limit of the civil legislation.”128 By the 
                                                 
128 Edmond Rabbath, La Constitution Libanaise—Origines, Textes et Commentaires, 100. 
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dictate of the decree, the right to protect group interests guaranteed by article 9 became 
the right to autonomously organize the life of the communities, further interpreted as the 
rights to manage internal affairs and to set internal disputes. The general structure of 
autonomy was already set, but the right definition of powers was outlined by the laws of 
recognition of the communities. 
With respect to the organization, these laws establish for each group a legal 
representative,129 who wields legislative and administrative powers sided by community 
councils that are elected or nominated according to each community organization. 
Internally, the representatives and the councils are the legislative, the executive, and the 
judicial bodies of the groups; externally, they are the referees of community interests, 
which are advanced and defended in front of the State. In light of these arrangements, 
Lebanon appears as a pyramid: on the top there is the State with its bodies, in the 
middle, there are the single communities, and at the basis single individuals. 
Furthermore, the laws of recognition confer to communities the power to 
manage the wakfs, which are trusts regulated by Islamic law as “permanent dedication 
of property” by donation or endowment, “delivered to …beneficiaries” who are entitled 
to “administer it”130 without retaining interests, but in a pious and charity spirit. In 
Lebanon, the wakf institution ultimately encompasses all properties which are held in 
                                                 
129 The patriarchs for the Christian Orthodox communities, the Bishop for the Latin Catholic community, 
the Pastor for the Protestant community, the Imam for the Shi’i community, and the Mufti for the Sunni 
community 
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common by groups, administered by communal bodies to the interest and profit of all 
group members. To this aim, communal bodies may even levy taxes on group members. 
Through wakf administration, groups can rely on a financial and economic basis 
by acting as entrepreneurs that guarantee services to their members, such as cultural 
activities. 
4.2 Cultural rights 
Article 10 of the constitution, dealing with cultural and educational rights, encompasses 
principles that are directly connected with the idea of cultural autonomy. In the first 
part, it establishes that “education is free insofar as it is not contrary to public order and 
morals and does not interfere with the dignity of any of the religions or creeds.” By the 
wording of the text, it emerges that education is strictly connected to religious 
communities, for it refers to the dignity of religions and creeds as the main limit to 
freedom of education. The legislator wanted to assure a sort of social stability through 
cultural respect, while the principle of autonomy stands clear as the second basic 
principle of the cultural rights arrangements. 
Indeed, the article further states that “there shall be no violation of the right of 
religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules 
issued by the state regulating public instruction.” Autonomy seems to be taken for 
granted for two reasons. First, the article declares that “there shall be no violation of the 
                                                                                                                                               
130 Jamal J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status, (London: Graham&Trotman, 1990 2nd edition), 
275. The notion of wakf is quite broad and may also include real estate properties and activities, such as 
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rights of communities,” which then results prominent in regulating instruction. In other 
words, the State does not concede autonomy to the groups with regards to education; by 
contrast, autonomy is the reality, by which the State abides. Secondly, the provision 
imposes a limit of general rules, issued by the State, that have to be respected by 
educational organizations. The State is relegated, on the one hand, to the role of 
‘coordinator’ of the educational system, in that it is the State that provides those general 
rules and, on the other, of ‘supervisor,’ in that it presumably ensures their respect. 
The autonomous organization of the educational system is a distinctive feature 
of Middle-East States that dates back to the period of Ottoman domination.131 In 
Lebanon particularly, a plethora of institutions was introduced by the French during the 
Mandate, who set up a public school system as well.132 The status quo of educational 
arrangements was maintained and constitutionalized by independent Lebanon.133 
The dramatic result of this situation is the spread of ideologies inside the schools 
that often times enhance divisions, rather than unity. For instance, Christian schools 
spread a sense of nationalism that was more connected to Europe than to the Middle 
East; while in Islamic religious schools, a sense of disloyalty to the Lebanese Christian 
                                                                                                                                               
cultural, educational, and hospital. 
131 Under the Ottoman Empire, several charity institutions set up schools for their communities of 
reference that eventually became open to everybody without distinction of faith. See Chapter 2 that 
analyzes the historical development of the millet system in the Ottoman era. 
132 Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: In Search of Identity for Lebanon, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 
110-3. 
133 Actually, it showed the same balances of power with a certain prominence of the Jesuit educational 
institutions. Ibid., 116. 
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establishment was at the basis of pupils’ education.134 Moreover, foreign intervention in 
the educational system increased the sense of division and hindered a general Lebanese 
identity from being developed through coherent and unified educational programs, so 
that “the evident result of this unlimited freedom” is that “it transformed Lebanon in a 
sort of cultural kaleidoscope.”135 
In principle, the variety of educational organization does not endanger social 
stability in an economical frame-work of free market, where many entrepreneurs offer 
different possibilities suitable for different categories of people. However, the situation 
in Lebanon is sensitive for two reasons. Firstly, the social structure of Lebanon is frail, 
thus this variety of educational organizations does not contribute to strengthen social 
ties, and helps, instead, to increase social disunity. Secondly, the variety of educational 
organizations would not be objectionable, if the education that they provide is strictly 
connected to common civic principles and historical narratives, and shared political 
myths. The diverse and sometimes incompatible historical, geographical, and political 
perspectives endanger the creation of a stable and common social space, while this 
freedom of education 
through the languages in use, the ideas that are conveyed, the mentalities 
that it foments,… could not contribute to an unshakable harmony among 
the communities, within which [this freedom] meets an ideal space of 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 117-20. 
135 Edmond Rabbath, La Constitution Libanaise—Origines, Textes et Commentaires, 117. Indeed, many 
schools are run by Italians, Germans, French, and Russians, as well as, recently, by Iranians and Saudis, 
mainly of religious inspiration. 
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penetration and expansion, exacerbating… the spiritual rift, from which 
the country suffers.136 
The last aspect of associational rights, which drafts the even more complicated frame of 
Lebanese instability, relates to political rights that will be analyzed in the next section. 
5. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: ETHNIC POWER-SHARING 
In drafting the constitutional history of Lebanon, the basic political agreements on 
political representation were characterized by a strict division of powers according to 
ethno-religious identity. 
The National Pact of 1943, modified by the Taif Agreements of 1989, is a 
political agreement that is not included in any legal act. It could be defined as a 
constitutional act, or as a political act with constitutional effects, but in its nature it is 
non-legal, because it has not been adopted by any official legal procedure. However, it 
affects Lebanese politics, by shaping the asset of political powers and, hence, by 
patterning the Lebanese polity. 
This agreement establishes a system of ethnic power-sharing in virtue of which 
the division of powers and offices has to run along ethnic lines: equal representation of 
Muslims and Christians in the parliament, and assignment of offices to religious sub-
groups. Ethnic representation is guaranteed both at the central and at a local level. 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
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5.1 Representation in public offices: the Constitution 
The Constitution slightly refers to the ethnic distribution principle in two articles. 
Article 95, paragraph 3, letter ‘b’ of the Constitution states that 
The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the 
judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and 
mixed agencies are to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements 
of national reconciliation; they shall be replaced by the principle of 
expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their 
equivalents are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed 
equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular 
job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of 
expertise and competence. 
The nature of the article is transitory, as it is highlighted by the spirit of this section of 
the constitution, titled “Abolition of Confessionalism” and further pinpointed by 
paragraph 1 and 2. Basically, the legislator wanted to maintain the confessionalist 
option in order to keep harmony among the groups, in view of a progressively 
decreasing relevance of confessional affiliation and in direction of neutral 
representation.137 
The contradiction stands clear in the second part of the article; indeed, the 
legislator accurately excepts the major political posts from this rule, in that they are 
considered the most sensitive in the political arena and thus more likely to be object of 
                                                 
137 Historically, the participation in public offices of mainly Muslims during the Ottoman period and of a 
large majority of Christians during the French Mandate caused deep rivalries. Therefore, the transitory 
clause of ethnic-religious representation aimed to include all citizens in public offices until their 
affiliation would have lost any importance. 
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contention between the groups. Moreover, article 95 is in open contrast with article 12 
of the Constitution, which holds an affiliation-blind orientation based on meritocracy.138 
The enactment of the representation principle in public offices followed the 
principle of representation of Christians and Muslims in the Parliament.139 The Head of 
State Chehab explicated that the principle of representation was two-fold: first, it 
ensures the equal representation of Christians and Muslims as the two main 
communities in Lebanon; secondly, it ensures the representation of the single 
communities inside the two groups.140 
However, the President did not take into account intra-group power relations and 
rivalries, so that the only communities that actually gained representation were the 
Christian-Maronite and the Sunni, while the others had presumably to reach 
compromise with the main elites that managed power. 
After decades of Christian majority over Muslims, a communal balance was 
established between the two groups in 1989. By the constitutional compromise of the 
Taif Agreements, the Parliament shall be composed equally of Christians and Muslims, 
while leaving untouched power-sharing arrangements for governmental posts. 
                                                 
138 Article 12 states that “every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, no preference being made 
except on the basis of merit and competence, according to the conditions established by law. A special 
statute guarantees the rights of state officials in the departments to which they belong.” 
139 Edmond Rabbath, La Constitution Libanaise—Origines, Textes et Commentaires, 120. As a matter of 
fact, President Fuad Chehab, elected in 1958, announced that if the equal representation principle was 
valid for the legislative body, it should be applied also to any public office. 
140 Eventually, the application to public offices of this principle became law in 1959, by the promulgation 
of Legislative Decree 112, in June 12th. 
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These arrangements lie outside the written constitution, by revising the social 
pact through elite bargaining. However, the 1989 revision of the social pact persists in 
maintaining a double division of the society, which is reflected in the power-sharing 
arrangements. At the legislative level, society is divided in two dominant groups, 
Christians and Muslims; whereas, at the governmental level, sub-groups are given direct 
consideration and granted a specific post in the range of powers. This two-level 
communalism, or double consociationalism, creates intra-group conflict in order to 
achieve representation in the Parliament, while endures the rigidity of the system by 
keeping fixed posts that hinders the political structure from responding to changing 
realty. 
5.2 Representation at the local level 
Political representation of different ethno-religious groups at local level represents the 
second important aspect of power-sharing arrangements in Lebanon. Historically, the 
issue of local representation is divided in two periods: during the French Mandate, when 
State organization was characterized by a high degree of centralization, and after the 
Taif Agreement that introduced a certain degree of decentralization. This issue is of 
central importance because local representation lies at the first level of access to power, 
and as such, it is the first arena of possible contention in the distribution of power 
among groups. 
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5.2.1 Centralization 
The general administrative division of Lebanese territory was introduced by the French 
during their Mandate, and it provides for muhafaza, regions, further divided in qada’, 
districts. The first period of Lebanon was characterized by a high degree of 
centralization for two reasons. First, the French model reversed on Lebanon French 
principles of administration, whereby centralization was historically considered the 
most effective way to assure political stability by deep State control over both central 
and local administrative issues.141 Second, elites preferred relying on bargaining 
occasions offered by central power arrangements, rather than deferring their powers to a 
complete democratic system in which they would have been held accountable for each 
choice facing the risk of being dismissed by elections.142 
On the basis of this principle, provinces and districts were designed by 
Municipality Law of 1963, after the independence of Lebanon, so as to be ethnically 
homogenous; this prevented ethnic contestation in the access to power and permitted 
harmonic distribution of power among the sub-groups that tended to live homogenously 
in Lebanese territory. 
Legislative Decree n. 118, promulgated in 30 June 1977 promoted federations of 
municipalities and increased the minimum number of inhabitants needed to establish a 
                                                 
141 Several studies in literature highlight historical causes of French tendency to centralized authority. A 
quite old analysis by Gaetano Salvemini gives the clear historical perspective of how France opted for 
centralization and why it was maintained through the years. See, Gaetano Salvemini, French 
Centralization, in Luigi Ballerini and Massimo Ciavolella (eds.), Civilization and Democracy—
Salvemini’s Anthology of Cattaneo’s Writings, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2006), 87-88. 
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municipality, on the basis of the principle of effective management.143 The main result 
was the upheaval of ethnic balances, which led to a de facto stagnation of local affairs 
management. 
5.2.2 Attempts of Decentralization: the Taif Agreements 
The Taif Agreements readdressed power relationships among sects, by reforming the 
system of local representation. 
During negotiations, proposals of federalization were advanced, but the actual 
fear of disunity and of possible further division clamped down the attempts of a federal 
distribution of power. Although the wording of the text clarifies this position,144 article 
3 introduces and regulates decentralization. According to article 3, paragraph 2, “the 
powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all 
state administrations shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest 
level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.” 
The aim is to increase local powers through a sort of subsidiary principle, so that 
people’s needs should be addressed at the lowest level possible. Moreover, following 
paragraph 3 stresses the necessity to design provinces so as that they would be 
ethnically mixed.145 Basically, the political restraints on decentralization move from the 
                                                                                                                                               
142 Adnan G. Iskandar, Bureaucracy in Lebanon, (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1964), 22-23. 
143 Fadia Kiwan, Decentralilzation: Choosing a Model, in Nawaf Salam (ed.), Options for Lebanon, 57. 
144 Expressions such as “unity of the nation,” “national unity,” and “integrity of the land” are frequent. 
145 It states that “the administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national 
fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistence and unity of the soil, people, and 
institutions.” 
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fear of creation of a federation of ethnically homogenous cantons shared by political 
elites, which feel threatened in the exercise of their powers by “a return to local 
democracy and to people directly.”146 
The result was the unaltered division of provinces, which served also as 
electoral district.147 Moreover, the sectarian principle of seat distribution was 
maintained, according to three principles: first, equal representation of Christians and 
Muslims was required,148 secondly, equal representations of the several denominations 
within the two groups,149 and finally, proportional representation according to the 
district.150 
Therefore, seats were fixed for each group according to the population of 
districts. For instance, three seats are assigned to one district, where the majority of the 
population is Christian and the minority is Muslim. Thus, two of the seats will be 
assigned to Christian candidates and only one to Muslim candidates. If the Christian 
population is half Maronite and half Greek-Orthodox, the electoral system requires that 
each sect will have a seat. While if the majority of the Muslim population is Sunni, and 
only a minority is Shi’i, the Muslim seat will be held by a Sunni. The rest of the sects 
will be free to support one of the three candidates. A certain degree of collaboration is 
                                                 
146 Fadia Kiwan, Decentralilzation: Choosing a Model, in Nawaf Salam (ed.), Options for Lebanon, 57-
61. 
147 This is established by article 2, letter A, paragraph 4 of the Taif Agreement. 
148 Taif Agrrement, article 2, letter A, paragraph 5, point a. 
149 Taif Agrrement, article 2, letter A, paragraph 5, point b. 
150 Taif Agrrement, article 2, letter A, paragraph 5, point c. 
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thus encouraged by this electoral system that, however, “militates negatively toward 
blurring issues and obfuscating programs, but positively it obliges inter-communal 
cooperation and compromise.”151 
As a matter of fact, the Agreements did not bring any novelty nor did they 
introduce any major change in the Lebanese system except for equal representation of 
Christians and Muslims in the Parliament. Actually, the Agreements called for a 
complete abolition of the sectarian system, which brings into question the millet system 
in its entirety. 
The main contradiction lies in the results of the arrangements and its inspiring 
principles. In theory, the principles of ethnic power-sharing aimed to create a system in 
which each group had a representative in public offices and power-wielding bodies, 
while in reality, the results tragically show an overturn of the ethnic balances through 
simple elite bargaining. The main cause of failure of the Lebanese system has been 
identified with the millet system itself that allegedly perturbed Lebanese polity and 
politics by triggering a “pathologic development from political confessionalism” 
originating from “the communitarian regime, to a form of metastasis that has overrun 
mentalities and institutions.”152 
Yet, the confessional system has not been dismissed. The law of abolition of the 
sectarian arrangements has not been promulgated and the only achievement toward a 
                                                 
151 David C. Gordon, Lebanon—The Fragmented Nation, (London: Croom and Hoover, 1980), 102. 
152 Edmond Rabbath, La Constitution Libanaise—Origines, Textes et Commentaires, 517. 
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neutral State was the abolition of the sectarian specification in identity cards by way of 
a memorandum issued by Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud on 12 February 2009.153 This 
cannot be considered mere inactivity of the legislator; on the contrary, it may be 
considered the lack of will to dismantle the sectarian system or the lack of political will 
to comply with the Agreements. It is thus the case to address these issues in light of the 
in-depth analysis of the Lebanese millet as a whole. 
6. ETHNIC BARGAINING IN CONFLICT POLITIES: WHAT 
DOES THE LEBANESE MILLET TEACH? 
Both political and legal literatures on Lebanese confessionalism generally reject the 
sectarian political arrangements in toto.154 However, a combined analysis of political 
theories and legal evidence of the causes that lead ethnic conflict to outburst may 
readdress the issues and shed new light on the validity of the millet system in general, 
and on the negative aspects that have to be corrected. I argue that the main problematic 
aspect of the millet system is political representation. In particular, I claim that local 
representation is still an effective tool to achieve ethnic equilibrium. Moreover, I argue 
that cultural rights and personal autonomy still represent effective protection of groups 
in a context of high ethnic tension, where collective identity represents the basis of 
power relation and interests’ negotiation. 
                                                 
153 See, www.usaid.gov/lb/newsroom/photo_archive.html 
154 See, for instance, the conference paper by Maurus Reinkowski, Ottoman ‘Multiculturalism?—The 
Example of the Confessional System in Lebanon, (Orient Institute of the Deutsche Mörgenländische 
Gesellschaft, Beirut: 1999), 19-21, where the author claims that Lebanon may solve its problems living 
aside both multiculturalism and “milletism”. 
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Theories about conflict can be divided in two categories: conflict theories and 
general political theories applied to conflict. The first category, conflict theories, 
focuses on the nature of the conflict as a peculiar relation between human beings or 
groups. The second category, general political theories applied to conflict, focuses on 
the causes of conflict. I will start with the first category. 
6.1 Conflict Theories 
Galtung formulated three interconnected stages of conflict: personal, inter-group, and 
inter-State. The whole branch of conflict studies focuses on conflict management, how 
to reduce violence to prevent war, and how to manage conflicts by non-violent 
means.155 
Studies on inter-group conflict mainly focused on ethnic conflicts, specifically 
on the role of actors in the conflict, their interests, and their behavior. While major 
contributions have been made on pure ethnic conflicts, minor contribution has been 
made on ethno-religious conflicts. According to these authors, possible legal solutions 
are autonomy or power-sharing, or other legal-political arrangements.156 
Assuming that conflicts may be solved through models of autonomy, it is not yet 
clear how multi-factor conflicts can be managed. On this aspect, Fox contributed to 
research by theorizing ethno-religious conflicts as relations in which religion is not the 
                                                 
155 See, Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, 
(London: Sage, 1996), 75-80. 
156 See, Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, (Washignton, 
D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). 
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main cause of conflict, but it may be the cause of its embitterment.157 The analysis of 
actors’ behavior in the conflict shows that 
another factor that influences the process of ethno-religious conflict is 
the interest of religious elites as they exercise… the control of religious 
institution and religious legitimacy. They influence the grievance 
formation process through the use of religious legitimacy. When religion 
is not an issue in the conflict, religious legitimacy facilitates the 
formation of grievances over non-religious issues.158 
If then religion is a collateral element of grievance, and if autonomy is one of the 
possible solutions to conflicts, then the negative potential of religion could be lessened 
by complete satisfaction of religious group interests through autonomy. Still, autonomy 
can bring potential disruptive elements by separating groups and creating isolated 
mono-blocs prone to delegate inter-relations to higher level of social life. In other 
words, cultural segregation would mean to postpone the moment of interaction to the 
sphere of political action, where group interests are negotiated by group representatives. 
This lack of a communal social basis and the absence of a neutral space of interaction 
among groups shift the arena of relations to the political realm, where relations are 
based on a logic of negotiation that does not imply cultural collaboration. 
In Lebanon, the millet arrangements aim to satisfy groups’ demands for 
autonomy. In theory, the millet arrangements with respect to personal autonomy and 
cultural rights are preordained to meet religious groups’ demands. The laws that 
guaranteed autonomy to ethno-religious groups created legal bodies capable of 
                                                 
157 Johnatan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century, (Lanham, US: Lexington Books, 
2002), 110-115. 
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legislating over their members on religious and cultural matters. Moreover, autonomy is 
constitutionalized by the principles of cultural autonomy and personal autonomy, which 
thus confirms the hypothesis formulated by Fox. 
The disruptive aspect of the millet system is represented by two gaps of the legal 
arrangements. First of all, there is no real connection between the legal sub-systems of 
the sub-groups and the general legal system of the State. A connection between the two 
legal spheres would enable the development of a common legal basis that would be 
directly connected to cultural issues, in that those sub-systems deal with family law, 
part of the cultural heritage of a people. 
Secondly, the millet arrangements failed to develop a common Lebanese culture. 
By relegating culture to the sphere of group autonomy, the millet system again impedes 
the development of a common neutral space able to include all citizens. 
The current organization of the millet system hinders general rule-of-law from 
developing, which could be, in legal terms, the general legal basis of the Lebanese 
system and serve, in socio-political terms, as that neutral platform in which social 
interests combine. 
Given the negative and positive aspects of the millet system in conflict 
management, it remains unclear whether the millet itself is to be considered a cause to 
                                                                                                                                               
158 Ibid., 180. 
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the conflict; hence, it is necessary to analyze political theories that deal with the causes 
of conflict. 
6.2 Political theories applied to conflicts 
Those political theories that focus on ethnic conflict pertain mainly to institutionalist 
and rationalist approaches. 
According to the institutionalist approach, a rigid political system is more likely 
to collapse when facing ethnic conflicts, because of its inability to redress ethnic claims 
in the governance system.159 This argument is based on the assumption that flexible 
systems are designed to include all actors, i.e. to be “integrative,” and leave open the 
option for complete separation of conflicting parts.160 However, these claims lack of 
adequate consideration of identity as the main factor of political action. In other terms, 
these theories analyze cases in which identity is considered a justification for conflict, 
while the main cause is political representation and the inability of the system to 
adequately accommodate actors’ demands. 
According to the rationalist approach, collective identity is a fixed aspect of 
group identity. Groups behave as elites, whose political action is considered in terms of 
power relations. Rationalists claim that conflict outbursts when elites fear to lose power 
                                                 
159 Velerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the  Destruction of Socialism and the State, 
(NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
160 Stefan Wolff, Complex Autonomy Arrangements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of 
Consociationalism in Brussels, Northern Ireland and South Tyrol, in Marc Weller, Stefan Wolff (eds.), 
Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative Approaches to Institutional Design in 
Divided Societies, (Oxon: Routledge), 119. 
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or when groups fear to be excluded from power in future political arrangements.161 This 
approach does not explain why cooperation and coexistence occur, failing to consider 
the social and institutional aspects of a certain polity, and, power relations within a 
certain group. 
As for Lebanon, both approaches are testable in front of constitutional 
arrangements. The institutional system of ethnic representation in Lebanon is 
dramatically rigid. Ethnic power-sharing was considered as a way towards pacification 
among the various ethno-religious groups by granting to each sect a certain sector of 
power. However, the ethnic division of posts is so rigid that the system is unable to 
respond to social changes. The periodical frustration of the will to abolish the millet 
system in political representation augmented the disruptive potential of the latent ethno-
religious conflict. 
Moreover, ethno-religious power-sharing arrangements are inconsistent: in the 
Parliament, ethno-religious balance is conceived only between Christians and Muslims, 
while letting the two groups alone in dealing with internal conflicts among the single 
denominations; in the executive, ethno-religious balance is considered among the 
various sub-groups. The system thus fails to address the question of a two-fold conflict: 
between Christians and Muslims on the one hand, and between the single sects within 
these two groups, on the other. 
                                                 
161 David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict,” International Security, vol. 21 n. 2, (Fall 1996), 41-75. 
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Both the institutionalist and the rationalist approaches fail to consider two 
aspects. First, they do not take into consideration the social aspect of collective identity 
as a potential realm for satisfactory management of identity issues through cultural 
autonomy arrangements. Secondly, both approaches focus on the central level of 
political systems to address the questions of ethno-religious conflict and do not consider 
the possibility of redressing power-sharing arrangements at the local level through 
political representation. 
6.3 Legally arranged coexistence: local representation 
It is possible to recognize the failures of this system in order to think of a possible re-
organization of the millet in Lebanon and consider its potentials. One may trace at least 
two points of failure, and two corresponding potentialities: the first pertains to political 
representation and the second to cultural autonomy. 
With regard to political representation, confessionalism is not a system of equal 
representation but should be considered a system that channels possibilities to access 
power by virtue of ethno-religious affiliation. Indeed, legal arrangements of political 
representation were first oriented to guarantee Christian supremacy over Muslim 
citizens, and then to guarantee equal representation of Christian and Muslims. Still, it 
cannot be considered satisfactory representation for two reasons. 
On the one hand, governmental posts are strictly divided among the sects, thus 
political and administrative appointment is not the result of negotiation among the 
groups, but a given. The rigid provisions about ethno-religious power-sharing do not 
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mirror power relations, but crystallize them and leave no room for negotiation. Equal 
representation of all sects can be guaranteed in various flexible ways that permit 
rotation of posts among the groups and sub-groups and give all of them actual power. 
By fixing posts, the system impedes any development of constitutional customs that 
depend on social bargaining and becomes, instead, the legal justification for 
perpetuation of inter-communal conflict. 
On the other hand, confessionalism does not guarantee equal representation 
because it focuses only on the main division between Christians and Muslims, while 
intra-group conflicts are even more complex and dangerous than between the two of 
them.162 
Assuming that conflict of moderate level contributes to developing a political 
atmosphere more favorable to the formation of consociational arrangements,163 then 
legal arrangements may help to establish the ground for bargaining. Since inter-
communal conflict is rooted in society, then the legal focus for the arrangements should 
be over-all participation with no fixed division of seats. Rather, a general constitutional 
command of equal representation of all sects will improve inter-communal bargaining 
for the division of both governmental posts and Parliament seats. This could 
simultaneously lead sub-groups to join the bargaining arena as well as exacerbate the 
danger of under-representation of small communities that do not have actual power in 
                                                 
162 For instance, Druzes, who belong to the category of Muslims, are historically more prone to cooperate 
with Christians than with other Islamic sects. Again, Ismaelites, who also belong to the Muslim category, 
are denied any participation by Muslim fellows. 
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political negotiation.164 The issue then shifts to other possible arrangements that focus 
locally, on the lowest level of administration. 
On a territorial basis, legal arrangements of fixed rules at the local level could be 
applied most effectively. Local administrations wield less competitive power and focus 
on basic needs of the population. At this level, it is possible to take into adequate 
consideration questions of identity in politics. Hence, a set of arrangements of ethno-
religious representation would, first, be easier to be managed, and, secondly, it would 
constitute real representation of all social forces. 
Conflict management through local representation would mean ethno-religious 
power-sharing at the local level, satisfying the demands of access to power by all actors. 
The combination of territorial decentralization and political representation would enable 
a more practical management of ethno-religious conflicts, because it would permit to 
control ethno-religious-power relations rightly from the lowest institutions. Moreover, 
Lebanese history shows that under Ottoman rule local representation properly addressed 
                                                                                                                                               
163 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 81-83. 
164 As it has been previously noticed, cooperation among sub-groups occurs often times to achieve 
political aims, mainly in the struggle for representation in power. Thus, groups and sub-groups cannot be 
considered monolithic units inside the groups, and may be willing to cooperate more than to mobilize 
towards conflict if rightly stimulated. As demonstrates the Druze-Christian cooperation, “the state’s 
various intra-communal actors, in their efforts to maximize their own attainments, attempted to represent 
their groups and dissuade or outbid their competitors, thus promoting inter-communal coexistence but 
also enhancing inter-communal discord. The advantages of this approach are that it underscores ethnic 
mobilization as a dynamic process, avoiding the pitfall of essentialism-that is, of regarding ethnic groups 
as rigid, homogeneous, and unchanging entities-and that it helps explain the motives for inter-communal 
conflict and cooperation.” See, Oren Barak, “Intra-Communal and Inter-Communal Dimensions of 
Conflict and Peace in Lebanon,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 34, n. 4 (November, 
2002), 619-644, at 638. With adequate constitutional arrangements establishing satisfactory balance 
between rigidity for sub-groups representation and elasticity in groups power-sharing, the millet system 
would be still an available solution for Lebanon. 
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actors’ demands for recognition, until the introduction of those arrangements that 
granted Christian supremacy in the Parliament. 
Power-sharing is itself a compromise that aims to avoid risky conflicts by setting 
guarantees through rigid rules. However, a certain degree of flexibility should be 
maintained in order to make the system capable of responding to social changes, and of 
creating those opportunities for inter-action that may develop cooperation through 
continuous negotiation among actors. In the Lebanese case, the rigidity of equal 
representation of the two constituent groups in Parliament could be associated with 
certain flexibility in the representation of sub-groups in the government. Thus, by 
guaranteeing the division of seats through a fifty-fifty formula, Christians and Muslims 
are equally represented as the constituent groups of Lebanon. Whereas, by leaving to 
the constituent groups the task of achieving representation in the government, the 
system would create a certain degree of intra-group conflict that leads elites to negotiate 
compromises for power-sharing. This degree of elasticity would surely endanger social 
stability since inter- and intra-group conflicts would remain at an acceptable level only 
if actors share a common political culture disposed to compromise. This willingness 
defines the Lebanese nation, in that social divisions would be unified by a common 
disposition to coexistence165 and to reach political compromise, which shifts the focus 
to the social side of coexistence. 
                                                 
165 The notion of nation is defined as the “will of the people to live together” as Marko paraphrased 
Renan’s concept of daily plebiscite. See, Joseph Marko, “United in Diversity?: Problems of State- and 
Nation-Building in Post-Conflict Situations: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Vermont Law Review, 
vol. 30, n. 3 (Spring 2006), pp. 503-550, at 510. 
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With regard to the social dimension of collective identity, the failure of the 
millet system in Lebanon lies in the lack of connection between the single sub-groups, 
which live autonomously, and prevent the development of a general Lebanese identity. 
Those societies in which collective identity plays the main role in social participation 
have to grant a certain degree of autonomy to groups. By granting this, States take into 
consideration the social satisfaction of identity claims, and “enable [groups] to make 
compromises and concessions without having to fear out-bidding and out-flanking by 
ethno-centric radicals.”166 For this purpose, the elements of personal autonomy and of 
cultural autonomy are still valid tools for accommodating identity demands and ethno-
religious claims. However, these tools have to be oriented to the creation of a supra-
sectarian identity. In other words, autonomy arrangements must not lead to total 
disruption of social ties among groups. Therefore, constitutional arrangements have to 
create a public common ground, where single identities combine and find their 
appropriate place in a general citizenship. 
In Lebanon, the main failure of the system consists of the lack of ties between 
confessional groups, calling into question the rule-of-law and social stability. 
With regard to the rule of law, the legal system affects the rights of those 
categories that are not protected or even directly discriminated against by religious 
                                                 
166 Stefan Wolff, Complex Autonomy Arrangements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of 
Consociationalism in Brussels, Northern Ireland and South Tyrol, 118. 
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law.167 Supposing that a legal system can opt for a pluralistic nature of its sources, it 
may accept different legal traditions within a general common framework that serves as 
legal basis for any component of the system. This legal framework should establish a 
series of effective connections between the sub-systems and the general system, so as to 
keep the system together by monitoring procedures that guarantee unity. In Lebanon 
these connections are too weak, with the result that the sub-systems live separately. 
Secondly, the general framework has to guarantee the minimum bunch of basic rights 
that may not be recognized or may be deliberately breached by the single legal 
traditions. Again, in Lebanon, basic rights are not guaranteed in that there is no 
common authority that fills the gap of the legal sub-systems, and that adjusts the defects 
of the legal traditions.168 
With regard to social stability, the necessity of a general framework is of deep 
importance not only for the respect of human rights but also for the social stability of 
the State. A basic civil legislation in family law matters helps to guarantee the respect of 
those rights that do not find adequate protection in religious law and contributes to 
develop a system of law applicable to those cases that fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
single sub-groups. This space of jurisdiction can help to create a further social group: 
the ‘others.’ This group, void of direct specific affiliation, would develop a supra-group 
                                                 
167 See, Lamia Rustum Shehadeh, “The Legal Status of Married Women in Lebanon,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 30, n. 4 (November, 1998), pp. 501-519. 
168 For instance, illegitimate children and Muslim women willing to divorce, Christian men or women 
willing to divorce cannot exercise their correspondent basic human rights, which are not envisaged by the 
legal traditions which are the only enacted in the country. 
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identity regulated by ethno-religious-blinded laws and secular jurisdiction with possible 
effects on other societal realms. 
Moreover, a common education in civil law and history helps to develop a sense 
of belonging which transcends the single sub-groups. To achieve this goal, it is 
necessary that all actors are willing to compromise and to contribute to the building and 
development of common society. This assumption, which is rooted in Galtung’s 
conception of primacy of culture in conflicts,169 whereby culture is the starting point for 
resolving conflicts, calls into question the will of the constituent groups of Lebanon to 
participate and share societal and political life. 
This willingness to compromise cannot be uniquely regulated by law and 
originates from historical and political frameworks. However, law can support 
compromise by creating spaces of interaction, precisely through the balance between 
the necessity of unity and demands for autonomy. 
The central problem of the Lebanese millet is that it shaped Lebanon as a 
consociational democracy through communal arrangements between Christian and 
Muslim groups at the central level, while it protects sub-groups through communal and 
personal autonomy. The first aspect, which may be defined as ‘consociationalism 
through millet,’ is not sustainable. However, this sustainability is not put into question 
by the millet, but rather, it is consociationalism itself that is politically and legally 
                                                 
169 See, Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, 
(London: SAGE, 1996). 
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debatable as a long-term sustainable choice. This claim is based on the consideration of 
other consociational legal systems, such as Belgium, South Tyrol, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In the last case, it has been noted that “confessional identity does not per 
se exclude coexistence with other confessions in one State,” while nationalist claims of 
supremacy over other national groups makes coexistence unlikely.170 Thus, it is not the 
millet itself, but its application as a means to set consociational arrangements that 
proves to be inadequate. As previously argued, a territorial application of political 
representation would be a satisfactory option since the devolution of ethno-religious 
power-sharing “at the lower levels often does not have serious political overtones, while 
at the same time such a division of the body politic into autonomous ethno-religious 
groups cannot dominate and paralyze the power of the whole nation.”171 The territorial 
option of political communalism is an appropriate solution in terms of conflict 
management properly because “it manages at least to emasculate the frictions and 
frustrations of conflicting ethno-religious groups at the national level by restricting 
them to the local scene.”172 
Moreover, the millet choice in Lebanon could be the adequate solution to protect 
those sub-groups that are reduced to the status of minorities within the constituent 
                                                 
170 Florian Bieber, “Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multireligious States,” 
Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, n. 2 (April, 2000), pp. 269-281, at 278-279. 
171 Catherine D. Papastathopoulos, “Constitutionalism and Communalism: Cyprus,” University of Toronto 
Law Journal, vol. 16, n. 1 (1965), pp. 118-144, at 129. Previously in the article, the author distinguishes 
among three kinds of communalism: national, whereby ethnic power-sharing is applied to central 
government, territorial, whereby power-sharing is set at local government entities, and total or fused 
communalism, which results from a combination of the previous ones. 
172 Ibid. 
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groups. As diffuse minorities, no other solution could be available to protect cultural 
claims through autonomy arrangements. Yet, if the aspects of communal and personal 
autonomies are not called into question as proper means of protection, the question of 
political representation is controversial in terms of temporal sustainability. Political 
representation in Lebanon was introduced by the French as a temporary arrangement. 
This was reintroduced during the Taif negotiations. Still, ethno-religious power-sharing 
is the main feature of Lebanese polity. Given that “in the long-run its usefulness is 
highly questionable because it crystallizes and perpetuates communal differences,”173 
the first step to dismantle the complex ethno-religious structure would be decentralizing 
political representation.174 
Political millet arrangements in consociational polities have proven to be 
unsustainable, but cultural and personal millet arrangements still prove to be satisfactory 
means of protection of diffuse minorities. This argument is developed in the next 
chapter, which analyzes the Israeli case, where no power-sharing arrangements exist, 
and the structure of the millet serves as effective protection of minorities. 
                                                 
173 Ibid. 
174 Decentralization as introduced in the 1970s may effectively reduce conflict not simply by mere 
federalization, but it rather should be understood in terms of ethnic power-sharing tools. See, Richard 
Hrair Dekmejian, “Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon,” Comparative Politics, 
vol. 10, n. 2 (January, 1978), pp. 251-265. 
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The millet system in Israel is the basic system of group rights and operates in addition to 
the liberal model for protecting individual rights. This combination results in a complex 
system that envisages both the principle of communitarianism, which links communal 
identity to the exercise of rights, and the principle of individualism, which guarantees 
the right to be left alone. 
Historically, the Israeli system is unique because it is the only case of 
application of the millet system in a society where Jews are the majority. Moreover, the 
dual nature of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State makes the purpose of protection 
of non-Jewish groups more challenging. Indeed, what is their place in Jewish society? 
Even within the Jewish majority, however, the ruling elite is a minority group—
Orthodox Jews,—who impose their view of Judaism over the objection of other non-
religious and non-Orthodox group.175 
Besides the debates over the relationship between religion and State, between 
religiosity and secularity in Israel, between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews, the main 
concern lies in the treatment of the Arab minority.176 This politically charged issue, may 
be addressed by the following question: what is the place for Arab and other non-Jewish 
minorities in a Jewish State? 
                                                 
175 Recently, the non-Orthodox opposition has increased in light of significant episodes. For instance, the 
annulment of a conversion conducted by a non-Orthodox rabbi, due to the convert’s decision to embrace 
secular life and the proposed bill, advanced by the Russian new-comers’ party Israel Baytenu, which 
would transfer significant competences on conversion issues to the Chief Rabbinate.  
176 It is worth clarifying that this chapter analyzes only the Israeli legal system and not the Palestinian 
one, which has jurisdiction over the territories under the rule of the Palestinian National Authority. Thus, 
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This chapter analyzes the Israeli millet in terms of personal rights, associational 
rights, and political representation. Particularly, it focuses on the struggle between 
religion and secularism in family law, on the protection of non-Jewish minorities under 
the Orthodox establishment, and on political representation, which is based on de facto 
guarantees. The chapter also discusses the combination and conflicts of communitarian 
and individualistic approaches in the protection of rights. 
I claim that the combined system of communitarianism and individualism 
provides effective protection for both group and individual rights. Moreover, I argue 
that, as in the case of Lebanon,177 minority protection models are effective when 
negotiations for group inclusion are based on mutual trust, which excludes the 
possibility of imposing a particular social view by one group. Specifically, Israel was 
established as a Jewish State; therefore, any politics of inclusion would be invalid if 
minority groups try to subvert the Jewish and democratic essence of the State. This 
holds true from the Arab point of view that considers the Jewish State ontologically 
incompatible with Arab national aspirations and from the Orthodox point of view that 
considers the democratic State partially incompatible with Jewish halakhic aspirations. 
1. ISRAEL: MINORITIES in A JEWISH DEMOCRACY? 
The Declaration of Independence in 1948 defines Israel as a Jewish State, giving to 
Judaism a privileged place in the definition of the nature and the essence of the State 
                                                                                                                                               
by Arab minority, I refer to Arabs citizens of Israel, who may be Muslim, Christian, or Druze. I use the 
expression “Arab Israelis,” which stresses both their nationality and citizenship. 
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from a historical and cultural point of view. The Declaration does not have the rank of 
law, though it has legal binding effects and legal influences. It is the document that 
expresses the exercise of constitutional power in the establishment of the State of Israel 
and, consequently, it has legal binding effects.178 In general, it serves as a source for 
inspiration in the interpretation of Israeli legislation. 
The Declaration considers freedom, justice, and peace as the basic principles of 
the State, with a direct reference to Biblical prophetic tradition, while it ensures social 
and political equality with no respect to religion, race, or sex.179 Immediately after the 
establishment of the State, the Jewish nature of Israel became controversial between the 
religious and secular establishments. Indeed, their views differed over the interpretation 
of the Jewish nature of the State: the secular establishment referred to the Jewish 
cultural heritage combined with modern Western secular culture, while the religious 
establishment has progressively advanced the transformation of Israel into a Jewish 
religious State.180 
                                                                                                                                               
177 See Chapter 2. 
178 The exercise of constitutional power—pouvoir constituant—was internationally supervised in virtue 
of the 181 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of UN on 29 November 1947. This document, 
known as the Resolution on Partitioning of Palestine, established that Palestine would be divided in two 
States, one Jewish and one Arab. The two peoples were given the authority to exercise constitutional 
power in order to establish two States provided they would respect minority rights. The Arabs did not 
recognize the partition and, consequently, refused to establish their State. See, supra, sections 4 and 5.2. 
179 See par. 13 of the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%
20of%20Establishment%20of%20State%20of%20Israel  
180 The idea of the secular founding fathers stemmed from the haskalah movement (the Jewish 
Enlightenment.) Legal scholars even tried to revive Jewish law in combination with modern principles, 
which eventually did not work. However, Zionism aimed to create in both social and legal terms a Jewish 
State that would synthesize modern legal principles and life-style with Jewish tradition. See, Assaf 
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In order to stress the democratic nature of the State already established by the 
Declaration of Independence, the Israeli Parliament passed a law in 1985 that amended 
the Basic Law: The Knesset 5718-1958 (the Israeli Parliament), introducing the word 
“democratic” after “Jewish” when referring to the State. This definition was further 
used in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 5752-1992, the Israeli Bill of 
Rights, and it is the basis of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Indeed, the dual 
nature of the State is subject to continuous development in both public and legal 
discourses.  
In The Central Election Committee v. MK Ahmad Tibi and Azmi Bishara,181 
Justice Barak outlined the basic understanding of the definition “Jewish and democratic 
State,” whereby “Jewish” is explained, par. 12 and 13, in terms of Zionism and heritage 
(thus, immigration to Israel from the Diaspora, the revival of the Hebrew language, 
Jewish festivals and symbols, and Jewish religious sentiment), while “democratic” is 
explained, par. 14, in terms of rule of law, human rights protection, separation of 
powers, freedom and egalitarianism in elections, and independence of the judiciary. 
While Jewish citizens can find their full place in the society and become fully 
involved in the conflict discourse between religion and secularism, it may seem that 
non-Jewish minorities are somehow displaced from the social realm. However, since its 
                                                                                                                                               
Likhovski, “The Invention of ‘Hebrew Law’ in Mandatory Palestine,” The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, vol. 46, n. 2 (Spring 1998), 339-373. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, religious 
leaders have progressively strengthened principles originating directly from Jewish law—i.e., halakhah. 
A secular slogan, which often occurs in stickers, recites: “medinat halakhah, halkhah ha-medina”—a 
halakhic country is the end of the State. 
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foundation, Israel has recognized the existence of non-Jewish minorities and has 
progressively enacted policies of protection. 
The Declaration of Independence directly appeals to the “Arab inhabitants of 
Israel” and exhorts them to participate in the building of the Israeli State and then 
guaranteeing them political representation in the institutions.182 Although the moment 
of foundation was solely Jewish, the constitutional power was open to non-Jewish 
actors, namely Arabs. The request of peace and cooperation and the guarantee of 
representation are the elements of recognition of non-Jewish minorities by the Jewish 
State. Thus, the Jewish State does not exclude non-Jewish citizens from full enjoyment 
of rights, and envisages a model of protection that eventually developed over the years. 
This recognition was followed by the preservation of the status quo in matters of 
personal status by the adoption of the millet system that was in force in Mandate 
Palestine. The Palestine Order in Council,183 which was issued by the British 
Government, may be defined as the constitutional provision of Mandate Palestine. It 
recognizes jurisdiction of religious courts in matters of personal status (arts. 47 and 51) 
and specifically refers to Muslim courts (art. 52), Jewish courts (art. 53), and Christian 
                                                                                                                                               
181 High Court of Justice, 11280/02, The Central Election Committee v. MK Ahmad Tibi and Azmi 
Bishara, available in English at www.court.gov.il 
182 Par. 16 of the Declaration of Independence states: “WE APPEAL—in the very midst of the onslaught 
launched against us now for months—to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and 
participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation 
in all its provisional and permanent institutions.” 
183 The Order was issued on international and national legal bases: the Mandate, conferred to Britain on 
Palestine according to art. 22 of the Statue of The League of Nations, gave international legitimacy, and 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 gave internal legitimacy. 
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courts (art. 54). Moreover, the preamble of the Order, in recognizing the British 
commitment to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine, states that “nothing 
should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine.”184 
The understanding of minority protection in terms of self-rule was a historical 
heritage of the Ottoman Empire, but while the preservation of the millet system stems 
from the Order and the Mandate, the commitment to protect non-Jewish minorities 
stems from the UN Resolution for Partitioning Palestine and the Declaration of 
Independence. The Mandate guarantees the respect of nationality principles as 
understood in the Ottoman tradition (art. 7); moreover, it recognizes the millet system in 
terms of both jurisdictional and cultural communal autonomy (art. 9).185 
UN Resolution 181 of 1947 recognized the right to self-determination of both 
Jews and Arabs and clearly conditioned the exercise of constitutional power on the 
respect for minority rights. Chapter 2 of the Resolution186 is dedicated to minority rights 
and adopts both liberal individualistic perspective—i.e., protection of freedom of 
consciousness and religion—and communal approach, by compelling protection of 
collective rights and self-governing autonomy. Thus, based on a cultural understanding 
                                                 
184 The text of the Order is available at: 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C7AAE196F41AA055052565F50054E656 
185 The text of the Mandate for Palestine is available at http://www.mideastweb.org/mandate.htm  
186 The text of UN/RES/181 of 1947 is available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm  
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of social organization, the millet system has become the object of an obligation of 
international law due to UN recognition. 
The adoption of the millet system in Israel ha been conditioned by international 
factors. The following three sections focus on the development of the Israeli system as 
both Jewish and democratic. 
2. PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
Israel inherited the millet system of personal autonomy from Mandate Palestine. The 
Israeli system differs from other millet systems for two reasons: the State recognizes 
communities with different scopes of autonomy and it limits religious jurisdiction 
through legislative activity, while the High Court of Justice scrutinizes religious 
jurisprudence. 
The religious and secular legal systems have struggled to enlarge their 
respective jurisdictions, by claiming authority over matters out of exclusive jurisdiction. 
While this struggle reflects historical developments and ideological positions, the 
novelty of the Israeli system is the mutual influence of religious and secular laws by 
parliamentary imposition on religious courts to enact secular norms, and by the judicial 
acquisition of religious-traditional principles as the interpretative standards of secular 
norms. 
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This section analyzes the system of religious courts as part of the communitarian 
approach, particularly focusing on the relations between secular and religious 
jurisdictions and on the issue of protection of fundamental rights in religious law. 
2.1 The Jurisdiction of Religious Courts 
Israel recognizes thirteen religious communities other than the Jewish, twelve of which 
have religious courts. Jewish, Muslim, and Druze courts are an integral part of the 
State’s judicial body and thus subject to its control, while Christian authorities lie 
outside of the State judicial body and their function is restricted to the notification of 
marriage to governmental authorities in charge of registration. 
The legal framework that establishes both the scope of jurisdiction and the 
applicable law is complex and relies on several legal bases. The first is the Palestine 
Order in Council, which regulates the functioning of Christian courts. The second is 
State law, which intervened to regulate Jewish, Muslim, and Druze courts. Moreover, 
State law has progressively imposed on religious courts the application of secular 
principles, mainly by guaranteeing equality and protection of weak categories, such as 
women and children. The third legal basis is the jurisprudence of the High Court of 
Justice on matters related to religious judicial decisions: the approach of the Court has 
been cautious in the first decades of the State, while in recent years, it has progressively 
supported equality principles to the detriment of religious jurisdiction. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 103 -
2.1.1 Statutory Law: Palestine Order in Council and Israeli legislation 
Art. 54 of the Palestine Order in Council defines the jurisdiction of Christian religious 
courts, which is exclusive in matters of marriage and divorce. Israel recognizes nine 
denominations: (Eastern) Orthodox, Latin (Roman Catholic), Gregorian-Armenian, 
Armenian (Catholic), Syrian (Catholic), Greek Catholic, Maronite, and Syrian 
Orthodox; each denomination has its own judicial authority and conduct marriage and 
divorce according to its own law. Christians enjoy the largest degree of autonomy since 
they do not belong to the State judicial system and, consequently, they are not appointed 
nor funded by State authorities, as other judges are. 
On the other hand, Jewish, Muslim, and Druze religious courts are regulated by 
State law enacted after the foundation of the State. 
The Rabbinical Courts Law of 1955 establishes exclusive jurisdiction on matters 
of marriage and divorce (sec. 2) and states that halakhah (sec. 4) is the applicable law. 
The law requires mutual consent of the parties to hear other matters related to family 
law, but if no other petition is filed with a concurrent civil judge, then the matters are 
automatically included in the petition in front of the rabbinical judge. 
Rabbinical courts also have jurisdiction on other matters not related to family 
law that are equally important in social life, such as kashruth certificates (alimentary 
norms), Jewish burial issues, and conversion procedures, particularly relevant to the 
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legislation that grants automatic citizenship to Jews according to the Law of Return.187 
Through the jurisdiction on these issues and the activity of the Chief Rabbinate, the 
Jewish religious leadership—i.e., the Orthodox community—has progressively 
succeeded in imposing their view of Judaism and excluding other Jewish narratives. 
The Qadi Law of 1961 regulates Muslim courts, which have the broadest 
jurisdiction in the religious court system: indeed, they have jurisdiction on all matters 
relating to personal status and not only marriage or divorce. Consequently, qadis—i.e., 
Muslim judges—also hear petitions on financial support of wives and maintenance, 
child custody, and property division. The applicable law is the Ottoman shari’a law as 
applied in Israel before the creation of the State. 
Until 1963, when Druze Religious Court Law was enacted, Druze used to apply 
to the Muslim court or, more rarely, to the Civil Court.188 The law establishes and 
regulates Druze courts on the patterns of other religious courts laws by conferring 
exclusive jurisdiction over matters of marriage and divorce. It requires mutual consent 
of the parties for other matters to be heard in front of the religious judge (called, as in 
Lebanon, qadi madhhab). The law establishes first instance and appellate courts, which 
                                                 
187 The Law of Return 1950/5710 entitles Jews, by birth or conversion, their spouses, and those of Jewish 
descent up to the third generation the right to automatically gain Israeli citizenship. This law represents 
the direct connection between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, by implementing the Jewish character of 
the State. Moreover, it constitutes the legal commitment to “Jewish rescue.” Indeed, the rights provided 
by the law of return are conferred not only to Jews, but also to non-Jews of Jewish descent or married to 
Jews, who were as well object of persecution in history. This special connection to Jewish Diaspora and 
the commitment to Jewish rescue are challenged by post-Zionism, which considers Zionist values already 
implemented by the existence of the State of Israel. See, Danny Ben-Moshe, Post-Zionism in the Oslo 
Era and the Implications for the Diaspora, in Efraim Karsh (ed.), Israel: The First Hundred Years—
Israel in the International Arena, Vol. 4, (London: Frank Kass, 2004), 305-326. 
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are composed of judges appointed by the Head of the State on the basis of a list offered 
by an appointing committee. 
Druze courts apply Druze religious law, which is essentially similar to Lebanese 
Druze law but modified by Israeli statues. The same law, for example, requires the act 
of divorce to be validated by the Druze religious court, which will decide on the matter 
and on other related matters only as post-divorce petitions.189 
2.1.2 Civil Family Courts and Civil Law 
Until 1995, all matters that did not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of religious 
courts were heard by civil courts, when family law courts were established. Their 
jurisdiction is exclusive in matters of personal status of foreign marriage contracts and 
in matters of mixed couples, while on other matters they have competent jurisdiction 
with religious courts. In those cases in which mutual consent of the parties is required, 
such as child custody, one may have primary jurisdiction of civil courts parallel to 
religious jurisdiction subject to mutual consent by the parties. 
In general, to avoid overlapping decisions, the principle of first jurisdiction 
applies: therefore, the first judge with whom a petition is filed hears the case, while 
according to the principle of continuity, future revisions of that petition will be heard in 
front of the same judge. 
                                                                                                                                               
188 Aharon Layish, Marriage, Divorce and Succession in the Druze Family, (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 293. 
189 Ibid., 12. 
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The establishment of specific family courts was a political achievement of 
secular forces that aimed to reduce the negative effects stemming from the application 
of religious law. The first step in this process was the establishment, at the beginning of 
the 1980s, of a Committee headed by Justice Sheinbaum, which recommended the 
creation of a separate judicial body with jurisdiction over family law matters.190 The 
Sheinbaum Committee found that notwithstanding the efforts of imposing secular 
parameters on religious judges, the Israeli judicial system needed a separate judicial 
body to deal with family law matters in order to guarantee the effective protection of 
rights through specialist professional training of judges and rapidity of judicial 
response. The goal was achieved only after fifteen years, in that the issue was at the 
center of the conflict between religious and secular parties in the Parliament. 
As pointed out by the Committee, Israel has adopted a series of laws that aim to 
secularize religious jurisdiction. In front of the clear inequality between men and 
women stemming from the application of religious law, the Knesset has enacted a series 
of laws that compel religious judges to abide by the principle of equality and non-
discrimination between the sexes. The first law enacted was the Women’s Equality 
Rights Law of 1951-5711, which required religious judges to treat women equally in 
judgment and in family law matters. Apart from some provisions such as the minimum 
age for marriage, however, this law contains general provisions of equality, while it 
does not provide specific restrictions that judges should respect. 
                                                 
190 See, Elisha Sheinbaum, Report of the Commission to Probe Implementation of Family Law in Israel, 
(Jerusalem: Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Justice, August 1981), available only in 
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In the 1960s, the Knesset enacted other two relevant laws: the Legal Capacity 
and Guardianship Law of 1962-5722 and the Succession Law 1965-5725. Both laws 
intervened in order to guarantee women their rights in child custody and in inheritance 
in case of infringement by religious law. However, women still suffer from 
discrimination under the religious regime and although these interventions, “in practice, 
there are differences in interpretation and emphasis which may lead to different 
decisions,” therefore, “men prefer to litigate in the rabbinical court” while “women 
prefer to litigate in the civil court.”191 
Several aspects remain problematic in the case of application of religious law. In 
Muslim law, for instance, child custody is preferably accorded to the father. In Jewish 
law, a man can refuse to divorce a woman preventing her from re-marrying, while for a 
man it is easier to get free of his wife’s refusal to divorce by declaring her rebellious. 
Moreover, under religious law, maintenance and alimony issues are decided in favor of 
the man, to the detriment of women’s rights to equal economic treatment after divorce. 
The same can be said for inheritance law. Inequality is even clearer when one considers 
that women are prevented from becoming religious judges, although the Equality Rights 
Law bans discrimination in the access to professions. 
The most effective limitation of negative results stemming from the application 
of religious law is the supervision of the High Court of Justice. In Israel, religious 
                                                                                                                                               
Hebrew at http://www.dat.gov.il/. 
191 Susan R. Zaidel, Divorce With Respect—A Guide to Divorce and Divorce Mediation in Israel, (Haifa: 
Haskamot, 1990), 45. 
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courts are integral part of the judicial system, and provide for two instances of litigation, 
while the decisions of the appellate religious courts can be challenged in front of the 
High Court of Justice, which has the power, according to sec. 7(a) of Courts Law 5717-
1957, to annul religious courts acts contrary to secular norms and to perform acts that 
religious courts refuse to perform. 
2.2 The High Court of Justice and Family Law 
The jurisprudence of the High Court of Justice has long been quiescent with religious 
courts decisions, while in the 1980s it started to set limits of principle, and definitely 
started to overturn religious courts decisions in the 1990s. 
The High Court of Justice (HCJ) has repeatedly complied with religious courts 
jurisdiction in many cases. In Leah Kahane v. Eliezer Kahane,192 the Court was asked to 
annul the decision of a rabbinical court, by which the rabbinical judges declared null the 
marriage of the petitioner and her husband, which according to halakhah is null in that 
celebrated between a cohen (belonging to the religious stock) and a divorcee. The High 
Court upheld the decision on the basis of exclusive jurisdiction. Again, in Radintzki v. 
Rabbinical Court of Appeal,193 the High Court drew a distinction between norms that 
regulate relationships among human beings and norms that regulate the relationship 
between Man and Divinity, and declared that the former category of norms, even if 
coercing, does not violate freedom of religion and consciousness. Subsequently, in 
                                                 
192 S.C. 571/69, in 24 (2) P.D. 549. 
193 H.C. 51/69, in 24 (1) P.D. 704. 
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Rogozinski v. State of Israel,194 a case of request for civil marriage advanced by a non-
believing couple, the Court clearly stated that the religious jurisdiction has precedence 
over freedom of consciousness. 
The same position was held in front of Muslim courts jurisdiction. Remarkable 
is the decision held in Halima Bria v. Qadi of the Shari’a Moslem Court et al.,195 
whereby the petitioner asked the High Court to order the qadi to abstain from hearing a 
petition of cancellation of guardianship directed against the petitioner as a re-married 
widow. The Court held that there was no discrimination of women’s rights and 
suggested that equality should be guaranteed within the application of religious law by 
wise interpretation. 
In the 1980s, the Court has adopted an inverse approach. Although the principle 
of exclusive jurisdiction is always guaranteed, the Court aims to limit the expansion 
tendencies of religious jurisdiction. In Cohen v. Rehovot Regional Rabbinical Court,196 
the Court upholds the reasoning of the rabbinical court, which maintained jurisdiction 
over a civil marriage between two Jews, but limited it to the matters of personal status, 
and declared that other related matters should be litigated in a civil court. The leading 
case is Bavli v. Rabbinical Court of Appeals,197 by which the HCJ annulled a rabbinical 
decision and imposed rabbinical courts to abide by the principle of equality, as 
                                                 
194 C.A. 450/70, in 26 (1) P.D. 129. 
195 HCJ 51/55, in 9 (1) P.D.1193. 
196 HCJ 51/80, IsrSC 35 (2) 8. 
197 HCJ 1000/92, 48 (2) P.D. 221. 
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enshrined in the Women’s Equality Rights Law of 1951, in issues of property division. 
This case is the first attempt of the Court to ensure the application of secular principles 
in religious courts. 
Recently, the Court held that civil marriage cannot be a basis to guarantee 
facilitated divorce in front of religious judges, where they may have jurisdiction,198 and 
repeatedly affirmed the restrictive principle of interpretation of the norm that guarantees 
the binding of ancillary matters to the divorce petition with a rabbinical judge, in case 
no other petition has been filed. 
There is, however, no clear division of jurisdiction and, although major changes 
have been introduced, basic legal considerations of religious law are still far from 
achieving modern secular standards of equality. While secular critiques of this system 
focus mainly on the infringement of gender equality rooted in religious traditions,199 
religious supporters of personal autonomy argue that, first, religious jurisdiction is 
voluntary in all matters except marriage and divorce, and, secondly, that the secular 
legal discourse bears the main responsibility of the low reputation of religious judges.200 
The novelty of the Israeli system lies precisely in the secular influence over 
religious law. The imposition of secular legal standards through legislative intervention 
                                                 
198 A v. Tel-Aviv Rabbinical Court, HCJ 2232/03 available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html. 
199 Nira Yuval-Davis, “The Bearers of the Collective: Women and Religious Legislation in Israel,” 
Feminist Review, n. 4 (1980), 15-27. 
200 Rav Dichovsky, “A Critique of Rabbinical Court Decisions,” Diné Israel, n. 13-14 (1986-1988), 7-19 
[Hebrew]. 
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and the judicial correction of constitutional deficits cause a secularly-oriented 
development of religious law. However, religious jurisdiction remains exclusive in 
some fundamental matters such as marriage and divorce, and applies parameters that 
impinge on the freedom of consciousness. Therefore, an effective solution would be to 
create a system of completely competent jurisdictions, whereby the adjudication is 
based on the free will of the litigants. Moreover, religious authority could serve also as 
arbitrator and mediator in pre-divorce phase, a diffuse practice in Israel,201 which 
guarantees both the maintenance of the religious moral authority within society and the 
full respect of fundamental rights standards in judicial activity. 
The inverse process, that is religious influence over secular norms, cannot be 
considered in the sense of a “theocratization” of Israeli society. Indeed, the unclear 
separation of religion and State, specifically in family law, did not prevent, for instance, 
the development of a comprehensive protection of same-sex couples, which are 
recognized as cohabiters and guaranteed rights as couples that contracted marriage 
under common law. Moreover, the High Court has recently recognized the right to 
same-sex couples’ unity in the case of foreign partner202 and the right to adopt by 
lesbians.203 
                                                 
201 Susan R. Zaidel, Divorce With Respect—A Guide to Divorce and Divorce Mediation in Israel, 53-55. 
202 HCJ 3045/05, Ben-Ari v. Director of Population, 2 IsrLR 2006, 283-328. 
203 CA 10280/01, Yaros-Hakak v. Attorney-General, 59(5) PD 64. 
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The coexistence of traditional-religious and contemporary-secular realms of 
rights also reflects in the system of protection of associational rights, which is analyzed 
in the next section. 
3. BETWEEN COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL 
The protection of rights stemming from ethno-religious identity takes a double track. 
The Ottoman millet has been adapted in order to guarantee collective rights in form of 
self-governed groups, while individual rights are protected as part of freedom of 
religion and consciousness. 
Thus, there exists a dual approach, communitarian and individualistic, and 
citizens are free to live the social realm they prefer. However, these two legal-social 
dimensions sometimes clash, and again the judicial intervention of the Supreme Court 
balances among recognized social interests. 
Minorities live in a State that recognizes both Jewish and democratic values as 
part of its constitutional principles; thus, cultural and national self-determination is 
limited and conditioned on the acceptance of Jewish values as constituent principles of 
the State. Conditioned existence in a Jewish society is considered by some authors the 
major impediment to the free development of Arab national aspirations in Israel,204 
which is, in their opinion, controlled and discriminated.205 According to Yiftachel, 
                                                 
204 This position is the basic argument in favor of a bi-national Jewish-Arab State. 
205 Nadim N. Rouhana, Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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Israel social space is divided in different spheres: the center is occupied by the dominant 
the Jewish-Ashkenazi establishment, while at the periphery lie Arabs and Oriental 
Jews.206 
According to these authors, Israel, by considering Jewish values as constituent 
principles of the State, systemically discriminates against non-Jewish minorities, in that 
they would be constitutionally excluded from the development of their cultural and 
social narratives.207 However, these positions do not consider the complexity of Israeli 
society and share a theoretically biased position. 
First, these authors do not give enough consideration to the enormous 
complexity of the operational development of the Jewish nature of the State. Israel is by 
and large a secular democracy, which refers to Jewishness as part of its national and 
social narrative. The Jewish character is differently enacted by State institutions. On the 
one hand, there is the Supreme Court, which in its jurisprudence refers to Judaism as a 
sum of values and principles to be balanced with democratic values and principles.208 
On the other, Jewishness is promoted by the main religious institution—i.e., the Chief 
Rabbinate—which provides religious services (including synagogues and ritual baths), 
administrates rabbinical judiciary (such as marriages, divorces, and kashruth 
                                                 
206 See, Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy—Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 163-8 and 215-21. 
207 See, Sami Smooha, “Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: the Status of the Arab minority in 
Israel” Ethnic and racial Studies, vol. 13, n. 3 (July 1990), 389-413. 
208 This view is epitomized by Justice Barak’s words in the ruling 11280/02 (HCJ), The Central Election 
Committee v. MK Ahmad Tibi and Azmi Bishara, available in English at www.court.gov.il, see supra, 
section 1. 
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certificates) and is in charge of rabbis ordination and appointment.209 The Chief 
Rabbinate promotes Orthodox Judaism, although Orthodox Jews constitute a minority 
both in Israel and the Jewish world. Thus, since Orthodox Jews are minority, the 
institutional position that they occupy is the result of the minority protection 
arrangements and the communal legal system of Israel. 
Secondly, the theoretical framework within which the abovementioned 
arguments are developed is narrowed to the point that it denies the possibility of 
minority groups to self-determination in an ethnic State. This position would be tenable, 
if Israel denied both group autonomy and individual protection of fundamental rights, 
but, since Israel recognizes cultural autonomy and to some extent communal autonomy, 
the argument lacks constitutional and historical support. The following section focuses 
on the legal organization of the Israeli millet. 
3.1 The Israeli millet 
In Israel, collective rights assume two forms of communal arrangements: traditional-
communal autonomy, which originates from the historical Palestinian millet, and 
cultural-religious autonomy, which originates from State arrangements. In addition, the 
Israeli legal system provides for protection of fundamental rights based on an 
individualistic approach. 
                                                 
209 Powers and obligations of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel are regulates by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel 
Law of 1980. 
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Legally, it is possible to draw a distinction between the two dimensions of 
cultural rights. Communal autonomy is regulated by statutory law, and considered part 
of pre-Israeli historical heritage, while individual rights are direct part of the 
constitution. Although no constitutional provision regulates it, communal autonomy can 
be considered part of Israeli unwritten constitution for two reasons: the traditional millet 
is an adaptation of the legal-historical heritage of Ottoman origin, and institutional 
behavior shows abidance by the pre-State de facto situation and tendency not to subvert 
it but to adapt it to new standards. 
The Israeli legislator has progressively introduced norms for adapting traditional 
arrangements to modern standards. In this sense, communal autonomy can be 
considered as a constitutional custom, thus part of Israeli unwritten constitution. 
3.1.1 Traditional Communal Autonomy 
In the Ottoman millet, ethno-religious communities were recognized managerial 
autonomy and movable or immovable property rights. After the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, the millet system was adopted by the British mandatory authorities and 
regulated by the Palestine Order in Council according to obligations imposed by the 
Mandate. 
Art. 9, part.2, of the Mandate recognizes the principle of both personal and 
communal managerial autonomy. Specifically, it recognizes communal funds, called 
wakfs, to be administrated “in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the 
founders.” Charitable funds were established for charitable purposes, such as 
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educational, religious, or health assistance activities. The wakfs also administrated Holy 
Places. The Mandate recognizes these forms of communal property, and introduced new 
principles of governance.210 
Arts. 13 and 15, part 2, recognize autonomy in management of Holy Places and 
educational autonomy respectively. However, the right and the duty to interfere with 
communal management are imposed on the basis of the principles of good governance 
and public order. Again, art. 16 recognizes “religious” and “eleemosynary bodies” as 
part of communities’ internal affairs, but retains the right to supervise wakfs activities in 
order to guarantee the respect of good governance and public order.211 
The Palestine Order in Council endorsed these principles and recognized 
Christian ecclesiastic leaderships (the Patriarchates and the Latin Archbishop), the 
Chief Rabbinate, and the Supreme Muslim Council as the authorities in charge of 
administrating communal affairs and, specifically, communal property.212 Moreover, the 
High Commissioner used to appoint special committees of supervision of wakfs 
governance. This system eventually collapsed after the War of Independence, in 1948-
1949, which caused many Arabs to flee from Mandatory Palestine. 
After the war, Israeli authorities appointed Muslim Commissions that, 
“resembling… wakf committees, but without their powers, [helped] channel 
                                                 
210 Yitzhak Reiter, Islamic Institution in Jerusalem—Palestinian Muslim Organization under Jordanian 
and Israeli Rule, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 23-6. 
211 Ibid., 5. 
212 David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel, (SF: Westview, 1990) 167-8. 
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government funds, [supervised] education and welfare, and [oversaw] holy sites.”213 
Moreover, the government allocated funds for the preservation and construction of 
mosques and cemeteries, and for training qadis. Despite these favorable policies, the 
situation remained blurred, in that the old millet system collapsed after religious 
authorities fled. 
Subsequently, the Knesset approved the Absentees’ Property Law of 1950, 
which empowered the Ministry of Religious Affairs to appoint a custodian to manage 
the Muslim wakfs. The appointed custodian was a non-Muslim Israeli, which caused 
resentment among Muslims, and often declared acquirable lands and properties that 
could not be managed by Muslim commissions for reasons of historical importance or 
internal incapability of governance.214 
Subsequently, Israel restored the millet system by introducing new principles 
that restricted communal autonomy of management. Two kinds of agreement can be 
outlined, which differ according to the degree of State intervention in internal affairs of 
the communities. Christians and Baha’is enjoy the largest degree of autonomy, while 
Muslims, Druze, and Jews are directly controlled by the government. All communities 
are, however, subject to Israeli legislation that deals with religious and historical 
heritage protection. In virtue of the Law for the Protection of Holy Places of 1967 and 
                                                 
213 Robert H. Eiseman, Islamic Law in Palestine and Israel: a History of the Survival of Tanzimat and 
Shari’a in the British Mandate and the Jewish State, (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 225. 
214 Ibid., 240-243. Subsequently, the Land Acquisition Law 1953 was passed, which guaranteed equitable 
compensation for lands acquired out of negotiation with the custodian or on the basis of governmental 
decisions. 
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the Antiquities Law of 1978, Israel commits to protect holy places and archaeological 
sites and goods. 
The Israeli Baha’i community is composed of volunteers, who reside in the State 
but are not citizens and take care of Baha’i holy places.215 In 1987, an international 
agreement was signed between the Israeli Government and the International Baha’i 
Community, which guarantees to world Baha’is the right to pilgrimage. By this 
agreement, Israel commits to protect Baha’i holy places and guarantees a certain degree 
of autonomy in property administration.216 
A different statue regulates Christian communities, which are entitled to full 
communal autonomy, including the power to levy taxes, as it was during the Ottoman 
Empire, in virtue of the Religious Committees Ordinance of 1926, issued by the British 
authorities during the Mandate. As Kretzmer points out, Christian communities have 
                                                 
215 Baha’i faith has developed in the 19th century from Shi’i Islam. Its fundamental principle lies in the 
concept of relative and progressive revelation: while there is one God, His humanly manifestations are 
different and embodied in several prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Buddha, Krishna, Jesus of 
Nazareth, Mahomet, and Bab, who founded and independent religious movement in Iran, from which 
Baha’is developed their faith. The Baha’i doctrine can be summarized in the motto “Unity in Diversity,” 
with a pedagogic vocation toward peace and coexistence, which explains Baha’is devotion to social 
causes and their commitment to cooperation activities. The internal structure of the Baha’i community, 
based on local elected councils, reflects their views on international relations, which envisage the 
abolition of national armies and the constitution of an international federated army with goals of 
enforcement of laws and statues adopted by an international parliament of the nations. Baha’is have faced 
persecution in Islamic countries for accusation of apostasy and polytheistic worship. In Iran, Iraq, and 
Egypt, legislative provisions directly discriminate against Baha’i followers. In Haifa, Northern Israel, 
there is the World Baha’i Temple, which makes of Israel reference State for Baha’is. See William S. 
Hatcher and J. Douglas Martin, The Baha’í Faith: The Emerging of a Global Religion, (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1998); on the persecution of post-Islamic creeds, see Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
216 Moreover, the Baha’i sites in Israel have been recently included in the World Heritage List of 
UNESCO, for their central relevance in Baha’i culture and religion. See the UNESCO World Heritage 
Commission decision 31 of 2007. 
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never established communal organs, by relying on ecclesiastical hierarchies, which are 
the referees to Israeli governments.217 
Christian denominations still enjoy communal autonomy and are represented by 
their ecclesiastical authorities as in Ottoman times, whereby they have property rights, 
arrange educational and religious activities, and manage health institutions. However, 
the arrangements of the Mandate period have been subject to general legislation, such as 
the principles of preservation and inalienability of archaeological properties, and the 
principles issued by the Ministry of Education as for school curricula. 
A special statue is reserved to the Catholic Church, in that it enjoys the 
protection of an international quasi-state body: the Holy See. Israel and the Holy See 
signed a Fundamental Agreement in 1993, whereby Israel guarantees the Catholic 
Church to freely administrate educational, religious, and health institutions according to 
Israeli governmental guidelines (arts. 3 and 6), and both parties commit to respect the 
status quo as far as holy places are concerned (arts. 4 and 5). Particular emphasis is 
given to property rights of the Church (art. 10), which can be exercised in harmony with 
Israeli legislation.218 
Although these arrangements originate from a legal tradition rooted in the millet 
system, the international guarantees of the Baha’i and the Catholic communities are 
                                                 
217 David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel, (SF: Westview, 1990), 168. 
218 See, FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND THE STATE OF 
ISRAEL, singed on 30 December 1993, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1993/12/Fundamental%20Agreement%20-
%20Israel-Holy%20See 
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enshrined in international law, specifically, in international agreements concluded by 
the State of Israel and international bodies that represent those communities.219 On the 
contrary, Muslims, Druze, and Jews enjoy rights and are subject to obligations directly 
part of the Israeli legal system. In other words, their autonomy derives from the fact that 
they are Israeli citizens who belong to specific communities, to which the State accord 
self-government freedom. 
In 1957, Israel recognized the autonomy of the Druze community. Besides the 
provisions for autonomous jurisdiction over personal status, the State accorded self-
government arrangements for religious services and for managing communal properties. 
The representative body is the Druze Religious Council, composed of male members of 
notable families appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which allocates funds 
for religious and educational services and supervises the implementation of the 
budget.220 
Muslim self-government was recognized in 1966, by the Wakf Law, which 
recognized the Islamic institution of charitable funds, but established a series of 
restrictions such as the inalienability of mosques properties and cemeteries lands. The 
principle of destination is particularly relevant. The Wakf Law restored the system of 
pre-existing Islamic funds and permitted the creation of new ones, but with only for 
                                                 
219 These arrangements resemble the Concordat, such as the one signed by Italy and the Holy See. See, 
Carlo Cardia, Ordinamenti Religiosi e Ordinamento dello Stato, (Bologna: Mulino, 2003), ch. 2. 
220 Socially, the Druze community is privileged within the Arab minority since they are loyal to the State 
and serve in the army. In a context of external, and, since recently, also internal threat, this group is fully 
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purposes of education, religious services, or health services. In this way, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs maintains a direct control over the community and prevents the 
possibility of acquiring external funds for non-religious purposes.221 
Finally, Jewish religious councils depend on the Chief Rabbinate as direct 
emanation of the Ministry for Religious Affairs. They organize religious services by 
administrating synagogues, ritual baths, and religious ceremonies; moreover, they are 
committed to spread Jewish education, in particular by funding and managing Talmudic 
academies (yeshivas).222 As for the other communities, the Chief Rabbinate depends on 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs for allocation of funds, budget approval and 
supervision. 
These communities pursue self-determination within the framework of limited 
autonomy guaranteed by the State, which anyway retains the ultimate control of 
communal activities. By recognizing communal autonomy, Israel gave continuity to the 
millet system, thus including communitarianism in the Israeli constitutional system. 
However, autonomy is consistently reduced by general legislation, to which all 
communities are subject, and by the direct control of the government. 
                                                                                                                                               
accepted rightly because it has recognized Israel as a Jewish and democratic State, compromising 
tradition with modern Israeli life-style. 
221 See Aharon Layish, “The Muslim Wakf in Israel,” Asian and African Studies, vol. 2, n. 1 (1966), 41-
76. 
222 The Chief Rabbinate organizes different yeshivas according to the target such as children, high school 
youngsters, and young married men, Orthodox men who accept to serve in the army, girls, converts, and 
newly religious persons. 
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Indeed, the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is not only of coordinating 
religious communities, but also of controlling communal activities. The main power of 
control remains financial, whereby funds are allocated by the Ministry, which retains 
the power of supervising implementation. By this doing, the Ministry can influence 
internal life of the communities and indirectly decide the activities that it considers 
worth pursuing. Two problems stem from the arrangements, which are related to both 
inter-communal and intra-communal discrimination. 
Inter-communal discrimination originates from governmental power to allocate 
funds. Since the ruling elite of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is Orthodox or ultra-
Orthodox, Jewish institutions are preferred in the funding procedure. Claims of 
discrimination in fund allocation have been treated by the Supreme Court, which after a 
period of self-restraint, decided to intervene. In Kaadan v. Jewish Agency, the Court 
found that the allocation of funds to Jewish institutions was disproportionate and 
consequently ordered the Ministry of Religious Affairs to equally re-allocate funds 
among the religious communities.223 
Intra-communal discrimination is related to the clash between the general 
principles of the State and the religious principles that inspire communal activities. 
Specifically, the principle of gender equality is the most contested. Again, the Supreme 
Court intervened in order to protect the principle of equality over the principle of 
                                                 
223 See HCJ 6698/95, Kaadan v. Jewish Agency, in Dinim 57, 573. Previously, in Adalah v. Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (HCJ 240/98, in 52 (5) P.D. 167), the Court dismissed the claim of discrimination in 
fund allocation claiming that the argument was too vague. 
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religious freedom and the principle of autonomous government. In Shakdiel,224 the 
Court ruled against the decision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs to dismiss the 
appointment of a woman to a religious council. The Court found that the reason of the 
dismissal was that the appointee was a woman, and this constitutes a gender 
discrimination sanctioned by Israeli law. Again, in Poraz,225 the Court ruled that a 
woman cannot be excluded from the committee for electing local rabbis on the basis of 
her gender. 
Communal autonomy in Israel is thus subject to a three-fold control. First, the 
Ministry guarantees the existence and the operability of communal institutions by 
coordinating and supervising communal activities. Secondly, communities are subject 
to the legal principles of the State and statutory legislation, and, finally, the Supreme 
Court reviews institutional decisions in accordance with fundamental legal principles. 
This system of control guarantees both group autonomy and social cohesion, in 
that communities are free to pursue their goals, and at the same time are prevented from 
constituting separate social bodies. Particularly, this system effectively works because, 
besides communal autonomy, individual protection of rights is guaranteed, so that to 
enjoy certain religious or cultural rights one has not to be subject to communal 
authority; although cultural and religious activities are organized by communal 
                                                 
224 See, HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister for Religious Affairs et al., 42(2) P.D. 221. 
225 See, HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Lahat, Mayor of Tel Aviv et al. 42(2) P.D. 309. 
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institutions, the individual dimension is equally respected and enforced by judicial 
intervention. 
3.1.2 The individual dimension: between law and judiciary 
Individual rights coexist in Israel together with collective rights. Historically, the right 
to diversity in rooted in the Declaration of Independence and sanctioned by the Bill of 
Rights. 
Freedom of religion and freedom of consciousness are enshrined in the 
Declaration of Independence and constitute basic principles of the State, which inspired 
anti-discriminatory legislation and special provisions for enabling the exercise of rights. 
It is the case of Employment Service Law 5719-1959 and the Succession Law 5725-
1965, which guarantee equality conditions in employment and in heritage controversies. 
Moreover, Defamation Law 5725-1965 enables judicial actions against speeches or 
texts considered defamatory of one religion or tradition. 
These principles not only are at the basis of anti-discrimination approaches, but 
also grant particular rights that are enjoyable rightly because one belongs to a certain 
group. For instance, Hours of Work and Rest Law 5711-1951 guarantees the possibility 
for Muslims and Christians to respect the rest day on Fridays and Sundays respectively, 
while the State follows the Jewish calendar. Similarly, the Law of Return 5710-1950 
and Nationality Law 5712-1952 directly accord Israeli citizenship to Jews and their 
relatives. This particular right recognized to Jews is often cited as direct discrimination 
against non-Jews. 
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However, as Lapidoth and Ahimeir emphasize, 
this privilege does not involve proper discrimination on religious 
grounds for several reasons… When a people attains statehood in 
fulfillment of its aspirations for national liberation it is common and 
natural that all members of that people are permitted and invited … to 
live in that country.226 
Legally, States are allowed to establish preferences in attaining citizenship as long as 
this does not involve discrimination of a particular group.227 Indeed, Israel accords this 
preference only to Jews and their relatives, while anyone else undergoes the same 
procedure established by the Nationality Law. 
In addition to these specific provisions, the Knesset approved a bill of rights in 
the 1990s, the Basic Law: Human liberty and Dignity 5752-1992, as a result of 
negotiations between religious and conservative parties on the one hand, and the secular 
and liberal parties on the other. This law, together with the principles of freedom, 
justice, equity, and peace of Israel’s heritage contained in the Foundation Law of 5740-
1980, serves as parameter for the judicial review. The Supreme Court asserted its power 
to review Israeli legislation and institutional acts in light of these fundamental 
principles.228 
                                                 
226 Ruth Lapidoth and Ora Ahimeir, Freedom of Religion in Jerusalem, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute 
for Israel Studies, 1999), 17. 
227 See art. 1, par. 3, of the UN Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
228 The main legal problem stems from the fact that Israel does not have a mono-act written constitution; 
on the contrary, it is spread in different legal acts, such as the basic laws. In United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., et 
al. v. Migdal Village, 49 (4) P.D. 221 (1995), the Court first ruled that it is among the powers of the 
Supreme Court to operate judicial review. On the development of the judicial review in Israel see, Yoram 
Rabin and Yuval Shany, “The Case for Judicial Review over Social Rights: Israeli Perspectives,” Israel 
Affairs, vol. 14, n. 4 (October 2008), 681-703. 
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The importance of religious sentiment notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a narrow approach in interpreting the scope of religious rights, while its judges 
constantly balance among equally relevant interests.229 For instance, in Lior Horev et al. 
v. The Minister of Transportation,230 the Court withheld the decision of the 
transportation authority to close a street during Shabbats, in order to protect the interest 
of religious resident of a neighborhood. The judges found that there was no balance 
between the religious interest to Shabbat observance and the secular interest to free 
circulation. 
After decades of specific legislation, the general level of protection of individual 
rights has consolidated in the progressive constitutionalization of fundamental rights. 
By the assertion of judicial review, the Supreme Court operates as the main guardian of 
individual rights in the legal system. 
Individualist-liberal approach and the traditional-communal approach of self-
government coexist with a further model of protection, which focuses on cultural 
collective rights. 
3.2 Cultural Collective Rights: Education and Languages 
The protection of cultural rights shows a different approach in the recognition of group 
identity. Israel recognizes collective rights to the Arab group, which is considered as a 
linguistic-cultural minority as a whole, while in the communal system, the State treats 
                                                 
229 Ruth Lapidoth and Ora Ahimeir, Freedom of Religion in Jerusalem, 5-9. 
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ethno-religious groups separately. In other words, Israel emphasizes different aspects of 
identity according to the form of protection that is guaranteed to the groups. 
Consequently, in communal autonomy, Israel recognizes the variety of ethno-religious 
identities, while in cultural autonomy Israel recognizes linguistic-cultural identities. 
Two main linguistic groups are recognized: Hebrew, spoken by Jews, and 
Arabic, spoken by Arabs, Christians, Muslims, Bedouins, and Druze alike. In addition 
to these two main groups, Israel recognizes cultural autonomy to the small Circassian 
community. 
Both Hebrew and Arabic are official languages of the State, as established by 
art. 82 of the Palestine Order in Council, though Hebrew enjoys particular status in 
connection with the Jewish nature of the State. Place names, currency, stamps, and 
emblems bear both Hebrew and Arabic writings, but Hebrew is the language of the 
institutions. Indeed, the Parliament, the Courts, and the Government use Hebrew as the 
main language of communication. However, Arabic and other immigrants’ languages, 
such as Russian and Amharic, are intensively used in social life and media 
communication.231 
Legal recognition of cultural autonomy stems from statutory law that has been 
enacted after the independence as well as from the policies adopted by the Ministry of 
                                                                                                                                               
230 HCJ 5016/96, 51 PD (4) 1, 34. 
231 Bernard Spolsky and Elana Goldberg Shohami, The Languages of Israel: Policy, Ideology and 
Practice, (Trowbridge, GB: Cromwell, 1999), 128-37, and 234-48. 
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Education, which functions as a coordinator of both public and private educational 
institutions. 
The principle of cultural autonomy was endorsed in the Compulsory Education 
Law of 1949, which establishes schools of both Arabic and Hebrew languages, and lets 
citizens free to choose what school to attend.232 In addition, State Education Law of 
1953 establishes different curricula for non-Jewish minorities in order to empower 
minority cultural preservation. This law conditions educational curricula on the 
approval of the Ministry of Education. 
Finally, the Schools Control Law of 1969 allows private institutions to 
administrate educational programs and schools, always under the control of the Ministry 
of Education.233 
Traditional cultural autonomy in communal self-government has not been 
completely reversed by new provisions. The Israeli system can be considered as a 
combination of both cultural and communal autonomy. On the one hand, the public 
system gives the possibility to choose the language of instruction as in other legal 
systems, such as Italy with German language schools in South-Tyrol; and on the other, 
                                                 
232 The choice of which school to attend is somehow socially driven. Arabs are expected to attend Arab 
schools and Jews are expected to attend Hebrew schools. However, there are many cases of “inverted 
choice,” such as the Arab-Israeli writer and journalist Sayed Kashua, who was educated in Hebrew 
schools and works mainly for Hebrew press. Kashua is seen as a sort of collaborator by the Arabs in that 
he turns to the Jewish audience, while his assimilation is incompatible with the Jewish majority being an 
Arab. See, Livne Neri, “The Wandering Arab” Haaretz, 9th January 2004 [Hebrew]. Many Jewish 
families decide to send their children to Arab schools for primary education, as it sometimes happens in 
Jaffa, or to bi-lingual (both Hebrew and Arabic) schools. 
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the State allows private organizations to manage educational institutions as in the 
traditional millet arrangements. 
Private schools are run by ethno-religious institutions, such as Christian 
churches, Islamic wakfs, and ultra-Orthodox foundations. This system resembles the 
Ottoman communal arrangement, with the main difference that these communities do 
not constitute separate societal bodies, in that all educational institutions are subject to 
the central control of State authority. 
This mixed system empowers minorities to perpetuate their cultures even when 
the community is small. For instance, the Circassian population in Israel amounts to 
3000 citizens,234 who share traditions and language of Caucasian origin.235 The 
autonomous educational system allows this small community to perpetuate traditions 
and language both in Arab and Hebrew schools. The same holds true for Druze and 
Christians. Moreover, each school can follow a specific calendar of festivals in virtue of 
the Hours of Work and Rest Law 5711-1951. 
Similarly, Ultra-Orthodox Jews opt for separate private schools in order to keep 
particular social rules, such as a strict division of sexes in public life, and to prevent 
                                                                                                                                               
233 Private schools are mainly run by Christians and ultra-Orthodox Jews. David Kretzmer, The Legal 
Status of the Arabs in Israel, 170. 
234 The data was collected from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.google.com/search?ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-
8&q=circassian&btnG=Google+Search&domains=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mfa.gov.il&sitesearch=http%
3A%2F%2Fwww.mfa.gov.il 
235 See, Isabelle Kreindler, Marsha Bensoussan, Eleanor Avinor, and Chen Bram, “Circassian Israelis: 
Multilingualism as a Way of Life,” Language, Culture and Curriculum, vol.8, n.2 (1995), 149-162, 
available at www.circassianworld.com/Israel.html. 
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their kids from speaking Hebrew as daily life language, while they prefer to speak 
Yiddish.236 
While cultural autonomy serves as a tool for protecting minorities, separate 
educational bodies may concur to create diverse social units, which stress diversity 
rather than unity. However, the danger of desegregation is avoided by the central 
control wielded by the Ministry of Education. 
Central control over educational curricula is realized in coordination with 
professional commissions for cultural minorities within the Ministry of Education. In 
the case of the Arab Commission, for instance, a new curriculum for Islamic studies 
was issued in the 1980s, in order to permit pupils of all levels to conciliate between 
Arab-Islamic identity and Israeli citizenship.237 The same system of autonomy allows 
educational institutions to enjoy cultural rights by following a specific religious 
calendar and celebrate festivals.238 
On the contrary, State control over private educational institutions and 
educational curricula in public institutions is considered as a restriction of cultural self-
determination. By regulating educational curricula, the State exerts control power over 
the cultural development of those groups to which educational policies are directed. 
Specifically, Israel “is unwilling to contribute to the memorialization of the Arab-
                                                 
236 On the use of Yiddish by ultra-Orthodox Jews see Michal Tannenbaum; Netta Abugov; and Dorit 
Ravid, “Hebrew-language Narratives of Yiddish-speaking Ultra-Orthodox Girls in Israel,” Journal of 
Multilingual and Multicultural Development, vol. 29, n. 6 (November 2006), 472-490. 
237 Ruth Lapidoth and Ora Ahimeir, Freedom of Religion in Jerusalem, 25. 
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Palestinian past. In the Jewish State the meaningful past should be Jewish only because 
it is believed that ‘history’ should legitimize Zionism.”239 
A claim of discrimination can be argued on the basis of systemic discrimination 
against a minority group—i.e. non-recognition. By recognizing both communal and 
cultural autonomies, Israel does not directly discriminate against minorities. However, a 
further claim of discrimination can be argued in front of State policies toward 
minorities. In other words, minorities can face indirect discrimination when a State 
enacts policies that aim to restrict the space of minority culture in favor and to impose 
the majority culture. Indeed, a State can guarantee cultural autonomy by simultaneously 
imposing the majority culture to its minorities: that State discriminates against 
minorities since it impedes their self-determination. 
The question then shifts from recognition to State policies toward minorities. 
For instance, linguistic rights can be guaranteed, but schools are compelled to teach a 
certain view of history or to adopt certain ideological visions that result incompatible 
with minority cultures. Hence, a State can discriminate against a minority not only by 
non-recognition, but also by impeding the preservation, the expression, and the 
development of minority cultures. 
Specifically, claims of direct or indirect discrimination against Arab minorities 
in Israel are not tenable. Separate schools and specific educational curricula are 
                                                                                                                                               
238 Ibid. 
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appropriate means of preservation and expression of minority cultures. On the other 
hand, one may argue that the space of development is reduced by State control over 
cultural expression. 
However, it is necessary for the State to guarantee social cohesion, which 
envisages also a common ground of principles that unify people belonging to different 
groups. One may argue that, in Israel, the space of cultural development of non-Jewish 
minorities is per se reduced, being Israel a Jewish State. The question is then not direct 
or indirect discrimination, but the free development of minority cultures within a State 
that embraces a specific culture and ideology. 
Indeed, ultra-Orthodox Jews face the same problem; while Arabs argue that their 
social space of cultural development is reduced due to the Jewish nature of the State, 
ultra-Orthodox Jews are impeded to further develop their cultural views that reject 
Zionism, while Israel is based on Zionist ideology. 
The issue of basic principles and ideology of a State can be considered from a 
political and a legal point of view. Politically, the space of development of minority 
cultures can broaden if minority elites effectively negotiate with State authorities, which 
may confer more rights or guarantee a deeper, more effective exercise of those rights. A 
State is more likely to concede broader autonomy as long as it does not consider the 
development of minority group as incompatible with its vision and principles. However, 
                                                                                                                                               
239 Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law—Politics and Culture of Legal Identities, (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2003), 110. 
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this possibility remains a political issue that depends on elite-bargaining and minority 
political mobilization. 
The role of law does not cease once a State constitutionally accommodates 
diverse groups by guaranteeing cultural preservation and expression. On the contrary, 
legal protection of rights can still serve to protect minority interests through anti-
discrimination. Again, the individualistic approach of protection of rights can 
effectively address those issues that a State refuses to accommodate. In other words, 
when the State refrains from actively protecting minorities, then, the individual 
dimension of cultural rights emerges as an effective tool to claim accommodation. 
In Israel, the Supreme Court has defended the linguistic rights of the Arab group 
against the hegemonic use of Hebrew. In this sense, the Supreme Court, by endorsing a 
perspective of individual right to language use, broadened the social space of expression 
of Arabs. In Reem Engineering Ltd. v. Municipality of Natzrat-Yilit,240 the Court ruled 
in favor of a building company that wanted to advertise house selling in Arabic only. 
The judges found that since the advertisement was directed mainly to Arab audience, on 
the basis of freedom of expression, there was no point of imposing a Hebrew version. In 
a previous ruling, Adalah v. Ma’atz,241 the judges obliged local authorities to guarantee 
Arabic toponyms in road sign by restating the status of Arabic as official language. The 
                                                 
240 C.A. 105/92 Reem Engineering Ltd. v. Municipality of Natzrat-Yilit, 47 P.D. (5) 189. 
241 HCJ 4438/97, Adalah v. Ma’atz, 98 Takdin (1) 11. 
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Court, by adopting an individualistic approach, intervenes to restrict the overwhelming 
hegemony of majority culture, and thereby reasserts collective interests. 
The collective and individualistic dimensions of cultural rights can both concur 
to achieve effective accommodation of minority claims. However, the combination of 
these two dimensions in the same system causes continuous negotiations between 
minority groups and institutions, so that the development of minority cultures is in 
constant evolution. Moreover, this evolution is necessarily connected to their national 
identity, which finds expression in active political life. Political representation is 
analyzed in the following section. 
4. VOICE TOOLS IN CONFRONTATIONAL SOCIETY 
The highest degree of “citizenization”242 is the participation of minority groups in 
political life. Indeed, their involvement in the decision-making process not only 
characterizes institutional openness to diversity, but guarantees the possibility to 
advance claims and protect interests from within the institutions. 
The forms of involvement vary from guaranteed seats in institutional bodies, 
special commissions, or ethnic power-sharing, which originate from constitutional 
arrangements. However, it is not necessary to guarantee political representation through 
formal procedures, in that a State can opt for de facto representation, which is 
nonetheless relevant in legal and political terms. 
                                                 
242 See, Will Kymlicka, “Multicultural Odysseys,”Ethnopolitics, vol. 6, n. 4 (2007), 585-597. 
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Israel does not guarantee political representation of minorities through formal 
procedures, while it opts for de facto representation, which stems from statutory 
provisions and judicial supervision. Electoral law is relevant to this topic, while no 
statutory provision deals with minority representation in other branches of power, which 
is guaranteed through constitutional custom.243 
The Basic Law: the Knesset 5718-1958 regulates the parliamentary system and 
includes electoral principles. Art. 4 establishes that “The Knesset shall be elected by 
general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections.” The proportional 
system in Israel has a constitutional value since it is established by a basic law, and it 
provides equal representation of all political parties participating in elections according 
to the votes that they receive. 
The proportional system was inherited from the pre-State institutional 
organization, which aimed to involve the plethora of social voices. After independence, 
minorities enjoyed this freedom and organized themselves into ethnic parties that also 
mirrored different political views. Thus, Israeli parties have both ethnic and political 
                                                 
243 Israeli institutions have progressively included Arab citizens even in upper political positions, such as 
diplomacy. In the Supreme Court, one of the judges is Arab, and even in the government Arab citizens 
are active and occupy high positions (such as the ministry of education, the ministry of regional 
development etc.). This involvement is not always beneficial to Arab Israelis’ identity, which in hung 
between Arabeness and Israliness. See, Yochaman Peres and Nira Yuval-Davis, “Some Observation on 
the Identity of Arab Israelis,” Human Relations, vol. 22, n. 3 (1969), 219-233. 
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identification. Given the high degree of conflict that characterizes Israeli society, the 
problem of anti-system parties244 has dramatically emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 
For the purpose of limiting anti-system forces in the Parliament, in 1989, an 
amendment of the Basic Law: the Knesset introduced severe limitations to participate in 
elections. Art. 7 (a) of this law establishes three principles to ban parties from 
participating in elections: the denial of the existence of Israel as the State of the Jewish 
people, denial of the democratic character of the State, and incitement to racism. These 
principles were included in the Parties Law of 1992, which includes two additional 
principles as reasons for disqualification: support to armed struggle of enemy States and 
terrorist organizations, and illegal activities conducted by the party as goals of its 
agenda. 
The authority to disqualify parties from elections lies with the Central Election 
Committee, composed of parliament members and headed by a judge of the Supreme 
Court, as established by the Knesset Election Law of 1969. The same law establishes 
that parties should organize in lists that have to submit their applications to the 
Committee, which authorizes or denies participation on the basis of the principles and 
the agendas of the parties. 
These statutory provisions are the legal basis of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the decisions of the Electoral Committee. The Court’s activism on 
                                                 
244 See, Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 133-137. 
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political participation illustrates Israel’s attitude toward minority involvement in politics 
and addresses the broader issue about the attitude of a State toward minorities with 
which it has confrontational relationships. 
After decades of political non-involvement, the Court has progressively 
increased its degree of intervention in political issues, both because of the internal 
necessity to deal with problems concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and because of the 
international pressure on Israeli policies towards Palestinians and its Arab citizens.245 
Since the 1980s, the Court has postulated its guardianship of the rule of law in political 
issues that touch the core constitutional principles of the State,246 including 
parliamentary rules, immunity of parliament members, and political participation. 
Ultimately, the Court rulings aspire to be indicators of justice, by taking into account 
social debate and institutional behavior.247 
The problem concerning the recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic 
State by non-ruling minorities has existed since the foundation of the State. Both 
institutional and judicial approaches have developed a restrictive interpretation of 
freedom of association in favor of the basic value of existence of Israel as both Jewish 
and democratic. In this sense, the free development of minorities is limited and 
restricted by the prevailing principles of eternal existence and secure life. As Barzilai 
                                                 
245 Orna Ben Nafatli and Keren Michaeli, “The Universal Judgment Authority and the State Judicial 
Discourse,” Hamishpat, vol. 9, (2004), 141-63 [Hebrew]. 
246 HCJ 652/81 Sarid v. Chairman of the Knesset, 36(2) PD 197. 
247 See Daphne Barak-Erez, “Broadening the Scope of Judicial Review in Israel” Indian Journal of 
Constitutional Law, vol. 3 (2009), 118-37, at 131-4. 
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points out, Israel’s “security-oriented liberalism” affected the social space of minorities 
by reducing their confrontational attitudes and contributed to increase liberal values 
within these communities.248 
The restrictive interpretation of the principle of association is shown in Sabri 
Jiryis v. District Commissioner, where the Supreme Court was asked to rule about the 
denial of a local authority to register the association El-Ard. This Arab association was 
based on Nasserist ideology, which spread nationalist and socialist ideas incompatible 
with the existence of Israel. The Court ruled that the denial of registration was per se 
legal but not because of the national aspirations of the Arab-Israeli citizens. On the 
contrary, the Court found that national aspirations incompatible with the existence of 
the State of Israel may theoretically be legitimate within a democratic context. 
According to the judges, it is the identification with a political movement that fomented 
warlike ideology by professing the physical destruction of the State that is not 
legitimate.249 
The doctrine of “physical destruction” as the parameter for restricting freedom 
of association was repeated in cases relating to political participation and only 
eventually was it broadened to include subversive goals in terms of denying Israel’s 
                                                 
248 The author claims that “Israel has experienced a security-oriented liberalism. This means that national 
security as State violence has been used as a criterion for preserving, eliminating, and granting rights. 
Therefore, interaction between liberalism and the security mentality have had various effects on non-
ruling communities… These interactions have elevated and empowered the State’s pressures on 
nonliberal communities to change their practices and reduce their level of autonomy. On the other hand, 
the decline in the ethos of national security due to liberalism has enhanced liberal members of nonruling 
communities to better mobilize State law.” Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law—Politics and Culture of 
Legal Identities, 95. 
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Jewish and democratic nature. Indeed, in Yardor v. Central Election Committee for the 
6th Knesset,250 the Court was asked to rule on a case of disqualification of the Arab 
Socialist List due to its denial of the existence and integrity of the State. The Court 
upheld the decision by reasserting the illegitimacy of destructive goals and defined the 
existence of Israel as a fundamental constitutional fact.251 
Following the same line of reasoning, the Court annulled the decision of the 
Central Committee for the 11th Knesset to disqualify the Jewish Kach party due to its 
racist ideology and the Arab Progressive List for Peace because its members adhered to 
the El-Ard movement. The Court found that no restriction of freedom of association 
was possible in these cases since both parties did not envisage the physical destruction 
of the State.252 The danger of increasing anti-democratic and anti-Zionist political 
activism led to the amendment of electoral law, by introducing those principles that 
recognize the “physical destruction” doctrine and broaden the possibility of ejection 
from active political life due to the denial of Israel’s Jewishness and democracy. 
On the basis of these new principles, the Court upheld the decision of the 
Central Election Committee for the 12th Knesset to disqualify the Kach party, which had 
been admitted to the previous elections, in that incompatible with the democratic nature 
                                                                                                                                               
249 HCJ 253/64, Sabri Jiryis v. District Commissioner, (1964) 18 PD (4) 673. 
250 HCJ 1/65, Yardor v. Central Committee for the 6th Knesset, (1965) PD 19(3) 365. 
251 In this decision, the Court even referred to Jewishness and democracy as basic features that 
characterize the credo of the Israeli people, but then reasoned in terms of the existence of the State as the 
main parameter of discretion in approaching questions of freedom of association. 
252 E.A. 3/84 Neiman v. Chariman of Central Election Committee for the 11th Knesset (1984) 39 PD (2) 
233. 
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of Israel.253 In Ben Shalom v. Central Election Committee for the 12th Knesset,254 the 
Court upheld the decision to allow the participation of the Arab Progressive List for 
Peace. The Court interpreted the Jewish nature of Israel in terms of the Jewish majority 
of the State, the privilege accorded to Jews by automatic citizenship, and the special 
relationship with Diaspora Jews. This interpretation added new points of view to the 
definition of Israel’s Jewishness given by Justice Barak.255 However, the most 
important point consists of the interpretative test outlined in the decision. 
The judges found that the formal statement whereby the list commits to pursue 
anti-system principles is not a sufficient rationale for disqualification. On the contrary, 
the test should follow a factual rationale, whereby the anti-system aim has to be central 
in the political agenda of the list and it has to be pursued in actual political life, 
specifically by participation in the elections. In this specific case, the list in question did 
not meet the requirements for its exclusion from political life. 
Subsequently, the Court applied this test also to the decisions of the electoral 
committee about disqualifications of propaganda methods. In other words, even though 
the party is allowed to participate in the elections because it does not meet the 
requirement for disqualification, its political propaganda is restricted according to the 
same principles of disqualification. 
                                                 
253 The decision, known as Neiman II, is the first decision about the disqualification of lists on the basis 
of the principles introduced by the amendment. See, E.A. 1/88 Neiman v. Chariman of Central Election 
Committee for the 12th Knesset (1988) 42 PD (4) 177. 
254 E.A. 2/88, Ben Shalom v. Central Election Committee for the 12th Knesset, (1988) PD 43(4) 221. 
255 Supra, section 1. 
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Accordingly, in Herut—The National Jewish Movement v. Chairman of the 
Central Election Committee for the 16th Knesset,256 the Court ruled that freedom of 
speech in political propaganda should be limited when it exceeds the tolerance threshold 
of public sentiment. In that case, the judges found that that propaganda passed the 
threshold in that it praised Islamist martyrdom and denied the existence of Israel by 
preaching the banishment of Jews from Israel’s territory, and contemptuously used the 
national anthem and flag. 
By contrast, in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Chairman of the Central 
Election Committee for the 16th Knesset,257 the Court overturned the decision of the 
Committee to ban propaganda broadcast showing the Palestinian flag and identifying 
the list with Arafat’s party. The argument of the Committee was based on the 
identification of that Arab list with hostile nationalist groups, whose actions are 
incompatible with the existence of the State. However, the Court established that 
freedom of speech was in this case superior in that it did not involve any direct offense 
to public sentiment—as it did in the previous case with reference to victims of terrorist 
attacks. 
By and large, it is difficult to trace a general approach of the Court with regard 
to political participation. However, after the endorsement of constitutional principles as 
parameters for disqualification, the doctrine of “physical destruction” was broadened to 
                                                 
256 HCJ 212/03 Herut—The National Jewish Movement v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee 
for the 16th Knesset, 57 PD (1) 750. 
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include also the constitutional reversal of essential State principles. The Court has 
adopted a restrictive approach, allowing disqualification in cases of real and actual 
danger of destruction or subversion. 
Nevertheless, some authors claim that conditioning the participation in elections 
to the acceptance of Israel as a Jewish State is per se a discrimination against non-
Jewish minorities.258 As argued above, discriminatory attitude of State institutions 
should be based on systemic exclusion, which is not the case, or on impediment to 
social and political development of a group. In the case of Israel, two main principles 
can be drawn from the limitations imposed on the participation in political life: the 
acceptance of the physical existence of the State, deriving from the “physical 
destruction” doctrine, and the acceptance of distinctive constitutional features of the 
State, stemming from the “constitutional reversal” doctrine. 
Can a State impose certain essential visions on its minority communities? Are 
minority communities obliged to refrain from pursuing their national aspirations that are 
basically incompatible with essential constitutional features of the State? Besides 
historical and political questions specifically connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the 
core problem regards the operational scope of political rights in a context of 
confrontational relations between the majority and non-ruling minorities. 
                                                                                                                                               
257 HCJ 651/03, Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee for 
the 16th Knesset, IsrSC (57) 2 62. 
258 See, Yvonne Schmidt, Foundations of Civil and Political Rights in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories, (Doctoral Dissertation, Norderstedt, Germany: GRIN, 2001), 284-286. 
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While recognizing the necessity to defend the existence of a State and its 
democratic nature, some authors deny the possibility for a State to embrace a certain 
ideological view to the extent that it becomes the parameter for enjoying political rights. 
For instance, Kremnitzer recognizes the necessity to limit active political rights to anti-
democratic movements and to parties that support hostile and terrorist groups, but he 
rejects the possibility that Israel’s Jewishness can become a parameter for guaranteeing 
or restricting political life.259 
The interpretation that the Court has given over the years of Israel’s Jewishness 
involves cultural issues such as language, traditions, historical heritage, and political 
goals such as the connection with the Jewish Diaspora. As Gavison emphasizes, 
although “principled commitment to the idea of Israel as the State of the Jewish people 
does not follow from, and is not mandated by, any conception of democracy,” 
nevertheless, “such commitment is allowed” before the law, therefore, “it may be 
justified to place certain limits on formal democracy” that aim to protect that 
commitment.260 This characterization does not forcibly discriminate against diverse 
groups. Indeed, States’ identification with a majority culture or even with a majority 
                                                 
259 Mordechai Kremnitzer, Disqualification of Lists and Parties: The Case of Israel, in Andras Sajo (ed.), 
Militant Democracy, (Utrecht: Eleven, 2004) 161-8. See also, Peter Cumper, Europe, Islam and 
Democracy—Balancing Religious and Secular Values under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
in European Yearbook on Minority Issues, EURAC & European Center for Minority Issues, vol. 3 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003-4), 163-80. 
260 Ruth Gavison, Twenty Years after Yardor: The Right to Stand for Election and the Lessons of History, 
in: Ruth Gavison and Mordechai Kremnitzer (eds.), Essays in Honor of Shimon Agranat, (Jerusalem: 
Graf Press, 1986), 160 [Hebrew], the English translation is quoted in Yoav Peled, “Ethnic Democracy 
and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State,” American Political Science 
Review, vol. 86, n.2 (June, 1992), 432-443, at p. 441, note 9. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 144 -
political goal does not imply incompatibility of minority social life with majority 
culture. Moreover, the constitutional justification for denial of political rights lies in the 
extreme rationale of defending the existence of the State. 
Yet, the accomplishment of minority national aspirations within an ethnic 
context remains the first confrontational aspect between minorities and the ruling 
community. 
5. MULTI-LEVEL MILLET: MINORITIES IN A 
CONFRONTATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SPACE 
Israel’s model of minority protection synthesizes both millet and Western traditions: it 
guarantees personal and communal autonomy and it guarantees both collective and 
individual rights. Although the individual sphere prevails in anti-discrimination law, the 
communal sphere infringes in those individual rights that exclusively pertain to personal 
autonomy arrangements. Moreover, two problems arise from the realm of collective 
rights: the degree of cultural freedom under State’s control and the degree of political 
freedom in a confrontational political context. 
5.1 Personal Autonomy and opportunity to opt-out 
Personal autonomy arrangements provide religious courts for exclusive jurisdiction on 
matters of marriage and divorce. Although religious jurisprudence is subject to judicial 
supervision by the Supreme Court, the core of exclusive jurisdiction remains untouched. 
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Therefore, marriage and divorce rights pertain to religious jurisdiction only, which 
implies that this system does not provide citizens for secular individual protection. 
Therefore, citizens are subject to religious jurisdiction without an opt-out 
possibility. This is far too much than what a secular democracy should recognize since 
the legal system denies the protection of specific rights. On the contrary, religious 
jurisdiction should be confined to pre-judicial phase, as in the case of family disputes 
mediation,261 or it should be subject to mutual will of the parties in arbitration courts.262 
In this way, religious and secular systems would coexist and all constitutional rights 
could be protected unless the parties decide to turn to religious jurisdiction. 
5.2 State’s control over minority cultural narratives 
As for collective rights, the main problem lies in State’s control over cultural expression 
of minorities. By controlling educational curricula, the State retains the power to 
approve certain cultural practices or to disfavor them. Ultimately, this means that the 
State has the power to establish the borders of the social space within which a minority 
group lives. Theoretically, it is not illegitimate for a State to control minority societal 
groups, in that the State has to guarantee both social cohesion and unity. On the other 
                                                 
261 This system has been adopted by Malaysia, where qadis and religious authorities work as counselors 
for settling family disputes. In this context, religious authority is not belittled by secular establishments, 
and, at the same time, the State retains the ultimate control over religious population that considers 
religious morality impelling over secular norms. See, Sharifah Zaleha Sye Hassan and Sven Cederroth, 
Managing Marital Disputes in Malaysia: Islamic Mediators and Conflict Resolution in Syariah Courts, 
(Richmond, UK: Routledge, 1997), 71-84 and 228-38. 
262 See, Abu Taher, “Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts,” The Sunday Times, 14th September 
2008. 
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hand, this ultimate control can turn into indirect discrimination of minority practices 
and in the imposition of majority narratives. 
However, the Israeli legal system guarantees protection against institutional 
discrimination in two ways. First, individual protection of rights limits practices of 
discrimination against a minority, which concretize in the infringement of individual 
rights such as the right to expression and association.263 Secondly, institutional behavior 
is subject to judicial control of the Supreme Court. Hence, petitions with the Supreme 
Court become tools for preventing discrimination and for pursuing accommodation 
claims. 
Moreover, the inclusion of minorities into the institutions gives minorities an 
opportunity for bargaining claims, which can avoid confrontational attitudes and the 
resort to court. Institutional inclusion of minority members could be developed as 
effective mediation between minority claims and majority necessities.264 Indeed, the 
participation of minority members in the decision-making process could guarantee 
continuous bargaining among non- and ruling elites, and it would favor the exploitation 
of State institutional options to pursue collective goals. In this way, resort to court 
would remain the last solution to address social conflicts. 
                                                 
263 Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law, 77-8. 
264 See, Ronald Weitzer and Badi Hasisi, “Does Ethnic Composition Make a Difference? Citizens’ 
Assessments of Arab Police Officers in Israel” Policing and Society, vol. 18, n. 4 (December, 2008) 362 -
76. 
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5.3 Political rights: State’s interests and national aspirations of non-ruling 
communities 
Israel does not recognize collective political rights, which are the largest form of 
inclusion in the decision-making process. The State guarantees de facto political 
participation through proportional elections, but it retains the control over the 
participation in elections. The Supreme Court developed the “physical destruction” 
doctrine and the “actual and real danger” doctrine, both of which constitute tests to rule 
about the exclusion of lists from elections. Yet, the reason why to restrict political rights 
of minorities involves debatable issues about democracy rules. 
Minority protection aims to accomplish three aims: cultural preservation, 
cultural expression, and group development. Cultural preservation involves avoiding 
assimilation by guaranteeing the maintenance of certain traditional or linguistic 
features—such as the possibility to use minority languages and to follow traditional 
practices. Cultural expression is a further stage, whereby minority culture not only is 
protected through specific arrangements but also becomes part of the national common 
good—including separate schools or educational curricula, official status of minority 
language, and minority members’ inclusion in the institutions. Finally, group 
development pertains to the national aspirations of a minority group. 
Free development is subject to negotiation between the State and the minority 
group, which advances claims to be accommodated within a constitutional space. 
However, a State can limit this development when minority claims are perceived as 
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incompatible with its constitutional foundations. Hence, the legal problem relies in the 
modality and limits within which a State is entitled to deny or to restrict political rights 
of groups in order to guarantee State unity, cohesion, and its very existence. 
This problem covers two aspects: the definition of those core constitutional 
principles that constitute the essence of the State and the interpretation of 
incompatibility between the State’s constitutional foundation and minority group 
claims. Both aspects involve ideological-political issues that result, in legal terms, in the 
decision to exclude a certain political party through administrative proceeding or 
judicial decision. 
The legal elaboration of those principles serves as the parameter to restrict or 
broaden political rights, and it establishes the border of tolerance toward the national 
development of minority groups. Specifically, the legal development of these principles 
lies in constitutional law, which evolves in constitutional jurisprudence. 
In order to avoid the “tyranny of the majority,” which results in the systemic 
impediment of minorities to affirm their political visions,265 pluralism should be 
interpreted not only as a cultural value, but also as a political value.266 The major 
challenge lies in the attitude towards a minority group whose visions are considered 
incompatible with the fundamental principles of the State. It is the case, for instance, of 
                                                 
265 Francesco Palermo and Jens Woelk, Diritto Costituzionale Comparato dei Gruppi e delle Minoranze, 
(Padova: CEDAM, 2008), 47-8. 
266 As Hannah Arendt argued, in “Was Ist Politik,” the essence of politics is the inclusion of diversity. 
See, Hannah Arendt, Was Ist Politik, in Ursula Ludz (ed.), Was Ist Politik—Fragmente aus dem Nachlass 
Hannah Arendt, (Munich: Piper, 1993), 9-12. 
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both Kurdish and religious parties in Turkey, of Batasuna Basque Party in Spain, and of 
ethnic or religious parties in Bulgaria and Romania. 
In these States, banning legislations are justified by the rationale that political 
organizations should recognize and share basic principles of the State. This notion 
varies according to the legal system and can include secularism, as in Turkey, ethnic-
blindness as in Romania and Bulgaria, and physical integrity of the State as in Spain. 
By contrast, the Court of Strasbourg has argued that although minority parties may 
advance claims that the State considers incompatible with its basic principles, they 
cannot be denied political rights, in that those principles may be however compatible 
with general democratic principles.267 
The Israeli Supreme Court protects both active political rights and freedom of 
expression in electoral propaganda. It approves the exclusion from election on the basis 
of actual and real danger of subversion, while it conditions the freedom of expression in 
political propaganda on the respect of public sentiment. 
Political rights are connected to other legal spheres such as freedom of 
expression and the constitutional foundations of a State. If these basic principles express 
the physical existence of the State, it has to be recognized to a State the opportunity to 
defend itself even to the detriment of political rights that may be exploited for 
subversive purposes. Again, is it legitimate for a State to restrict political rights of a 
                                                 
267 See, ECtHR United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Reports 1998-I, par. 55-7. 
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group that advances identity claims incompatible with the vision of the ruling 
community? 
The challenge of an inclusive society lies precisely in the danger that non-ruling 
communities may subvert the system structured by the ruling community. States’ 
identification with a majority culture may assume different features such as the official 
language, the official calendar, and privileges in acquiring citizenship accorded to a 
specific group. In order to guarantee equality, the State has to guarantee appropriate 
means of voice to diverse groups, and this implies the possibility to express cultural 
visions incompatible with the majority culture. Yet, when this cultural expression 
endangers the existence of the State, then the restriction of political rights may be 
justified, particularly in a context of conflict in which the existence of the State is at 
stake. 
Two considerations arise. First, the treatment of minority groups in the whole 
has to be analyzed. Secondly, the degree of precision in the exclusion from political life 
has to be regarded as fundamental. With regards to Israel, the general status of 
minorities does not imply systemic discrimination, and the exclusion procedure is based 
on precise principles and judicial supervision. It is the judicial review of institutional 
behavior that ultimately guarantees the protection of the equality principles by 
protecting both collective and individual rights. 
The specific characteristic of the Israeli system is the coexistence of both 
communal and individualistic approaches, which empowers minority groups to enjoy 
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collective rights and to bargain the broadening of their social space within the 
constitutional framework of the State. On the other hand, the coexistence of both 
approaches enables opt-out, which is the decision of citizens not to take part into the 
communal conflict, but to be subject only to the individualistic regime. 
Moreover, the individualistic regime serves also as a channel for advancing 
collective claims, through the protection of freedom of expression and of association. In 
a confrontational social context, a State is more likely to concede autonomy and to 
include those diverse groups that are not perceived as incompatible with majority 
culture and with the existence of the State, such as Druze and Circassians in Israel. The 
clearest position a minority has on fundamental issues such as the existence of the State 
of residence and its fundamental constitutional principles, the more it can gain from the 
inclusive processes. However, when a minority considers its existence in a certain 
constitutional space ontologically incompatible with its national aspirations, then the 
possibility of accomplishing claims of accommodation dramatically lessens, in that 
mutual distrust between the ruling community and the non-ruling community affects 
any agreement between the parties.268 
The incompatibility among principles stems from social and ideological visions 
and narratives. However, law can provide for rules of coexistence even in an ethnic 
majority context. Israel offers an example of elasticity in minority protection and of 
precision in the imposition of limits. Since most of the claims advanced by minority 
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groups find their expression in judicial confrontation, the living constitution of minority 
groups in Israel is developed by judicial review. In the words of Stella, it is the judiciary 
that becomes the guardian of diversity, in both its individual and collective aspects, 
through the protection of individual rights.269 
Minorities do not always find their space within the social space defined by the 
majority. Moreover, where minority claims are not taken in due account, the 
accommodation of diversity itself becomes incompatible with the principles of the 
State. As an example, the next case-study, Iraq, shows a return to the territorial model 
of protection and the rule of majority culture to the detriment of minorities. 
                                                                                                                                               
268 Sammy Smooha, Autonomy for Arabs in Israel? (Ra’anana: The Institute for Israeli Arab Studies, 
1999), 51-56 [Hebrew]. 
269 Federico Stella, La Giustizia e le Ingiustizie, (Bologna: Mulino, 2006). 
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Iraq inherited the millet system from the Ottoman Empire, and has adapted it in terms of 
personal and cultural autonomies. The question of political representation of groups has 
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emerged after the fall of Saddam’s dictatorship ended with the US-led invasion in 2003. 
The consequent institution-building process, which formally ended with the adoption of 
the constitution in 2005, shows remarkable concern about minority claims in terms of 
religious rights, cultural rights, and political participation rights. However, the process 
of constitutionalization shows a strong federal bias for accommodating the claims of 
ethnic groups that are territorially defined (Kurds and Turcomans). Although they took 
part in the drafting of the constitution, non-territorial ethnic, religious, and ethno-
religious groups lost the opportunity to advance their claims because of the institutional 
approach that has been adopted. Indeed, Kurds’ and Turcomans’ claims were 
accommodated through territorial autonomy instruments, in order to compensate 
historical discrimination and ensure their security in the new State, while religious 
minorities such as Christians, Baha’is, and Yezidis are denied appropriate protection 
despite a constitutional prohibition of discrimination. 
The federal system of the new Iraq addresses the claims of the main groups that 
have been involved in internal conflicts—i.e., Sunni Arabs, Shi’i Arabs, and Kurds—by 
dividing the country in eighteen ethnically homogenous provinces. Other ethnic and 
ethno-religious minorities are dispersed in these provinces and the lack of bargaining 
power impedes them from pursuing group interests in terms of cultural rights and 
political representation. Moreover, the constitutionalization of Islam as the official 
religion of the State questions the capability of the legal system to provide non-Islamic 
minorities for adequate protection in terms of religious and cultural rights. 
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This chapter analyzes the constitutional framework of the minority protection 
regime in post-war Iraq. After a historical overview of the legal status of minorities 
under both monarchist and Saddam’s regimes, this chapter focuses on the opportunities 
of the constitutionalization process. Institution-building activities, instead of 
reconnecting to the Middle-Eastern tradition of non-territorial protection of minorities 
known as the millet system, applied the Western model of territorial protection. 
I argue that this model may be an appropriate means of protection in cases in 
which ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts can lead to the collapse of civil society. 
Moreover, the territorial model properly suits those groups that are territorially defined 
and whose bargaining power is strong enough to threaten territorial disintegration of the 
State. 
However, I claim that non-territorial minorities should be treated with equal 
concern in a pluralistic society that aims to protect human rights, and that their claims 
can be adequately accommodated through the adoption of non-territorial devices of 
minority protection. Specifically, I claim that the combination of territorial and non-
territorial instruments of minority protection may be the adequate institutional approach 
to complex diversity, which derives from the existence in one State of several different 
groups, defined by identity (religious, ethnic, linguistic, or overlapping) and territory, 
which compete for power and recognition by pursuing autonomy. To this respect, the 
millet system, part of Iraqi legal tradition, constitutes an effective means of protection 
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of dispersed minority groups by guaranteeing them both cultural rights and political 
representation. 
The chapter focuses on what lessons can be drawn from the Iraqi experience in 
terms of minority protection in a complex diversity system and as a means of conflict-
management. 
1. Iraq’s Melting-Pot of Ethnic, Religious, and Ethno-Religious 
Diversities 
Although the majority of Iraqis are Shi’i Arabs, large communities that constitute Iraqi 
society differ in terms of ethnicity and religion. Ethnically, Kurds and Turcomans are 
the largest minorities in Iraq and live in the north-eastern parts of the country. They are 
Sunni Muslims except for a small group of Shi’i Kurds. In addition, a small Christian 
Armenian community lives mainly in the area of Baghdad. 
Religiously, the main minority is composed of Sunni Muslims, including Arabs, 
Kurds, and Turcomans. In addition, a variety of religious communities are historically 
resident in the country. The largest community is Christian, which includes Latin and 
Syriac Catholics, Protestants, Chaldeans, Syriac-Orthodox, and Assyrians, who consider 
themselves an ethnic and religious minority. Moreover, there are three religious 
minorities of ancient origin: Baha’is,270 Yezidis,271 and Sabians.272 The small number of 
                                                 
270 Baha’i faith has developed in the 19th century from Shi’i Islam. Its fundamental principle lies in the 
concept of relative and progressive revelation: while there is one God, His humanly manifestations are 
different and embodied in several prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Buddha, Krishna, Jesus of 
Nazareth, Mahomet, and Bab, who founded and independent religious movement in Iran, from which 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 157 -
Jews represents the last vestage of the Iraqi Jewish community, most of who fled from 
Iraq after the creation of Israel in 1948.273 
Religious and ethnic identities sometimes overlap, as in the case of Turcoman, 
who are Sunni Muslims, and Armenians, who are Catholic or Orthodox Christians. 
Nevertheless, some general relationships between these groups are identifiable. 
                                                                                                                                               
Baha’is developed their faith. The Baha’i doctrine can be summarized in the motto “Unity in Diversity,” 
with a pedagogic vocation toward peace and coexistence, which explains Baha’is devotion to social 
causes and their commitment to cooperation activities. The internal structure of the Baha’i community, 
based on local elected councils, reflects their views on international relations, which envisage the 
abolition of national armies and the constitution of an international federated army with goals of 
enforcement of laws and statues adopted by an international parliament of the nations. Baha’is have faced 
persecution in Islamic countries for accusation of apostasy and polytheistic worship. In Iran, Iraq, and 
Egypt, legislative provisions directly discriminate against Baha’i followers. See William S. Hatcher and J. 
Douglas Martin, The Baha’í Faith: The Emerging of a Global Religion, (New York: Harper & Row, 
1998); on the persecution of post-Islamic creeds, see Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984). 
271 Yezidis are an ethnically Indo-Iranic who settled in the regions of nowadays Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and 
Armenia. The Yezidi religion is syncretic and originates from ancient Persian religions, monotheistic 
cosmogony, and Shi’i Sufi doctrine. According to their faith, God created the world and gave it to the 
care of seven angels; among them, the most prominent is the Peacock Angel, whom they revere as a 
powerful entity, which distributed blessings and misfortunes. This figure, for the role it plays in 
cosmogony, is associated by both Christians and Muslims to the fallen archangel Satan, whereby Yezidis 
are considered as worshipers of the devil. For this reason, they are persecuted. Moreover, their particular 
rules on purity isolate them from other communities, the contact with which is perceived as polluting, 
which exacerbates negative prejudices against them. See, Birgül Açikyilidiz, The Yezidis: The History of 
a Community, Culture and Religion, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010). The biggest community of Yezidis 
outside Iraq is in Germany, where they have preserved their identity and culture with peculiar forms of 
cultural re-qualification within German society. See, Celalettin Kartal, “Yeziden in Deutschland—
Einwanderungsgeschichte, Veränderungen und Integrationsprobleme,” Kritische Justiz, vol. 40, n. 3 
(2007), 240-257. 
272 Sabians, also referred to as Mandaeans, are a Gnostic and Baptist religion, which has developed from 
the followers of John the Baptist and had Oriental platonic influences. Sabians believe in dualism, which 
is the division in dual concepts such as good-bad, right-left, mother-father, inherited from Manichaeism. 
Despite the fact that they are monotheistic, Mandaeans are persecuted as worshipers since they believe in 
the active role of angels in daily life. According to them, angels dwell in stars, so that astrology plays an 
important role in their faith. See Jorunn Jacobsen Buckley, The Mandaeans—Ancient Texts and Modern 
People, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
273 See Michelle Zumofen, Irak: Situation von religiösen Minderheiten in den von der KRG verwalteten 
Provinzen Sulaimaniyah, Erbil und Dohuk, Themenpapier der SFH-Länderanalyse, (Bern: 
Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe, 2008) 2. 
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Historically, Iraq has been dominated by Sunni Arabs, with institutional 
discrimination against non-Arab citizens during Saddam’s dictatorship. Moreover, 
discrimination targeted non-Sunni Muslims, and specific groups such as Baha’is, 
Yezidis, and Sabians. These historical discriminations and the genocidal practices of 
Saddam’s regime toward the Kurds created strong grievances characterizing groups’ 
claims in post-war Iraq. Sunnis feared backlash and discrimination by the Shi’i 
majority, while Kurds and Turcomans feared discrimination by Arabs, and Christians 
feared discrimination by Islamic activists. 
While Shi’is, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turcomans succeeded in advancing their 
claims even by guerrilla attacks, other minorities suffer not only from institutional 
discrimination but also from intimidation, assimilation, and physical attacks. Moreover, 
Baha’is are excluded from political rights since they are considered a heretical sect of 
Islam, while Jews voluntarily keep out of public life for fear of physical injuries.274 
In this plethora of ethnic, religious, and ethno-religious diversity those groups 
that are territorially defined have pursued their interests with more success, because of 
effective control over the territory of residence, while non-territorial minorities are left 
to their destiny and try to survive discrimination and attacks, often by choosing exile. 
                                                 
274 See Preti Taneja, Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq’s Minority Communities Since 2003, 
Minority Rights Group International Report (Minority Group Rights International, 2007) available at 
www.minorityrights.org 
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Beyond the analysis on the collapse of civil society,275 and the studies of the 
Iraqi civil war,276 this chapter focuses on the process of constitutionalization, and 
identifies in it the moment in which non-territorial minorities were excluded from 
protection. Far from analyzing the consequences that this exclusion has had or that it 
still has on the collapse of Iraq’s civil society, this chapter addresses the issue from a 
legal point of view. 
2. The Iraqi Millet  
2.1 Between Monarchy and Ba’athist Dictatorship 
Iraq achieved independence in 1932, fourteen years after the British Mandate over the 
territory that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The new State system was a 
constitutional monarchy, which inherited the Ottoman system of groups’ self-
government. 
The Constituent Assembly in charge of drafting the Iraqi Constitution had both 
Christian and Jewish representatives, who were eventually guaranteed seats in the 
Parliament.277 The constitution of 1925 recognized the arrangements of personal 
                                                 
275 See James D. Fearon and David D. Latin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review, vol. 97, n. 1 (February 2003), 75-90; Mary Kaldor, Denisa Kostovicova, and Yahia Said, 
“War and Peace: The Role of Global Civil Society,” Global Civil Society Yearbook, (2006/7), 94-121. 
276 See Toby Dodge, “Iraqi Transitions: From Regime Change to State Collapse,” Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 26, n. 4-5 (2005), 705-721. 
277 Nigel G. Davidson, “The Constitution of Iraq,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International 
Law, vol. 7, n. 1 (1925), 41-52, at 43. 
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autonomy, whereby each person is judged on matters of personal status and family law 
according to the legal tradition of the group he/she belongs to. 
Part V of the Constitution, dealing with judiciary, recognized civil courts, courts 
of first instance, and Islamic courts. Non-Muslim citizens and foreigners were subject to 
the jurisdiction of civil courts and were judged in matters of family law according to the 
religious law of the people they belonged to. Muslim citizens were subject to the 
jurisdiction of shari’a courts,278 which applied Ottoman law first and shari’a law that 
was developed in the draft of a civil code in 1951, which synthesized all Islamic legal 
traditions, including Shi’i schools.279 
After the 1958 revolution, which was led by the general Abdul Karim Qassim, 
Iraq became a Republic, where the power was wielded by revolutionary institutions, 
such as the National Assembly, and was eventually centered in the hands of the 
President. Subsequently, in the late 1960s, Constitutional amendments were introduced 
in order to establish, politically, the supremacy of the Arab Socialist Ba’athist party, 
based on Ba’ath ideology,280 and, ethnically, the supremacy of Sunni Arabs over other 
                                                 
278 Ibid., 49-51. 
279 Sayed Hassan Amin, Middle East Legal Systems, (London: Royston, 1985), 168. 
280 The Ba’ath Party, which in Arabic means renaissance, was founded in 1940 in Syria by Arab 
intellectuals influenced by French Positivism and European nationalism. Eventually, it associated pan-
Arabism, in the sense of a cultural nation (as originating from the concept of Kulturnation developed by 
Herder), and socialism in the sense of anti-imperialism and freedom from external intervention. The 
secular orientation helped Muslim-Christian cooperation in political activities, while pan-Arabism 
expressed the idea of unity of the Arab people free from Western domination or Western intervention, 
which was alternatively identified with British administration during the late mandate period, with the 
creation of the State of Israel within Arab lands, and, lastly, with American international policies. The 
Party opened national sections in Egypt, where it influenced Nasser, in Syria, where it came to power in 
the late 1960s, and in Iraq, where it developed an anti-Persian racist ideology under Saddam’s control. 
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groups. Discriminatory legislation targeted specific groups such as Baha’is, Kurds, and 
citizens of Persian origin.281 In the 1970s, Saddam Hussein started his career within the 
party, which eventually came under his full control in 1979, when he became Iraqi 
President after having stricken his political rivals. 
Although Ba’athist ideology was essentially secular, the system of personal 
autonomy was maintained, with partial modifications. For instance, religious authorities 
had to be recognized by State officials and the acts of marriage and divorce, carried out 
by communal religious authorities, had to be validated by the government. 
Moreover, Islamic substantial law was modified by the introduction of judicial 
permission for polygamous marriages, which could be eventually used by the existing 
wife as a rationale for requesting divorce.282 The legal system also recognized Islamic 
endowments, the wakfs, the arrangements of which fell under the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Personal Status, and were regulated by Islamic law. 
By focusing on the adaptation of the millet system in Iraq and, consequently, on 
the partial autonomy that minority communities enjoyed, one may infer that this system 
created spaces of freedom even under Saddam’s dictatorial regime. Yet, the 
                                                                                                                                               
See Abbas Kelidar, “The Wars of Saddam Hussein,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 28, n. 4 (October 
1992), 778-98; and John F. Devlin, “The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis,” American Historical 
Review, vol. 97, n. 5 (December 1991), 1396-1407. 
281 For instance, Revolutionary Command n. 61 of 1964 imposed limitations on political and civil rights 
of Kurdish and Persian citizens, such as access to public offices, both active and passive political rights. 
Moreover, the Ba’athist nationalization policy targeted in particular Kurdish, Baha’i, Jewish, and Persian 
properties, which were dispossessed in name of social interest. See, Sayed Hassan Amin, Middle East 
Legal Systems, 173. 
282 See, Sayed Hassan Amin, Middle East Legal Systems, 190-191. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 162 -
discriminatory practices and policies of the Iraqi establishment, which targeted specific 
groups such as Shi’is, Kurds, Baha’is, and Yezidis, clarify that the Iraqi millet was a 
mere legal tradition, which was inherited from the Ottoman era. 
The Kurdish case may clarify the point. In 1974 autonomy was recognized to 
Kurdish regions at the border with Iran and was limited to educational rights and to the 
recognition of Kurdish as the official language alongside with Arabic. However, the 
Iraqi regime maintained the economic control of the areas due to the presence of natural 
resources, mainly of oil.283 After Saddam took power, the regime tried to subvert the 
ethnic composition of the region first, and then, in the early 1990s, physically targeted 
Kurdish villages, in the attempt of ethnic cleansing. After the Gulf War, and the 
subsequent condemns on Iraq due to ethnic cleansing of Kurdish citizens, Iraqi 
sovereignty was severely limited by prohibiting Iraqi aircraft from flying over certain 
areas in the northern and southern parts of the country, the so-called no-fly zones.284 
International institutions, including the UN, the EC, and USAID, started managing post-
                                                 
283 See, “Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy,” MERIP Reports, Middle East Research and Information Project, 
n. 27 (April 1974), 26-27 and 30. 
284 No-fly zones can be defined as prohibited areas in the sky. This doctrine was specifically developed in 
order to prevent Saddam’s aircraft from flying over Kurdish regions and from protracting attacks on 
civilian population. The prohibition to fly over the Northern and Southern areas of Iraq was imposed by 
the US, France, UK, and Turkey by interpreting Security Council Resolution n. 688 of 1991, which called 
for the termination of the repression practices and demanded the removal of the threat to international 
peace and security constituted by civilians’ targeting. The interpretation that led to the creation of no-fly 
zones is contested since the UN Security Council resolution did not refer to fly zones. See, Michael 
Byers, War Law: Understading International Law and Armed Conflict, (Toronto: Douglas&McIntyre, 
2005), 41. The controversial interpretation of this document is linked to the controversy over the use of 
force in the Iraqi crisis and the consequent US policy, which interpreted UN Security Council Resolution 
678 of 1990 as allowing the use of force against Iraq’s breach of international law. See Jules Lobel and 
Michael Ratner, “Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorization of the Sue of Force, Cease-
Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regimes,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, n. 1 (January 
1999), 124-54. 
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conflict relief programs in the Kurdish regions as separate projects from the rest of the 
country. At the same time, Kurdish inhabitants organized an institutional framework 
that, although it was not recognized by the international community, made of Kurdish 
regions a de facto State within Iraq.285 
Both de facto autonomy and historical grievances gave the Kurds enough 
bargaining power to support the federalist option in post-Saddam Iraq. The 
accommodation of Kurdish claims through territorial autonomy seems to reflect the 
historical development of the region, whereby pre-existing territorial autonomy was 
constitutionalized. Moreover, this territorial accommodation also reflects the ethnic 
composition of majority Kurdish regions. Yet, those minorities that do not fit in the 
territorial model are not protected. 
The next section focuses on the contemporary millet system in Iraq. After a brief 
description of the transitional period, it assesses the existence of a millet system by 
analyzing its constitutional arrangements. 
2.2 The Post-War Iraqi Millet: Minorities in an Islamic Republic 
After the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, State powers were held by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), under the administration of Paul Bremer, which was 
                                                 
285 Michael M. Gunter, “A de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 14, n. 2 
(1993), 295-319; Ronald Ofteringer and Ralf Bäcker “A Republic of Statelessness: Three years of 
Humanitarian Intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Middle East Report, n. 187-8 (Mar.-Jun. 1994), 40-5. 
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“vested with legislative, executive, and judicial authority.”286 The CPA conducted the 
State-building process, by defining the legal framework of Iraq through the adoption of 
the Transition Administrative Law (TAL) in March 2004, which may be considered the 
interim constitution, and a series of statutes which established the three phases of the 
institution-building process. 
2.2.1 The period of transition: stabilizing Iraq 
During the first phase, from the military occupation in March 2003 to the appointment 
of the interim governing bodies in June 2004, the CPA has focused its work on the 
economic and institutional reconstruction of the country, with particular regard to the 
dismantlement of the dictatorship institutions. During the second phase, from June 2004 
to the elections in January 2005, the interim governing bodies worked for the 
institutional building of the country, with particular regard to the settlement of civil 
conflicts. During the third phase, from January 2005 to December 2005, powers were 
held by transitional governing bodies elected in January 2005, focusing their work on 
the draft of a constitution which was eventually ratified in October 2005 after a 
referendum. With the constitutionally-based elections, which were held in December 
2005, Iraq has been considered a full sovereign State, despite the on-going conflict and 
foreign military presence. 
The TAL is to be considered the interim constitution in that it was the non-
amendable law that regulated the distribution of powers as well as the interim 
                                                 
286 See Regulation n. 1 of 16 May 2003, art. 2. The documents are available at the web site of the 
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institutions and established the phases of the constituent process. In this law, Iraq is 
defined as a republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic State (art. 4). It recognizes 
Islam as the official religion (art. 7, first part), while it guarantees religious freedom of 
all individuals (art. 7, second part). Moreover, it recognizes Arabic and Kurdish as 
official languages and guarantees linguistic rights to minorities (art. 9). 
The TAL is concerned with political representation at the legislative body, the 
National Assembly, and establishes that the electoral law should guarantee fair 
representation of Iraqi communities (art. 30, letter C, second part, which directly lists 
Turcomans and Chaldo-Assyrians) and reserves one quarter of the seats to women (art. 
30, letter C, first part). The concern for political representation of Iraq’s diversity was 
further expressed by the CPA in the appointment procedures of the interim bodies, with 
particular regard to the Interim National Council, which served as a consultative body 
for the Interim Government policies and had veto powers on decrees and regulations 
proposed by the Interim Government. The Interim National Council was composed of 
100 members appointed by the National Conference and gathered Iraqi notables, 
representatives of the tribes, and of other Iraqi communities who were involved into the 
institution-building process by the CPA.287 
The interim bodies had governed Iraq until the election of January 2005, 
whereby the powers were transferred to transitional bodies, which included the National 
                                                                                                                                               
Coalition Provisional Authority, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ 
287 See the fact-sheet, issued by the CPA in January 2004, “Iraqi Interim Government” p. 3-4, available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/ 
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Assembly, the legislative body elected in January 2005, the transitional executive body 
composed of the Presidency Council,288 and the Council of Ministers with its Prime 
Minister. Moreover, the National Assembly was invested of the constituent power by 
art. 60, which imposed cooperation with societal groups during the drafting process 
through public debates and press discussion. The draft had to be ready by August 2005 
(art. 61, letter A), which would be subject to referendum after two months. No other 
provision of the first and second phase deals with minority protection in terms of 
cultural rights or political representation. Notwithstanding the TAL provision on equal 
representation, neither the Electoral Law, issued by CPA Order n. 96 of 15 June 2004, 
nor the Political Parties and Entities law, issued by CPA Order n. 97 in the same day, 
deal with representation rights of ethnic and religious minorities. As for gender 
representation, the latter law establishes that electoral lists should contain female 
candidate in a proportion to their male colleagues of two to six. 
2.2.2 The post-war Constitution: the role of Islam in Iraqi divided society 
The post-war Constitution was approved by a referendum in 25 October 2005 in 
a context of violent civil conflict.289 The referendum required the consent of two thirds 
of the provinces and of 65% of the population in each province. Electoral data show that 
Sunnis opposed the new constitution, since they feared to lose power because of new 
                                                 
288 The President was Kurd, and the two vice-presidents were one Arab Shi’i and one Arab Sunni. 
289 See, Edward Wong, “Final Tally Shows Iraqi Voters Approved New Constitution,” New York Times, 
25 October 2005. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 167 -
ethnic balances, while Kurds and Shi’is campaigned in favor of federal arrangements.290 
The new Constitution aims to balance the Islamic identity and diversity of Iraqi society; 
indeed, it recognizes the prominent position of Islam in the public sphere, but also 
guarantees the protection of minorities as part of Iraqi historical-cultural heritage. 
With respect to the role of Islam in Iraq, the new Constitution refers to Islam as 
the funding religion of the State. The preamble appeals to God by the traditional 
invocation “In the name of God, the Most merciful, the Most compassionate,” and 
encompasses the Islamic tradition into the constituent principles. For instance, par. 1 
describes the Iraqi glorious past, by referring to the saints and companions of the 
Prophet who lived in the country. Moreover, the preamble gives official status to Islam 
by involving religious leaders into the institution-building process. Indeed, par. 2 
acknowledges God’s authority over Iraqi citizens, and describes the institution-building 
process as the response to religious leaders’ requests for stability as well as to the 
requests of the international community and the ethnic communities of the country. 
Besides the general declarations of the preamble, the constitution gives 
prominence to Islam in two provisions. Art. 2, first part, declares Islam as the official 
religion of the State; particularly, it establishes that Islamic law is a source of law in the 
Iraqi legal system, and that positive law cannot be enacted in contradiction to Islamic 
principles. Art. 92 establishes that the Federal Supreme Court, which is the judicial 
                                                 
290 See, “Irakische Verfassung ist Angenommen,” Der Spiegel, 25 October 2005. 
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body at the top of the judicial hierarchy, shall be composed of legal scholars and Islamic 
experts.291 
Although the constitution does not define Iraq as an Islamic republic, Islam is 
part of its constitutional foundations and Islamic principles are part of the basic 
principles of the State. However, several provisions limit this Islamic rienttation by 
ensuring the protection of diversity. 
                                                 
291 The Constitution does not specify the composition of the Court, authorizing the legislator to regulate 
the matter. However, the law on the composition of the Federal Supreme Court has not yet been adopted, 
and the its nine members were appointed by the Presidency Council on the basis of a list, which included 
three nominees for each vacancy and was issued by the Higher Judicial Council (i.e., the independent 
body which supervises the judiciary branch). This procedure was established by the Transitional 
Administrative Law (art. 44, letter E), and has never been changed. Therefore, it is not yet possible to 
assess the functioning of the Federal Supreme Court as designed by the new Constitution, while it is 
possible to compare the constitutional provisions for its composition with parallel bodies in other 
countries where religion plays an important role in State politics and in the public sphere. With reference 
to the case-studies previously analyzed, neither Israel (chapter 3) nor Lebanon (chapter 2) include 
religious legal expert in their Supreme Courts, and this is not the case of Western liberal democracies. 
Thus, Iraq may incur in the risk of theocratization not only because of religious activists in politics, but 
also because of the constitutionalization of Islam in prominent constitutional organs. As far as politics is 
concerned, Islamic activists are both Sunni (particularly Sunni Salafists) and Shi’i, but given the Shi’i 
majority, the major push toward theocratization comes from Shi’i parties. Traditionally, Shi’i Islam 
refrains from direct political involvement and considers religious leaders as spiritual guides for political 
leaders in terms of ethics, public morals, and legal issues; however, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, based 
on Khomeieni’s ideology, changed this traditional view and established a new tradition within Shi’i 
Islam, whereby religious leaders directly engage in political life in order to establish the authority of legal 
jurists. This doctrine was developed by Khomeini in his Velayat-e Faqih (The Authority of Legal Jurists), 
where he elaborates a platonic political doctrine, whereby republic is the best form of State for Islam 
communities, and Islamic legal experts have to bear the ultimate authority on legislation and political life. 
In Iraq, the religious leader Sayyid Ali Al-Hussayni Al-Sistani shares the traditional view of Shi’i Islam, 
whereby his indirect participation in Iraqi political life is characterized by disposal to compromise with 
diverse views (such as the ones of Sunnis and of secular political leaders) and with perceived enemies 
(such as American military authorities in the country). However, other Shi’i religious leaders, such as 
Moqtada al-Sadr (leader of the Sadrist Movement), and other Shi’i politicians, including Ammar al-
Hakim (leader of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq), Muqdad al-Baghdadi (leader of the Kurdish Shi’i 
faction called Islamic Fayli Group), Kasim Muahammad Taqi al-Sahlani (leader of the Dawa Party), 
share the post-revolutionary views, whereby they supported the 1979 revolution in Iran and aim to 
transform Iraq into another Iran. Eventually, these political parties and movements gathered in the 
National Iraqi Alliance list, to which the first Prime Minister of new Iraq belongs, Nouri al-Maliki. 
Therefore, the inclusion of Islamic legal experts in the Supreme Court may be considered the feature of a 
potential authority of the jurists or at least of their strong influence within the legal system. 
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With respect to the protection of diversity, the constitution declares that Iraq is a 
democratic State (art. 109), and that also democratic principles are the basis for the 
annulment of contrary legislation (art. 2, part 1, letter B). Moreover, several provisions 
refer to diversity as a social feature that the legal system shall protect. In this respect, 
art. 2, part 2, recognizes the rights of religious minorities “such as Christians, Yazidis, 
and Mandean Sabeans,” while art. 3 defines Iraq as a multi-national, -religious, and –
sectarian State. Moreover, by directly recalling the discriminatory and genocidal 
practices of the dictatorial regime, par. 2 bans the principle of sectarianism and calls for 
the creation of inclusive State and society.292 
Iraq’s commitment to the values of co-existence and diversity is stated in the 
preamble as well (par. 4);293 specifically, par. 3 refers to Iraqi civil war and condemns 
its ideological grounds, which include sectarianism, racism, terrorism, and accusation of 
being infidel. Again, national unity and peaceful coexistence are considered as basic 
principles of the new regime. Paragraph 2 directly refers to ethnic discrimination 
against Kurds and Turcomans, and to religious discrimination against Shi’is, which 
characterized the policies of Saddam’s regime, while paragraph 3 calls for national 
unity and religious coexistence, and condemns sectarian violence, which dramatically 
                                                 
292 Par. 2, last part, states: “we sought hand in hand and shoulder to shoulder to create our new Iraq, the 
Iraq of the future, free from sectarianism, racism, complex of regional attachment, discrimination, and 
exclusion.” 
293 Par. 4 states “We, the people of Iraq, who have just risen from our stumble, and who are looking with 
confidence to the future through a republican, federal, democratic, pluralistic system, have resolved with 
the determination of our men, women, elderly, and youth to respect the rule of law, to establish justice 
and equality, to cast aside the politics of aggression, to pay attention to women and their rights, the 
elderly and their concerns, and children and their affairs, to spread the culture of diversity, and to defuse 
terrorism.” 
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targets minorities.294 Although the preamble does not directly refer to minorities, the 
inspiring provisions are to be understood in the sense of both peaceful coexistence 
among individuals and positive acceptance of diversity. 
Iraq, as other countries of the Middle East such as Lebanon and Israel, has a 
particular relationship with religion. It is not a theocracy, but the religious discourse 
acquires particular significance in the public sphere. Not only Iraq identifies with 
Islamic history and religion, but Islam acquires a particular status in terms of 
legislation. Islamic law is a source of law alongside with the law enacted by the 
Parliament, and Islamic experts are part of the highest judicial body. Hence, Islam is 
one of the constitutional bases of post-war Iraq together with the democratic principles 
of freedom, equality, and protection of minorities. 
The constitution regulates the status of minorities under the new Iraqi regime. 
This section analyzes the constitutional millet arrangements, which show that 
contemporary Iraq constitutionalized the millet system in terms of personal autonomy, 
communal autonomy, and political representation. 
2.3. PERSONAL AUTONOMY 
Art. 41 states that “Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according 
to their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices, and this shall be regulated by law.” The 
                                                 
294 Mumtaz Lalani, Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities, Minority Rights Group 
International Report (Minority Group Rights International, 2010) available at www.minorityrights.org, 
and Preti Taneja, Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq’s Minority Communities Since 2003, 8-16 and 
29-30. 
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principle of personal autonomy is thus constitutionalized according to the Iraqi legal 
tradition, which originates from the Ottoman millet system. 
However, the vague formulation of this provision may lead to different 
interpretations. Citizens’ freedom to commit to their personal status according to the 
legal or traditional heritages of the group to which they belong also entails the freedom 
to abstain from religious or traditional rulings. In other words, the article implies the 
“right to be left alone,” which is the freedom to opt-out from the communal system. 
The legal system should then provide citizens with a dual legal framework, 
which should envisage both a secular judicial body and different religious judicial 
bodies for the sects. However, contemporary Iraq has maintained the pre-war 
arrangements. The pre-constitutional legislation of the interim period gave continuity to 
the millet tradition of the legal system; the Iraqi Governing Council Resolution 137 of 
2003 recognized the validity of the Personal Status Code of 1959, whereby religious 
sects have judicial autonomy in matters of personal status, while general family law 
applicable to all citizens is the Islamic law codified in the Personal Status Code of 1959. 
Two problems arise in terms of minority protection and individual rights. 
With respect to minority protection, Iraqi law limits the jurisdiction of minority 
courts in favor of Islamic law, which is applicable to all citizens through the Personal 
Status Code. Therefore, Islam becomes not only the official religion of the State but its 
legal tradition, the shari’a, becomes also its main source of law in matters of personal 
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status. Shari’a is given prominence over other legal traditions, including the secular 
tradition, and, consequently, minority rights are limited. 
With respect to individual rights, Iraqi law conflicts with international human 
rights standards, particularly, with reference to women’s rights under Islamic law. As it 
has been emphasized, “the Code, the Shari’a, and customary traditions and practices 
affect the realization of women’s rights in both the private and public domain;” 
specifically, “conservative interpretations of Islamic norms, patriarchal traditions, 
economic factors and tribal customs [place] the most severe constraints on women’s 
rights and autonomy.”295 Specific aspects of personal law are prone to the infringement 
of women’s rights, such as the economical aspects of divorce, polygamy, transitional 
marriages, child custody, and minimum age for marriage.296 
Although the constitution is committed to the respect of human rights,297 it does 
not envisage clear procedures for assuring democratic principles. Art. 45 limits 
communal autonomy by prohibiting those practices that are contrary to human rights, 
and it calls for the advancement of clans and tribes. However, the lack of procedures or 
                                                 
295 American Bar Association, The Status of Women in Iraq: Update to the Assessment of Iraq’s De Jure 
and De Facto Compliance with International Legal Standards, (American Bar Association, Iraq Law 
Development Program: 2006), 105, available at www.aba.org. 
296 Ibid., 106-9. 
297 The commitment to the respect of human rights appears in three provisions: both art. 9, letter E, and 
art. 84, second paragraph, establish that the Intelligence Service shall operate according to Iraqi law and 
human rights principles; art. 45, second paragraph, prohibits tribal practices that conflict with human 
rights principles. Moreover, art. 102 establishes an independent commission, called High Commission on 
Human Rights, with competence of inquiry on breaches of human rights. Since the Constitution does not 
provide any catalogue of recognized human rights, these provisions have to be interpreted with reference 
to the bill of rights within the Constitution and to the human rights principles as recognized in 
international law with specific regard to the international treaties to which Iraq is party. 
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judicial bodies that supervise and scrutinize religious courts’ decision, as the Supreme 
Court in Israel,298 leads to two negative consequences. First, it impedes religious courts 
from complying with certain secular human rights standards. Secondly, it denies the 
unity of the legal system, since the latter is composed of separate units, which do not 
have any connection to constitutional principles. Moreover, the absence of any 
connecting body between the religious legal systems and the general legal system of the 
State prevents the clear definition of the dual nature of Iraq as an Islamic and 
democratic State. 
As in Lebanon, where judicial autonomy of religious communities is not limited 
by any supervision procedure,299 these arrangements endanger the legal unity of the 
State, and, consequently its stability. In terms of social sustainability, the Iraqi legal 
system runs the further risk of theocratization: by giving prominence to shari’a in 
family law, the legal system may be transformed in a subsidiary body of Islamic courts 
to the detriment of both minority and human rights protection. 
2.4. COMMUNAL AUTONOMY 
The traditional millet system developed communal self-government in terms of 
communal property arrangements and collective cultural rights. Ethno-religious 
communities were entitled to property rights for handling both real estate and religious 
                                                 
298 See chapter 3, on Israel. 
299 See chapter 2 on Lebanon. 
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sights. Moreover, each community had the right to manage educational, health, and 
charitable institutions. 
Iraq’s new constitution has adapted the traditional version of communal self-
government through programmatic provisions, whereby an effective accommodation of 
minority claims cannot develop without an adequate statutory regulation. 
With respect to communal property arrangements, art. 43, first part, point B, 
recognizes the right of religious communities to govern its internal affairs, to run 
institutions, and to manage wakfs. Point A of the same article establishes religious 
freedom in terms of rituals, and commits the State to the protection of holy sights. The 
same commitment is previously stressed at art. 10 and art. 35, which focuses on Iraq’s 
historical heritage. 
In addition, the Constitution recognizes through the right of association (art. 39, 
first part) the possibility to run health institutions under State supervision (art. 31, 
second part). The stress on State supervision also recurs in endowments regulations, 
since they are subject to the control of a specific commission included in the 
government (art. 103). 
With respect to collective cultural rights, the Constitution highlights the value of 
diversity and the necessity to protect minority cultures (art. 125). Indeed, art. 34, fourth 
part, and art. 114, sixth part, recognize private education. By considering the State’s 
commitment to protect cultural and religious diversities, one may infer that educational 
rights of minorities can be enjoyed even in public education through separate curricula. 
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However, private associations, and specifically religious associations, can run 
educational institutions in light of the provisions that grant them autonomy. 
The constitution focuses mainly on linguistic rights and regulates the use of 
languages through a three-ranked hierarchy: art. 4 recognizes five official languages, 
which are subject to territorial limits, while it gives the possibility to local use of other 
idioms. The second part of the article defines the official status of a language in terms 
of use in public domains such as the official gazette, institutional and official 
documents, including passports and coinage, schools, and both public and private 
speeches. 
First, the first part of the same article states that both Kurdish and Arabic are 
official languages of the State throughout the country. However, the third part bans the 
sole use of Kurdish in the Kurdish regions and implicitly obliges the joint use of Arabic. 
Secondly, the fourth part recognizes Turcoman, Syriac, and Armenian as further official 
languages in those “administrative units in which they constitute a density of 
population.” No explanation of “density” is given, and it has to be understood as a 
prescriptive provision to be regulated by statute. Finally, the fifth part recognizes the 
official use of other local languages on the condition of people’s approval through 
referendum. 
As it has been stressed, these arrangements “preserve a formal monoism through 
a common federal citizenship (one), but qualifies it through a pluralistic recognition of 
multiple nationalities (many) and the practical treatment of (two) Kurds and Arabs as 
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the most significant linguistic communities.”300 The linguistic regime reflects the 
general orientation of the Iraqi constitution toward minority protection, which is based 
on the recognition of diversity and the preservation of a common supra-sectarian 
identity that originates from Iraq’s Islamic and Arab majority population. 
“Iraq is in actuality pluri-national and bilingual:”301 the constitution recognizes 
and protects diversity, while it builds a solid national unit. According to the different 
poles of identity, the constitution limits pluralism and stresses unity. For instance, 
language is a pole of identity that is recognized in substantially pluralistic terms. 
Religion and ethnicity are two poles of identity that, on the contrary, are limited, while 
unity is stressed. The main problem that stems from this approach is rooted in possible 
coercive practices of the dominant culture. The persecution of non-Islamic minorities, 
as well as the violence among the different Islamic communities, shows that, ideally, 
the constitution aims to create a pluralistic society and a supra-communal identity, 
while practically, two poles of identity are dominant over the others: ethnicity, with 
Arab supremacy, and religion, with Islamic-Shi’i supremacy. 
The vagueness in addressing minority claims is also reflected in political rights, 
as the next section shows. 
                                                 
300 Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 49. 
301 Ibid. 
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2.5. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
Political representation arrangements constitute the highest degree of minority 
protection, since minority groups are guaranteed voice in the decision-making process. 
A State is more likely to provide minority groups for political representation if the 
group is perceived loyal to the State. However, in a situation of confrontational 
relationships among the dominant groups, minority protection issues are not perceived 
as relevant to the legal and political system. 
The Iraqi constitution does not recognize representation rights in political 
institutions, although article 9 calls for ethnic balance in the recruitment of armed 
forces. The importance given to ethnic diversity in armed forces is reflecting the main 
problem regarding minorities: loyalty. Minorities are often perceived as potentially 
disloyal groups because they pursue communal interests considered incompatible with 
the overarching national interest. The constitutionalization of ethnic inclusion in the 
armed forces is remarkable in that the army has been in Iraq the principal means of 
ethnic persecution. Thus, the inclusion of diverse groups in the army is an effective tool 
of integration, “as part of the process of citizenship building”302 and an adequate means 
of conflict prevention.303 With respect to ethnic representation, this is the only reference 
contained in the constitution. 
                                                 
302 Giuseppe Caforio, Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, (NY: Springer, 2006), 301. 
303 Peter J. Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 23. 
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The reorganization of armed forces aims to legitimize those institutions that are 
perceived as corrupted and in which citizens do not trust. Moreover, armed forces bear a 
symbolic power of security in that they should guarantee security from both external 
threats—i.e., attacks to the State—and internal disorder—i.e., violation of laws. As 
highlighted in the case of Northern Ireland, 
in post-conflict societies where the institution of the police has been 
discredited, it is an essential component of police reform that the 
composition of the police service be changed to both represent the 
community which the police is serving and to reflect the attitudes and 
behaviour of the reformed institutional culture. The composition and 
representativeness of the police service becomes a critical barometer of 
the level at which different communities within society identify and 
engage with the police.304 
The same may be said of the Israeli case, where the inclusion of the Arab minority into 
police forces stresses institutional accountability in a conflict between the ruling 
community and minority groups.305 
With respect to political representation, the Constitution also deals with gender 
equality. Art. 20 states that all Iraqi citizens have equal political rights in terms of both 
active and passive electoral rights, and of capability to be appointed to an office,306 but 
no reference is made to ethnic representation arrangements. 
                                                 
304 See Jane Gordon, “Post-Conflict Trasnformation: The Process of Institutional Legitimization of the 
Police in Northern Ireland,” Ethnopolitics, vol. 7, issue 1 (March 2008), 137-57. 
305 See the chapter 3 on Israel. 
306 The article stresses the gender-blind principle of representation by the expression “men and women.” 
Being Arabic a sexist language, it is not always clear when the expression “all Iraqis” refer to men only 
or whether it is intended to include also women. For instance, doubts arise with respect to interpretative 
aspects of article 42, which guarantees freedom of travel. 
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Although the constitution is silent on this issue, the electoral law regulates the 
question of political representation. The Election Law for the 2010 Council of 
Representatives Elections,307 largely based on the 2005 Election Law, establishes that 
elections for the federal legislative body shall be conducted according to the 
proportional system (point 2), which represents a political guarantee of representation. 
Moreover, it envisages a legal guarantee of representation through a complicated 
system, which is based on reserved seats to Yezidis, Sabians, Shabaks, and Christians. 
Point 6 establishes that eight seats out of 325 are reserved to minorities, and 
articles 8 and 9 establish that seats have to be linked to one governorate. Of these seats, 
five are reserved to Christians, who compete for representation on a national basis, 
although each seat has to correspond to a different governorate.308 The other free seats 
are reserved for the Yezidi, the Sabian, and the Shabak communities, each one linked to 
a different governorate.309 
The system of linkage between seats and governorates can guarantee adequate 
representation of societal groups if those units are ethnically homogenous, so that each 
seat will represent the population of a certain area. Moreover, the proportional system 
guarantees adequate representation of the different lists that participate in the elections. 
However, in the case of diffuse groups that do not constitute majority in any 
                                                 
307 The text of the law is available at the internet site of the Independent High Commission for Elections 
in Iraq, www.ihec.iq. 
308 See par. 10 of the explanatory note to the election system of the Independent High Commission for 
Elections in Iraq, www.ihec.iq. 
309 Ibid., par. 9. 
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administrative unit, the link between seat and territory can lead to detrimental effects. 
Indeed, in such systems, seats represent only the minority population of the 
administrative unit to which the seat corresponds, and the rest of the minority 
population resident in other units is not represented. 
Finally, although the system of reserved seats constitutes the highest guarantee 
of representation, the mere presence of minority deputies does not guarantee effective 
participation in the political process. The under-representation of minorities can be 
effectively mitigated by establishing particular voice tools such as guaranteed 
participation to parliamentary commissions of relevance for the minority groups and 
veto power in fields of high interest to minorities. In Iraq, although representation is 
guaranteed, neither the electoral nor the parliamentary codes provide minority 
representatives with specific guarantees for representation in those commissions that 
deal with aspects of minority interest such as the Committee for Religious Affairs and 
Endowments, the Committee for Education, and the Committee for Human Rights. 
In a social-political context of confrontational relationships among dominant 
groups, minorities risk to be underrepresented and, consequently, their claims risk to be 
excluded from the inclusive goals of the State. The competition for power among the 
dominant groups is detrimental to minorities, since they have to join one of the 
dominant groups in order to pursue their own interests, and this may lead to the 
exacerbation of inter-ethnic conflicts, particularly if minority groups are not territorially 
concentrated. In this case, they have to deal with further problems that arise from any 
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political compromise with a dominant group, since they would face critical relationships 
with other groups with which they did not compromise, and that constitute the majority 
in the area where the minority group is resident. 
On the contrary, adequate voice tools for minority interests, such as special 
powers in the decision-making procedures about education, religion, language, or 
culture, could guarantee, on the one hand, the national relevance of minority protection, 
and, on the other, the possibility to locally pursue minority interests with different 
dominant groups. 
The political arrangements show that the main focus of the State-building 
process was the settlement of the disputes among the dominant groups: Arabs and 
Kurds on the one hand, and Shi’is and Sunnis on the other. The settlement of conflicts 
among these dominant groups leads to the under-qualification of minorities’ interests 
and their under-representation in the institutions. As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, territorial 
arrangements have resulted in ethnic federalism, whereby ruling communities, defined 
as constituent groups (Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks),310 are guaranteed autonomy over 
ethnic homogeneous territories. Federalism is combined with ethnic power-sharing, 
whereby the representation of constituent groups is guaranteed in the institutions at the 
central level. Ethnic federalism and power-sharing protect the interests of the ruling 
communities and guarantee their participation in institutional life, while minorities, 
                                                 
310 The definition was given by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina in the Judgement U 5/98-
III, see Jens Woelk, Federalism and Consociationalism as Tools for State Reconstruction? The Case of 
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including minority groups and individuals who do not belong to one group exclusively, 
are excluded from actual protection.311 
The next section analyzes the federal system that resulted from the negotiation 
process. 
3. Kurdistan and Shi’istan: Minorities in a Federal (Islamic) Republic 
The 2005 Constitution created a federal State, which is divided in regions and 
governorates. Administrative units have those competences which do not fall within 
federal exclusive authority such as foreign policy, armed forces, citizenship, federal 
fiscal policy, and distribution of water resources (art. 110). Out of these exclusive 
competences, local authorities can issue legislation even in contrast to national law 
(arts. 115 and 121.2). 
Federalism was considered the only available choice for Iraq since it provided 
for an immediate solution of the two main conflicts that still lacerate Iraqi society: 
between Kurds and Arabs, and between Shi’is and Sunnis. 
With respect to the Kurdish-Arab conflict, Kurds’ demands for autonomy were 
rooted in past discrimination. Their main focus was economic and cultural autonomy in 
the Northern regions (also known as Iraqi Kurdistan) where, through autonomous 
government, they would avoid systemic isolation and genocidal attempts. Moreover, as 
                                                                                                                                               
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams, and Josef Marko (eds.), Federalism, 
Subnational Constitutions, and Minority Rights, (Westport, CT: PRAEGER, 2004), 188-91. 
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Byman emphasizes, Kurdish demands are similar to those of Scots in UK, or of 
Catalans in Spain. The Northern regions achieved de facto autonomy in the 1990s,312 
and their self-government constituted a strong precedent in the advocacy of federalism. 
From Kurdish autonomy, two main problems arise: the first is connected to economic 
consequences of federal arrangements and the second is related to minority rights. 
Kurdish territorial autonomy affects both use and management of natural 
resources such as oil and gas. However, the negotiation between Kurdish and Arab 
leaders led to the federalization of oil issues; art. 111 establishes that natural resources 
belong to all Iraqis, and art. 112 establishes that oil utilization competes to federal 
authorities and its revenues shall be distributed among all administrative units. 
Moreover, Kurdish autnomy endangers the respect of minority rights. On the 
one hand, Kurdish autonomy compensates past discrimination and represents a 
sustainable solution for the Arab-Kurdish conflict, but, on the other, it jeopardizes the 
status of other minorities, if the local government does not commit to minority 
protection. This holds true with particular reference to the Turcoman minority, which 
has confrontational relationships with Kurds. Turcomans’ claims on the city of Erbil, 
for instance, and the claims of ethnic and ideal connections to Turkey create conflicts in 
                                                                                                                                               
311 Jens Woelk, La Transizione Costituzionale della Bosnia ed Erzegovina—Dall’Ordinamento Imposto 
allo Stato Multinazionale Sostenibile?, (Padova: CEDAM, 2008), 98-9. 
312 Daniel Byman, “Constructing Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Security, 
vol. 28, no. 1 (summer 2003), 47-78. 
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Iraqi Kurdistan, where Turcomans are underrepresented and excluded from 
government.313 
With respect to the Sunni-Shi’i conflict, Shi’is’ numerical majority at the 
national level was mitigated by federal arrangements, which guarantee Sunni autonomy 
in three governorates (Salah ad-Din, Niwana, and Al Anbar). However, Sunnis rejected 
the 2005 constitution for fear of future under-representation at the national level. Sunnis 
favored consociationalism, in order to guarantee their actual representation both in the 
institutions and in political life, but this solution was rejected and the federal option 
prevailed. 
While Kurdish autonomy seems to have positive effects in institutional and 
economic terms, the rest of the country is developing as an Arab-Shi’i State, with a 
strong Arab-Sunni minority. Insecurity and violence still is the major cause of 
instability in mixed areas, such as the governorate of Baghdad. In this framework, 
diffuse minorities lost the opportunity to define their institutional space in new Iraqi 
citizenship. “In theory, federalism and other arrangements that guarantee minority rights 
reduce incentives for conflict,”314 but then the question is: what minorities were 
considered in the constitution-building process? 
                                                 
313 Vahram Petrosian, “The Iraqi Turkomans and Turkey,” Iran & the Caucasus, vol. 7, no. 1/2 (2003), 
279-308. 
314 Daniel Byman, “Constructing Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Security, 
vol. 28, no. 1 (summer 2003), 47-78, at 55. 
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While local autonomy rule was considered a valid solution to avoid Shi’i 
tyranny, the communities that benefit from ethnic federalism are Kurds and Sunni-
Arabs, both of whom are guaranteed autonomy in three regions each, and Shi’i Arabs, 
who are the majority in the nine remnant regions and turn to be the dominant group at 
the national level. These three groups are to be considered the constituent peoples of 
Iraq, while ethnic and religious minorities hardly find a place in the federal 
arrangements. 
Minorities are indeed guaranteed protection by the constitutional provisions that 
have adopted the millet system, but their validity is limited to the federal level. Indeed, 
political representation is guaranteed only at the federal parliament, and article 125, 
which guarantees “the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the 
various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians,” has not yet been 
enacted. 
Moreover, communal cultural autonomy arrangements correspond to areas of 
shared authority between the federal and the regional governments, such as the 
management of tribal uses, health policy, and educational policy (art. 114.1, 114.5, and 
114.6 respectively). These provisions would ensure the application of the constitutional 
millet at the local level; nevertheless, the results rely on the political will of local 
authorities for two reasons. First, the constitution does not oblige local authorities to 
enact the constitutional millet; secondly, an appropriate application of communal 
cultural arrangement would be ensured by active participation of minority 
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representatives at both the federal and local levels. At the federal level, minorities are 
under-represented, and, at the local level, no political representation is provided, 
therefore, the actual protection of minorities relies mainly on local authorities. 
To this respect, Anderson and Stansfield proposed a territorial division into five 
regions, equal in number of inhabitants and roughly homogenous in ethnic 
composition.315 These authors argue that “when a minority community fears the 
cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious hegemony of the majority community, inter-
communal tension can be avoided by allowing the minority rights of self-government 
within its own communal enclave.”316 During the early institution-building phase, the 
rights of minorities were hardly considered in the attempt to settle inter-ethnic and inter-
religious conflicts through territorial arrangements. 
The constitutional space recognizes the existence of ethno-religious minorities 
and establishes a model of protection, which results from the adaptation of the millet 
system. However, the protection of these minorities, which focuses particularly on 
linguistic issues, is contradicted by the territorial arrangements that settle the conflicts 
among the main ethno-religious groups. As a consequence, at both the federal and the 
local levels, minorities do not find appropriate protection. 
At the local level, the federal option mitigated Shi’i majority rule by creating 
ethnically homogenous regions. However, the replication of the State model in terms of 
                                                 
315 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfielf, “The Implications of Elections for federalism in Iraq: Toward a 
Five-Regional Model,” Publius, vol. 35, (Summer 2005), 359-82, at 373 and ff. 
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territorial division into autonomous areas does not solve the problem of minority 
protection, but just localizes it. In other words, at the local level, majority groupings of 
Shi’is, Sunnis, and Kurds constitute ethno-religious supremacy with no guarantees for 
minorities. Indeed, art. 125 of the constitution, which requires local administrative 
bodies to respect minority rights, has not yet been enacted nor is it included into 
regional constitutions. 
The lack of arrangements for the political representation of minorities and the 
territorial autonomy provisions absorb the constitutional millet. Hence, the potential of 
the millet system in terms of minority claims accommodation and of conflict settlement 
was neutralized by the federal option. The constitution tries to combine territorial and 
non-territorial autonomy models, which are not mutually exclusive since they address 
different issues and questions, but in Iraq territorial provisions and the powers of 
regional entities invalid the non-territorial approach. Then, the main problem is the 
combination of territorial and non-territorial arrangements in terms of constitutional-
engineering and social sustainability. 
4. Back to the Territorial Model: structural and contingent Minorities 
Territorial and non-territorial accommodations answer to different claims for protection 
of minority rights. Territorial arrangements are suitable for minority groups that reside 
in a defined territory and that constitute the majority population of that area; whereas, 
non-territorial arrangements are suitable for minority groups that are dispersed in the 
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territory of a State. In the first case, minority groups become the majority in an area, 
where the residents that represent the majority of the State population become a 
contingent minority in that region. In the second case, diffuse groups are to be 
considered structural minorities. Thus, constitutional engineering should foster 
appropriate solutions for both structural and contingent minorities. 
As Woelk emphasizes with reference to Bosnia Herzegovina, constitutional 
transitions in ethnically confrontational areas imply “the institutionalization of the 
ethnic element,” which “is often implemented by the use of territory, both because of 
the historical importance of the territorial element… and because of the claims 
advanced by different groups that are preordained to the control of a certain part of the 
territory.”317 In other words, the institution-building of post-conflict areas cannot adopt 
an ethnic-blind approach without the risk of exacerbating ethnic divisions. Moreover, 
the use of territory in constitutional engineering is an appropriate solution in presence of 
a claim by a certain group over a specific area. 
4.1 Combining territorial and non-territorial tools of minority protection 
In Iraq, this is the case of both Kurds and Sunnis, who represent the majority population 
in specific areas of the country and who have proposed territorial self-government rules 
in order to directly access natural resources and to avoid the risk of Shi’i supremacy at 
the central level. However, in these areas, Arabs and Shi’is become contingent 
                                                 
317 Jens Woelk, La Transizione Costituzionale della Bosnia ed Erzegovina—Dall’Ordinamento Imposto 
allo Stato Multinazionale Sostenibile?, 73-4. 
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minorities, while Turcomans, Christians, and Yezidis remain structural minorities. The 
use of territory in addressing the claims of structural and diffuse minorities, as well as 
those of contingent minorities, does not solve the problem of co-existence, but just 
reverses it. A minority becomes the majority in an autonomous region, while other 
minorities are not protected. Hence, additional instruments have to be applied in order 
to accommodate diverse interests. In this respect, a local application of the millet that 
could guarantee minority rights implies the combination of territorial and non-territorial 
models of protection. 
In the case of Iraq, a combination between non- and territorial models of 
protection would imply the regional application of the millet system. The example of 
cultural communal autonomy could clarify this point. Cultural communal autonomy 
implies the collective exercise of cultural rights, such as the use of language and the 
preservation of minority cultures in educational curricula and social practices. The Iraqi 
constitution recognizes these rights, but does not provide for tools of regional 
implementation. For instance, a representative committee of minority groups could 
elaborate, at the federal level, general educational policies in cooperation with the 
central government, while at the local level it could implement those policies in 
cooperation with the regional governments. This would lead minority groups to 
cooperate with both central and federated governments, while the general model of 
protection would be locally applied by taking into adequate consideration the specific 
needs of each area. 
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In this respect, the basic condition for the implementation of minority rights is 
political representation, in order to preserve multiculturalism and to prevent occasions 
of further conflict. Political representation aims to include diverse groups into the 
decision-making process through institutional means that guarantee participation rights. 
Töpperwien defines participation rights “as a guaranteed and institutionalized special 
influence on the decision-making process of the state…” that “promise to promote the 
democratic integration of [diverse] groups.” Ultimately, “having a guaranteed influence 
on the decision-making process promises to enhance the loyalty to and identification 
with the state and prevents the alienation inherent in the feeling of being a perennial 
loser.”318 
However, this does not mean that minorities should be involved in all decision-
making processes. On the contrary, different groups could be guaranteed participation 
in different areas of interest and levels of governance. The inclusion of minorities in 
different political processes varies according to their bargaining power and their will to 
participate in political life. The basic needs of any minority group are physical survival 
and cultural preservation, which correspond to the interests of security and non-
assimilation.319 
                                                 
318Nicole Töpperwein, Participation in the  Decision-Making Process as a Means of group 
Accommodation, in G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams, and Josef Marko (eds.), Federalism, Subnational 
Constitutions, and Minority Rights, 42. 
319 This chapter does not deal with security issues of Iraqi minorities, since it is not of direct interest of 
this study. However, appropriate protection of minority groups can enhance the chances of security in two 
ways. First, by including minority members into armed forces, effective protection of diverse groups can 
be established, since the actual interests and needs of the minority group will be adequately taken into 
account by its representatives in the armed forces. Secondly, the inclusion of minority members in all 
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With respect to areas of influence, cultural preservation can be appropriately 
guaranteed through special participation rights in political bodies that deal with cultural 
issues, such as the Ministry of Education, or through special representation procedures, 
such as educational committees in charge of drafting educational curricula; financial 
committees in charge of defining the budgetary funds of educational institutions; and 
special committees for minority rights in media broadcasting. The more bargaining 
power a groups has, the more it can influence the political process in different areas. An 
economically powerful group, for instance, may advance claims for directly 
participating in the economic process, like, for instance, the Kurds, who control the oil-
rich areas in their autonomous regions. 
With respect to levels of governance, different instruments of accommodation 
may be adequate for different levels of governance, particularly in federal States, where 
autonomy at the local level jeopardizes the rights of both structural and contingent 
minorities. Here, combinations of different instruments of minority protection may 
result into the so-called “complex power-sharing,”320 which originates from the 
“conflict-settlement approach that resorts to territorial self-government as the main tool, 
and to further mechanisms for respecting diversities in divided societies.”321 While, at 
                                                                                                                                               
spheres of social, labor, and political life of a State enhances the chances of cultural inter-change and 
mutual knowledge, so that, by knowing each other, diverse groups come into direct contact and can 
develop strategies and forms of coexistence. 
320 See Stefan Wolff, Complex Power Sharing as Conflict reoslution: South Tyrol in comparative 
Perspective, in Jens Woelk, Francesco Palermo, Josef Marko (eds.), Tolerance Through Law—Self-
Goevrnance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff-Brill, 2008), 329-70. 
321 Jens Woelk, La Transizione Costituzionale della Bosnia ed Erzegovina—Dall’Ordinamento Imposto 
allo Stato Multinazionale Sostenibile?, 61. 
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the local level, a minority group may represent a consistent number of the population, it 
may be a small group at the national level. Therefore, different claims and different 
tools for representation should be established to accommodate the claims of groups 
according to their status at a specific level of governance. 
In Iraq, for instance, Turcomans are a small minority at the national level 
(roughly the 2% of the population), but they are mostly concentrated in the Kurdish 
regions, where they are more active in political activity. Therefore, two different forms 
of protection could suit Turcomans: at the national level, they could be involved in 
educational policy-making, while at the local level they could be involved in other areas 
of influence. The lack of data about local ethnic and religious percentages shows the 
indifference toward both local relationships among groups and toward possible local 
forms for accommodating minority claims. 
4.2 Governance-oriented conflict settlement: conflict subsidiarity and 
national unity 
The main focus of the Iraqi institutional frame remains the central level for the 
necessary reconstruction of the State after the prolonged conflict, and federal 
arrangements do not address all the issues connected to minority protection. Federalism 
does not settle conflicts among other ethno-religious groups and impedes structural 
minorities from achieving self-determination. The governance-directed solutions for 
accommodating minority claims would be valid tools for addressing minority issues in 
terms of conflict-settlement and national unity. 
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With respect to conflict-settlement, the diversification of accommodation tools 
in addressing minority claims at the different levels of governance leads to diverse 
perspective of conflicts. At the central level, where small groups would have specific 
areas of influence, the government would be involved in framing institutional policies 
toward minorities and in settling general conflicts of interests. At the local level, where 
minority groups face actual problems and basic needs related to the protection of their 
rights, regional governments would be involved in the direct implementation of national 
policies, and would deal with actual and practical issues connected to minority 
protection. In this way, minority members would be guaranteed adequate protection 
through direct participation in political life. Hence, minorities would have actual say in 
the protection of their interests, and, at the same time, they would participate in the 
general political life of the country, by pursuing their interests in cooperation with other 
groups. 
With respect to national unity, the local management of diversity aims to create 
possibilities of cooperation among groups, by managing communal conflicts at the 
lowest level of governance. This approach leads to a “conflict subsidiarity,” whereby 
each level of governance deals with communal conflicts according to its capacities, and 
leads to the preservation of the supra-communal interests at the higher level of 
governance, where groups are already used to pursuing interests through cooperation 
rather than engaging in conflict. The subdivision of communal conflict in different 
levels of governance permits the implementation of policies that take into account 
actual needs of minority groups at the local level, by establishing the most suitable 
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solution in terms of social, economic, and political sustainability. Higher levels of 
governance would benefit from this fragmentation in that the incentive to cooperate 
locally aims to enhance chances of co-existence. 
Consequently, the national level would take into account minority issues from a 
general perspective, by formulating policies in accordance with minority groups 
representatives. The system of conflict subsidiarity would preserve national unity, by 
avoiding political fragmentation along ethnic lines at the central level. However, the 
central government cannot invalidate such a system by identifying the country with the 
majority culture solely. 
In Iraq, the constitutionalization of the multicultural approach is contradicted by 
the provisions that regulate the status of Islam in both the social and legal realms. 
Socially, Islam is the official religion of the State, while legally, Islamic law is the 
parameter for invalidation of contrary legislation and is the basis of family law. 
Therefore, the problem of individual rights emerges in terms of their democratic 
implementation. Religion in Iraq is not an abstract element for building identity; it is not 
just a socio-political myth, but it is part of the institutional and legal systems. Religion, 
then, is not only an element of identification of the majority population, but is imposed 
in every aspect of social and institutional life. No opt-out possibilities are provided by 
the legal system, and this gap dramatically impinges on the protection of individual 
rights as well as on the accommodation of minority claims. 
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Iraq can be defined as an Islamic federal republic, where the three constituent 
groups, Shi’i Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds achieved a constitutional consolidation of 
their status in post-Saddam’s Iraq by guaranteeing autonomy to Kurds and Sunnis on 
the one hand, and Shi’i supremacy at the national level on the other. Iraqi federalization 
shows a territorial bias that disregards the possibility of adopting different tools for 
accommodating the diversity that is not territorially definable; as a consequence, Iraqi 
smaller minorities “got lost” in constitutionalization. This territorial bias originates from 
the European tradition, but Iraq could have been, and maybe could still be, a laboratory 
of new ideal solutions by using different approaches and different tools. This holds 
particularly true, when one considers the convergence of European and non-European 
necessity of managing diversity, as the next chapter shows. 
However, existing constitutional law recognizes a general model of non-
territorial protection of minorities—i.e. the Iraqi version of the millet system—which 
could be adopted alongside with federalism and territorial autonomy provisions in order 
to address the claims of both structural and contingent minorities. 
The combination of different approaches, territorial and non-, as well as of 
different tools, could differently manage inter-communal relationships according to the 
level of governance in terms of opportunity for negotiation and area of influence. Since 
no legal instrument is universally sustainable, each situation should be treated 
differently, but the only territorial option just denies the rights of non-territorial 
minorities. Moreover, no “tailor-made” solution can expectedly solve inter-communal 
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conflict; on the contrary, negotiated and agreed upon solutions can not only settle 
conflicts, but also meet requirements of sustainability in terms of time—i.e., peace in 
the long run—and socio-economic conditions—i.e., State institutional structure and 
social response. 
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Western models of minority protection are based on different forms of territorial self-
government because the understanding of minority group is rooted in territorialism. 
Ethnic, national, and linguistic minorities are defined in terms of cultural homogeneity 
that differentiates a group from the rest of the people that lives in a country.322 These 
minority groups usually reside in a certain territory, to which the State accords forms of 
self-government, by replicating the social organization of the State. However, those 
minorities that are not territorially definable remain unprotected. Moreover, States’ 
commitment to protect minorities is linked to the historical presence of the minority 
group in a country. Consequently, two kinds of minorities remain unprotected: diffuse 
and new minorities. 
Diffuse minorities are groups dispersed in the territory of a country, for which 
the territorial self-government model does not fit.323 New minorities are the result of 
migrations, which originate from causes such as economic depression, political 
instability, and violence. Both diffuse and new minorities do not fit in the historical-
national model that Europe has developed since the birth of the nation-State. The 
Westphalian State is the institutional result of the organizational efforts of one single 
                                                 
322 See, Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, (New York: UN, 1979). 
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people,324 and the natural way to deal with minority aspirations is the establishment “of 
spatial foundations for the perpetuation of group distinctiveness.”325 
Post-modern studies in political theory show how globalization affects nation-
States, by disproving territory as the principal factor of identity that links States and 
peoples. As a consequence, since States are increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, 
other poles of identity have progressively become relevant in defining communities and 
peoples’ sense of belonging. This process of de-territorialization 
refers to the way in which people now feel they belong to various 
communities despite the fact they do not share a common territory with 
all the other members… This attention to the way communities are 
connected, despite being spread across considerable distances, and 
redefined through exchange across multiple borders, has challenged the 
classical ethno-graphic assumptions that cultures could be mapped into 
autonomous and bounded spaces.326 
How may Europe, which traditionally conceives identity in nation-State terms, face the 
new challenge offered by post-modernity? Theoretically, the appropriate answer is “to 
treat the different differently,” and, practically, it means to establish forms of non-
territorial protection of diverse groups. 
                                                                                                                                               
323 See, Roberto Toniatti, Minorities and Protected Minorities: Constitutional Models Compared, in: 
Michael Dunne and Tiziano Bonazzi (eds.), Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies, (Keele, 
UK: Keele University Press, 1994), 199. 
324 M. Crawford Young, Cultural Pluralism in the Third World, in: Susan Olzak and Joan Nagel (eds.), 
Competitive Ethnic Relation, (Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1986), 113-135. 
325 Marvin W. Mikesell and Alexander B. Murphy, “A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority-
Group Aspirations,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 81, n. 4 (Dec., 1991), 581-
604, at 583, citing David B. Knight, The Dilemma of Nations in a Rigid State-Structured World, in: Nurit 
Kliot and Stanley Waterman (eds.), Pluralism and Political Geography: People, Territory and State, 
(London: Crrom Helm, 1983), 114-137. 
326 Nikos Papastergiadis, The Turbulence of Migration, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 115-116. 
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Historically, at least two forms of non-territorial autonomy were introduced in 
the West: in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in Estonia, both in the early 1900s. 
However, new forms of non-territorial autonomy are developing in different European 
legal systems. Thus, cultural autonomy is not totally unknown to the West, and it is 
possible to compare European examples and the millet system as the most organized 
form of non-territorial autonomy is possible. 
After a brief description of the historical examples of cultural autonomy in 
Europe, this chapter analyzes the forms of non-territorial autonomy that have been 
recently adopted by European legal systems. I argue that it is possible to identify non-
territorial protection in terms of personal autonomy, cultural communal autonomy, and 
political representation. I claim that the non-territorial solution has become the new 
paradigm of minority protection, and, consequently, “Europe is going Eastward” by 
organizing its own adaptation of the millet system. 
1. Non-Territorial Autonomy in European History: Eastern Europe 
and the Hapsburg Empire 
Since the Peace of Westphalia, ethnic and national homogeneity have emerged as the 
main characteristics of the nation-State model. Subsequently, the need to protect 
collective rights within the framework of human rights has constituted the central focus 
of the international community between the two World Wars.327 The model of minority 
                                                 
327 Silvia Beatriz Blumkin, Protection of Minorities: For Individuals or Groups? in: Satish Chandra (ed.), 
International Protection of Minorities, (Delhi, India: Mittal, 1986),18-21. 
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protection entailed by both international and bilateral agreements was territorial, 
whereby a State guaranteed the protection of its nationals, who resided in another 
State.328 
Territorial autonomy is a direct consequence of the dominant political vision for 
which ethno-national homogeneity was a feature of social organization, and ethno-
national diversity was confined into specific areas of a country as a result of border 
change and territorial sovereignty alteration. 
However, Europe experienced also a different approach in protecting minorities 
that did not fit into the ethno-national model. Three historical cases, which are the 
Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth, Estonia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, show 
Europe’s attempt to manage diversity in terms of collective rather than national identity. 
The necessity to protect groups in non-territorial forms originated from the contact with 
different forms of social organization, such as the Jewish minority in Eastern Europe, or 
the Ottoman heritage in Central Europe. 
During the 15th-17th centuries, the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth conceded 
collective self-government to the Jewish community, which had fled from Germanic 
kingdoms. Collective autonomy conceded to Jews included both cultural and personal 
aspects. Therefore, Lithuanian-Polish authorities recognized the Jewish educational 
system based on religious studies with Yiddish and Hebrew as languages of instruction, 
                                                 
328 Emma Lantschner and Roberta Medda, Bilateral Approach to the Protection of Kin-Minorities, in: 
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (ed.), The Protection of National Minorities by 
Their Kin-State, vol. 4, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002), 107-109. 
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and the Jewish judicial system in matters such as personal status and internal affairs of 
the community.329 Following the dissolution of the Commonwealth, Jews lost their 
autonomy. 
In 1925, Estonia approved the Law on Cultural Autonomy, whereby 
communities of at least three thousand members were entitled to constitute Self-
Government Councils with fiscal, communal, and legislative autonomies. With respect 
to fiscal autonomy, the Councils could levy taxes from their members in order to 
implement their policies. With respect to communal autonomy, each community had 
property and real estate rights, whereby they could own and purchase goods for benefit 
of the community. With respect to cultural autonomy, Councils could run schools, 
educational institutions, and communal activities, under the control of the central 
government, which supervised possible anti-system activities.330 
During the late 19th century, a more revolutionary idea was introduced in the 
Hapsburg Empire, which already conceded large autonomy to the Hungarian regions in 
both religious and cultural matters. The proposal for introducing a cultural autonomy 
system was advanced by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, who believed in cultural 
democratization in an Austro-Marxist perspective. Specifically, Renner proposed a 
combined system of territorialism and communalism, whereby both the State and the 
                                                 
329 Shmuel Arthur Cygielman, Jewish Autnomy in Poland and Lithuania until 1648 (5408), (Jerusalem: 
Shlomo Nathan, 1997). 
330 Asbjørn Eide, Vibeke Greni, and Maria Lundberg, Autonomy: Concept, Content, History and Role in 
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ethno-national communities supplied citizens’ needs in different areas of competence. 
With respect to the State, regionalization was considered as the most appropriate means 
to deal with citizens’ needs in terms of economy, justice, and representation. With 
respect to ethno-national communities, communalism was considered the most effective 
approach to deal with cultural and personal issues.331 
Renner’s main argument focused on the status of minority. He claimed that 
territorial arrangements inevitably created new minorities, such as the members of the 
dominant group who live in an autonomous region, or left minorities unprotected, such 
as minority groups within autonomous regions. Hence, according to him, the 
appropriate solution to the national question is personal autonomy, whereby 
autonomous rule does not apply to an area but to a group of people, irrespectively of 
their residence within the country.332 
Moreover, Renner argued that political representation on ethnic basis was 
necessary at the local level, in order to pursue the inclusion of all groups into the 
decision-making process. Whereas, at the federal level, he despised ethno-national 
representation arrangements, in that the federal government did not require any ethnic 
                                                 
331 Karl Renner, State and Nation, in: Ephraim Nimni (ed.), National Cultural Autonomy and Its 
Contemporary Critics, (London: Routledge, 2005). The original version, translated by Jospeh O’Donnell, 
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Staatrechtliche Untersuchung über die möglichen Principen einer Lösung und die juristischen 
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contribution since it dealt with matters such as the army, finances, economy, and 
health.333 
Besides the historical example of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth, the 
cases of Estonia and Austro-Hungary show that non-territorial autonomy was developed 
in terms of personal autonomy, communal autonomy, and political representation. 
These three features characterize the millet system as well and, therefore, it is not 
inappropriate to advance the hypothesis of a European millet. 
Cultural autonomy is not completely unknown to Europe, but, until recently, it 
has not been developed. However, the analysis of new approaches toward minority 
issues shows that non-territorial arrangements have been often introduced in European 
legal systems to respond to quest for protection, to solve ethno-national conflicts, and to 
protect new minorities. As it will be shown in the next section, different legal systems 
within Europe have adopted forms of non-territorial protection that guarantee personal 
autonomy, cultural autonomy, and political representation. 
2. Dispersed and New Communities: Personal and Communal Cultural 
Autonomy 
The non-territorial devices for protecting minorities change according to the aspect on 
which the protection focuses. Indeed, States recognize minorities on the basis of a 
political choice, and, consequently, they accord a specific form of protection. For 
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instance, States may focus on the linguistic aspect and, accordingly, protect the 
preservation and the use of minority languages. Such is the case of Italy, where the 
constitution (art. 6) recognizes linguistic minorities and commits to their protection. 
Similarly, States may focus on the religious aspect and, therefore, protect religious 
group, such as art. 8 of the Italian constitution. 
However, there exists no comprehensive model of protection. Each State 
recognizes a minority group to which it accords a form of protection on the basis of a 
specific aspect of identity, such as language, religion, or ethnicity. As a consequence, a 
certain group may be protected under one aspect and at the same time it may be denied 
protection under others. For instance, the Jewish community is considered in Italy as a 
religious minority, and it is accorded specific protection through an Agreement with the 
State. This approach stresses the religious aspect of the Jewish community, while it 
denies the cultural and linguistic dimensions of Jewish identity. 
Despite this segmentation in the recognition practice of States, three approaches 
can be identified. The first pertains to religious minorities, whereby States recognize 
religion as a value to be protected. The second pertains to cultural-linguistic minorities, 
whereby States focus on language and, consequently, on cultural heritage of minority 
groups. Finally, some legal systems provide minority groups for mechanisms of 
representation, in order to enable them to pursue their interests within the institutional 
framework of the State. 
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This section analyzes in comparative perspective some examples of non-
territorial devices that have been adopted by European legal systems for protecting 
minorities. 
2.1 Religious Communities and the Personal Status: Concordats, 
Agreements, and Religious Courts 
The relationship between State and religion in Europe is traditionally confrontational. 
While the concept of secularism has developed in the sense of “diminishing of the role 
of the clerical elite in the life of state and society,”334 religious communities has 
increasingly advanced claim for recognition and protection of their rights, because “at a 
time when the ‘nation-state’ is in crisis religion is growing in strength as an integrative 
factor.”335 The result of the promotional approach is a compromise between the 
accommodation of religious needs and public order necessities, mainly understood as 
the respect for fundamental rights. The accommodation of religious communities may 
vary from a basic degree of recognition of religious freedom to the recognition of 
autonomy. 
2.1.1 Concordats and Agreements 
By and large, European legal systems defend the secular nature of the State and accord 
different forms of protection to religious communities in order to avoid discrimination 
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against religious minority groups and the dominant religious community. Three legal 
mechanisms can be identified: the Concordat, the Agreement, and the Registration. 
Historically, the Concordat is an agreement or a treaty signed by the Catholic 
Church and a State. The tradition of the Concordats started in the 12th century and has 
continued until recent times: the Concordat with the Italian Kingdom of 1929, part of 
the Lateran Treaty, later modified in 1984, the Concordat with Portugal of 2004, the 
Concordats with German Länder in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the Concordat 
with Poland of 1993. The Concordats contain provisions for regulating the relationship 
between Catholic-religious authorities and civil-State authorities, as well as the 
financial aspect of Church’s properties. 
With respect to the relationships between Church and State, the Concordats 
define the status of Catholicism in the signing State, while it may contain special 
provisions for the civil recognition of religious marriages. With respect to the financial 
aspect, the Concordats recognize the right of the Church to own properties and define 
the fiscal treatment, while they may recognize preferential treatment for citizens’ 
donations to the Church. The peculiarity of the Concordat lies in the partnership 
between the Church and a State. In other words, it is not the religious community of one 
State that bargains with governmental authorities, but the Church in its legal capacity as 
international subject and in its historical-spiritual task to represent the worldwide 
Catholic community. 
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Other religious groups, such as Evangelicals, Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists, 
which are not represented by international bodies, have to bargain directly with 
governmental authorities in order to achieve recognition. For instance, Germany signed 
an Agreement with the Jewish Communities in 2003, and Italy signed an Agreement 
with the Lutheran Church in 1995 and with the Buddhist Union in 2000. These 
agreements are statutorily enacted, and contain both aspects of regulation that are 
contained in the Concordats. They regulate the status of religious communities in the 
State and the fiscal treatment of communal properties. Moreover, these agreements may 
accord special rights in virtue of community membership. For example, Sikhs in Britain 
are dispensed with the obligation to wear a crash-helmet in that they are subject to the 
religious obligation to wear a turban.336 Similarly, Italian Buddhists are dispensed with 
the obligation of serving in the army in virtue of their religious-philosophical belief.337 
The degree of autonomy may vary according to the agreement and largely depends on 
negotiations between the communities and the State. 
The degree of autonomy and, consequently, the internal freedom of religious 
communities depend on States’ will to interfere with their internal affairs. As for the 
recognition processes of other minorities, a State is more likely to concede autonomy 
when it does not perceive potential anti-systemic threats from the community. The 
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lowest degree of autonomy is guaranteed by the registration procedure, which is 
adopted by many Central- and Eastern-European countries, such as Latvia,338 
Slovenia,339 Poland, Lithuania340 and Hungary.341 These legal systems recognize 
religious communities on the basis of their registration to governmental lists. Certain 
countries, such as Hungary, impose numerical requirements, whereby religious 
communities are entitled to start the registration procedure if they include a minimum of 
one hundred members. Moreover, the registration procedures may discriminate against 
non-traditional cults, by according privileges to those religious communities that are 
part of the historical heritage of the country. As Angeletti emphasizes, this mechanism 
is likely to discriminate against both non-dominant and non-traditional religious 
communities.342 Nonetheless, it has to be stressed that the ultimate decision about 
according protection and defining its form is a political decision, which depends on 
negotiation processes between the parties and perception of mutual interests and threats. 
Despite the differences of these approaches, some similarities can be identified. 
The recognition of religious groups as autonomous communities implies two aspects: a 
certain degree of self-government and personal autonomy. With respect to self-
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dell’Europa Centro Orientale di Nuovo Ingresso nell’Unione Europea, in: Giuseppe Leziroli (ed.), La 
Chiesa e l’Europa, (Cosenza: Pellegrini, 2007), 172-179. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 210 -
government, States’ recognition of autonomy implies internal management and property 
rights. In other words, irrespective of the form of recognition, religious communities 
enjoy a certain degree of freedom in the management of institutional and organizational 
aspects. Protected communities also enjoy property rights and a favored fiscal 
treatment. Moreover, those provisions that recognize civil effects of religious rituals of 
marriage may be considered as limited personal autonomy, in that the State recognizes 
the religious legal system of the community that it protects, although with only 
reference to marriage law. 
The features of autonomy originated from these agreements are not different 
from the ones of the millet, in terms of communal traditional autonomy and personal 
autonomy. Indeed, communal traditional autonomy in millet arrangements confers 
property rights to communities and a certain degree of internal self-government. In 
addition, personal autonomy guarantees the application of religious legal systems in 
family law matters. To this respect, two other examples have to be mentioned: the 
Greek and the British legal systems. 
2.1.2 Personal autonomy: the cases of Greece and Great Britain 
Greece recognizes both personal and traditional communal autonomy to the historical 
Muslim minority in Thrace. The special arrangements that regulate the status of 
Thracian Muslims are contained in the 1914 Act n. 145 and in the 1920 Act n. 2345, 
both included in the agreements with Turkey that followed Greek independence. 
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Greece recognizes the same autonomy that was guaranteed to ethno-religious 
groups under Ottoman rule, and it includes both exclusive jurisdiction of Islamic courts 
in family law matters and internal self-government. However, Greek authorities 
imposed some restrictions including Greek nationality of religious leaders (muftis), 
governmental control on muftis’ appointment, and the use of the Greek language in 
official documents. 
Nevertheless, from a substantial legal perspective, the Greek millet causes “legal 
segregation” of Thracian Muslims and, moreover, it denies those “remedies of control 
that are guaranteed by both Greek law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights.”343 In theoretical terms, 
what should be in consideration is the social balance between legal 
imposition of norms, which are alien to minority society and avoidance 
of creating social ghettos. In effect, what determines the point of balance 
between the two opposite positions is the grade of real freedom for the 
minority members; first to choose the legal modalities of their national 
and religious identity; second to move socially within the broader Greek 
society.344 
This system is the vestige of the Ottoman millet system, which governed the 
accommodation of minority groups in the Ottoman Empire. Besides the validity of the 
system in order to protect the old Islamic minority in Thrace, it has to be stressed that 
perplexities arise with respect to its compatibility with both domestic and international 
human rights standards. Indeed, the Greek system denies Thracian Muslims the 
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possibility to opt for civil litigation in family law matters as well as the possibility of 
civil scrutiny or appeal of Islamic courts’ decisions. 
Similarly, in October 2008, the British legal system has recognized Islamic 
courts as courts of arbitration in family law matters. The decision of Lord Chief Justice 
Phillips followed the proposal by Dr. Rowan Williams, archbishop of Canterbury, who 
deemed the recognition of Islamic law by the British legal system unavoidable.345 As 
arbitration courts regulated by the 1996 Arbitration Act, Islamic courts can rule over 
family law matters by applying Islamic law. However, the arbitration act has to be 
sanctioned by a civil court, which after a legal scrutiny can uphold or withhold the 
decision. 
The system of Islamic arbitration seems to be a balance between the demand for 
institutionalizing autonomy and the parallel need of the system to guarantee the respect 
for fundamental rights. However, perplexities of the liberal world still focus on the 
inadequate protection of individual rights based on the mere scrutiny of civil courts as 
well as on the danger of legal collapse, by the enlargement of sources of law consequent 
to the recognition of Islamic courts. As MacEoin emphasizes, this recognition creates 
a dichotomous legal system that holds Muslims and non-Muslims to 
different standards... It is a challenge to what we believe to be the rights 
and freedoms of the individual, to our concept of a legal system based on 
what parliament enacts, and to the right of all of us to live in a society as 
free as possible from ethnic-religious division or communal claims to 
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superiority and a special status that puts them in some respects above the 
law to which we are all bound.346 
This opinion is based on the argument of respect for human rights standards, which 
represents the main goal of democratic judicial systems. Sbai describes British Islamic 
courts as “an anomaly for the West, because they deny the recognition of the most basic 
rights: they disregard both the principle of inviolability of human rights and the values 
of liberty and equality, which are the basis of European democracies.”347 This opinion is 
convincing with respect to those legal systems that “segregate” citizens in legal sub-
systems by denying adequate protection of fundamental rights standards, such as the 
case of Greece with reference to Thracian Muslims. Nevertheless, when legal systems 
offer a plurality of opportunities to their citizens, they guarantee individual liberty by 
leaving the choice of the jurisdiction to their citizens, who are free to opt for the 
litigation system of the State or other litigation systems that may infringe basic rights. 
2.1.2 Personal Autonomy and opt-out opportunities 
A further distinction may be identified between those legal systems that offer a mere 
“starting option” and those that offer a plurality of opt-out possibilities. In the first case, 
States provide citizens for the opportunity to choose between civil or religious 
jurisdictions, but once they made their choice no other remedy is envisaged by the 
system. These systems do not adequately protect fundamental rights, in that the decision 
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to opt for religious jurisdiction may be based on social pressure, inadequate 
considerations, limited knowledge of the consequences. 
On the contrary, those systems that guarantee a plurality of opt-out remedies 
establish constant procedures for protecting fundamental rights in the judicial process. 
The first decision to opt for one of the available jurisdictions may have been 
reconsidered, or may have proved to be unsatisfactory; therefore, the system has to 
guarantee further opt-out remedies, such as legal supervision, as in the British system, 
or appeal procedures, as in the Israeli system.348 In this way, citizens are free to choose 
the law according to which they aspire to be judged in conformity with their will and 
belief. At the same time, the possibility for the general legal system to prevail over 
minor legal systems is guaranteed. 
2.1.3 Foreign legal decisions and the validation of religious law 
Religious law is further recognized by European legal systems through the recognition 
of foreign decisions; specifically, it is the case of decisions on family law matters taken 
in Israel and in Muslim countries where Islamic law regulates personal status. 
The European judge cannot simply disregard the foreign decision on the ground 
that it is based on religious law, since in certain legal systems religious law is the only 
applicable to family law matters. This is the reasoning of the Italian jurisprudence in 
cases of recognition of Israeli divorce decisions, which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
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religious judges.349 On the other hand, automatic recognition would endanger the 
respect for fundamental rights of the recognizing legal system and the European public 
order. 
The case of Germany is emblematic, since the judges have increasingly adopted 
a case-to-case approach, whereby they are open to recognition provided that the original 
jurisdiction is not in contradiction with the fundamental principle of the German and the 
European legal system. For instance, in some cases of divorce, the judge has simply 
recognized the act of repudiation, provided that the proceeding was compatible with 
German law, including adequate information of the wife and separation of the spouses 
for more than one year.350 However, other courts simply rejected instances for 
recognition on the ground that Islamic law does not guarantee equality between the 
sexes in legal proceedings, in particular when women are denied the rights connected to 
the due process of law.351 
The courts adopt a more restrictive approach to recognition when different 
interests are at stake, such as the interest of the child in decisions over custody and 
guardianship. In a condition of legal uncertainty, the German judges tend to recognize 
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foreign decision in order to preserve the rights acquired under the foreign legal system 
as long as they are compatible with the fundamental principles of the European and 
German legal systems.352 
In order to assess the validity of a system in terms of minority protection and 
human rights protection, personal autonomy has to be considered in relation to other 
aspects of self-government, such as cultural autonomy and political representation. 
3. The European Communal Model 
European legal systems have experienced forms of communal autonomy in 
consociational democracies such as the Netherlands and Belgium. In these legal 
systems, forms of territorialism were combined with forms of communal organization in 
specific areas of management. Moreover, limited self-government in educational 
policies has been introduced in many States in virtue of agreements between the State 
and religious or ethnic minorities as, for instance, in Italy, Germany, and France. 
Although these forms of communal self-government underwent processes of revision, 
consolidation, or obsolescence, the renewed interest in communal cultural autonomy 
has recently increased with respect to the protection of Muslim minorities residing in 
Europe and their demands for recognition and protection. 
                                                                                                                                               
351 See AG Frankfurt am Main, NJW (1989) 1434. 
352 For a detailed analysis of the application of Islamic law in German courts see, Mathias Rohe, The 
Application of Islamic Family Law in German Courts and Its Compatibility with German Public Policy, 
in: Jürgen Basedow and Nadjma Yassari (eds.), Iranian Family and Succession Laws and Their 
Application in German Courts, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 19-34. 
Giovanni Matteo Quer School of International Studies University of Trento 
 
- 217 -
The two European approaches, traditional communal self-government and 
minority groups’ autonomy, find their basic similarity in the focus on linguistic rights 
and on the enforcement of minority rights in educational policies. 
3.1 European communal self-government: the Netherlands and Belgium 
With respect to traditional European self-government, the literature refers to the Dutch 
and, partially, to the Belgian cases as “pillarized systems.” The system of 
“pillarization”, in Dutch “verzuiling,” refers to the institutionalization of pluralism in 
every stage of social life, whereby educational, health, economical, media institutions 
are divided according to the group of belonging.353 For instance, in the Netherlands, 
until the late 1960s, there existed three groups: Catholics, Protestants, and Seculars. 
Social, media, educational, health, and public economical lives were divided according 
to the group one belonged to. 
The institutionalization of social pluralism was considered functional to the 
post-war reconstruction period, when the need of diversification and the necessity to 
remark collective identity did not prevent elites from conducting a prosperous and 
compromising political life. Although society was divided along religious lines, elites 
were oriented to reach compromise, but, often, confrontational positions based on 
mutual exclusive perceptions paralyzed the negotiation process.354 This is the reason 
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why the pillarization system was considered strong and, at the same time, weak, in that 
it offered the opportunity to pursue politics of identity, but it simultaneously 
jeopardized the unity and stability of the political system by creating separate social 
blocs under elites’ control.355 Growing secularism has eventually led to the decline of 
this system due to the decreasing importance of religious leaders and identity, until the 
total dismantlement caused by the constitutional revision of 1983 and the consequent 
exclusion of religion from the public sphere. 
The verzuiling system is still applied in Belgium, where the constitution 
establishes a mixed system of government, which includes both territorial and 
communal elements. With reference to the communal elements, art. 115 establishes 
three linguistic communities: the French, the Flemish, and the German; each 
community has councils (arts. 115 and 116) and governments (art. 121). The Councils 
have competence on cultural and educational issues as well as on personal issues (arts. 
127 and 131), and their legislative power has limited territorial and institutional scope. 
In other words council legislation has force within the region inhabited by people 
belonging to that linguistic community or with respect to the institution belonging to 
that community (arts. 128, par. 2 and 131, par. 2, respectively). Although the 
constitution calls for inter-communal cooperation, the sustainability of this system has 
in several occasions been questioned.356 Indeed, the institutionalization of linguistic 
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diversity has polarized several conflicting aspects of Belgian economy, society, and 
politics into what appears a mere linguistic conflict among communities.357 
The pillarization model is an example of institutionalized diversity, whereby the 
State recognizes diversity as a structural element of its society. On the contrary, those 
States that recognize diversity as a marginal societal characteristic find other solutions 
for the accommodation of collective identity claims. Forms of cultural autonomy exist 
in Europe through minority protection models, which can be established by the 
constitution (as in Italy for linguistic and religious minorities, or in Germany for 
religious minorities) or by statutory law (as in Lithuania, Estonia, and Hungary). 
3.2 Autonomy and the right to culture 
Cultural autonomy models focus on two issues: linguistic rights and educational 
policies. With respect to language, promotional systems, which recognize and protect 
diversity, allow the use of minority language in local institutions, in the media, and in 
toponomy. By this doing, the State encourages the preservation and the social 
development of minority groups through the revival of minority languages, which serve 
as means for spreading minority culture. With respect to educational policies, 
promotional systems allow separate schools where the working-language is the minority 
language and where special curricula are taught for preserving minority culture. For 
economic, financial, and numeric reasons, a State may prefer not to establish separate 
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schools but to allow separate educational curricula for minority members within the 
State’s school system. 
The specific arrangements on State’s control over educational curricula, the 
degree of autonomy, and State’s financial support to minority policies are regulated by 
the laws that implement recognition. For instance, the Concordats, the agreements, and 
their statutory enactment establish parameters and procedures for the actualization of 
constitutional programmatic provisions. In the case of diffuse minorities, these 
provisions apply not to a territory but to a community. Therefore, in the case of the 
Jewish minority in Italy, the 1987 Agreement between the State and the Union of the 
Jewish Communities guarantees Italian Jews the right to abstain from receiving 
Catholic religious education in public schools (art. 11) and the right to establish Jewish 
schools and Jewish educational institutes (art. 12). Moreover, art. 13 recognizes the 
rabbinical degree, given by rabbinical institutions that are managed by the Union of the 
Jewish Communities, as license to perform religious duties as rabbi. These provisions 
do not apply to a specific territorial area of the country, but to the Jewish community as 
a whole. 
This system of communal autonomy has developed for protecting diffuse 
minorities. Some States, such as Germany and Hungary, impose a historical 
requirement, whereby minorities are entitled to autonomy only if they are historically 
resident in the State. For instance, Germany recognizes those communities that have 
been resident on German soil for at least 30 years. By this restriction, which was 
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imposed by the Ministry of Interior in 1954, one can identify those communities that are 
entitled to autonomy under the regime of public law organizations (Körperschaft des 
öffentlichen Rechts).358 In Hungary, the 1993 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities (n. 
LXXVII) requires for a minority group a 100 year-long residency on Hungarian soil to 
be entitled to protection. Given that the restrictive requirements to achieve special 
protection are the result of a political decision by the State, nevertheless, new minorities 
have succeeded in acquiring recognition. 
3.2.1 Designing a social space for Islam in Europe 
Specifically, Islamic minorities have acquired in several European States a considerable 
degree of autonomy, and are accorded similar rights to which diffuse minority are 
entitled. 
In the Netherlands, for instance, the Muslim community has settled in the 
pillarized society as a further group alongside Protestants, Catholics, and Seculars. 
Although the rise of Islam as a group claiming recognition has emerged during the same 
years in which the pillarization system was declining, the Muslim community “pulled in 
opposite direction.”359 Indeed, the pillarization practices were embedded in society, and 
they continued through local authorities’ arrangements and institutional behavior even 
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after the constitutional revision of 1983.360 Similarly, in Belgium, cultural rights of the 
Muslim community are guaranteed by the institutionalized procedures and practices of 
the linguistic communities. In other States, such as Germany and Austria, Muslim 
communities enjoy the same rights of other religious minorities that are recognized and 
protected by the State. 
On the contrary, in States such as Italy, where an official agreement has not yet 
been reached, Muslim communities act within the legal space that derives from freedom 
of association, and they enjoy the rights recognized by the anti-discrimination regime. 
The peculiar situation of Islam in Europe is connected to the third aspect of 
minority protection, which is political representation. Several legal systems in Europe 
recognize representation rights to minority groups, through which minority leaders can 
more effectively pursue communal interests. As the next section shows, the Islamic 
minority in Europe have progressively changed the system of minority protection even 
in those States that do not directly recognize Muslim minorities as well as in those 
systems that do not envisage forms of political representation. 
3.3. Political Representation: Minority Councils and the Institutionalized 
Dialogue with Islamic Communities 
The above-mentioned models of cultural autonomy in European legal systems are based 
on institutionalized practices of representative participation. The first model, which is 
cultural autonomy in pillarized systems, is based on stable institutions of representation, 
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such as in Belgium. Here, cultural communities enjoy autonomy in specific areas of 
competence and have institutions, which are constitutionally recognized and statutorily 
regulated. The second model, on the contrary, which is cultural autonomy in 
promotional systems, is based on representative means during the negotiation processes. 
While the general approach of these States is to deny political representation, 
some remarkable exceptions have to be considered. Eastern European States, such as 
Estonia and Hungary, recognized stable institutions for minority representation, the so-
called minority councils; whereas, Western European States recognized forms of 
institutionalized dialogue with the Islamic communities, although they do not recognize 
Islam as a structural minority. 
3.3.1 Minority Councils: Estonia and Hungary 
Minority councils have competence on a variety of issues and have different powers and 
degrees of autonomy according to the legal framework. 
Estonia, for instance, regulates the functioning of Minority Councils by the 1993 
Law on Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities.361 This law guarantees the right to 
form ethnic institutions for supporting educational, religious, and cultural activities 
(arts. 3, 4, and 5). Moreover, this law provides minorities for representative bodies, the 
national minority council and the national minority boards (arts. 11 and 12). These 
national institutions of representation are elected by the members of the minority group 
(art. 13) and have the power to establish representative bodies at the local level, in 
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counties and municipalities (art. 11, par. 2). These national representative bodies 
superintend the functioning of all cultural institutions and exercise their powers within 
the scope defined by the law (art. 5)—which deals mainly with cultural issues, 
including educational institutions and policies, inter-ethnic cooperation, use of minority 
language in media, and support of minority language in cultural events (art. 4). The 
State monitors cultural organization activities through the procedure of registration (art. 
7), in virtue of which a minority group acquires legal recognition, and through the 
supervision of elections within the bodies that represent minority groups (art. 13). 
This system of representation constitutes a valid means of self-government; 
nonetheless, it has a remarkable weakness in the scope of application of cultural 
autonomy. Estonia recognizes minorities and protects them through self-government 
arrangements, but the degree of autonomy is limited to cultural issues and is focused on 
internal aspects. In other words, the State recognizes minorities’ self-government, but 
refrains from actively participating in monitoring its actual implementation. On the 
contrary, other systems, such as Hungary, provide minorities for a wide range of 
protection procedures, in order to guarantee the effective exercise of autonomy rights at 
all levels of governance. 
The Hungarian legal system establishes a three-fold system of protection. First, 
the constitution establishes a special body at the Parliament (art. 32, letter B), the 
Ombudsman for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, which deals with 
                                                                                                                                               
361 The text of the law, in English translation, is available at http://www.einst.ee/factsheets/cult_auton/ 
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complaints regarding violation of minority rights, serves as legal advisor, and reports to 
a parliamentary ad hoc committee.362 Secondly, the 1993 Act on the Rights on National 
and Ethnic Minorities n. LXXVII states that minorities can establish councils at both 
local and national levels. Finally, the same law absorbs cultural autonomy in territorial 
autonomy in areas in which the minority group represents the majority of the resident 
population. Besides this last case of territorial autonomy, the specific interest of this 
chapter is the functioning of cultural autonomy, which guarantees both local and 
national representation. 
Local minority councils work parallel to local institutions, and serve as 
consultative bodies in areas such educational and cultural policies, media, and use of 
minority language. Moreover, they can establish specific committees that pursue 
independent policies in their areas of interest.363 In addition, minorities have a national 
representative body, the General Assembly on National and Ethnic Minorities, which is 
composed of 53 members elected by local Minority Councils. The General Assembly 
serves as an advisory and monitoring body for all State’s institutions dealing with 
minority issues; furthermore, it has a special veto power on statutory legislation and 
governmental decrees that affect minorities’ interests, which include preservation of 
                                                 
362 See Niamh Walsh, “Minority Self-Government in Hungary: Legislation and Practice,” Journal of 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, (Summer 2000), 26-27; on-line journal available at 
http://ecmi.de/jemie/ 
363 See National Democratic Institute Assessment Report, “The Hungarian Minority Self-Government 
System as a means of Increasing Romani Political Participation,” September/October 2006, 15-7, 
available at http://www.ndi.org/files/2163_hu_roma_self_assessment_100106.pdf 
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cultural heritage, museums, use of language, educational issues, implementation of 
cultural policies, and budgetary funds for local minority councils.364 
This special system combines monitoring bodies, the Ombudsman, with actual 
representative bodies, local Minority Councils and the General Assembly. Moreover, it 
provides for elastic as well as rigid procedures, according to the level of governance. At 
the local level, Minority Councils serve mainly as consultative bodies and have powers 
to implement policies within specific areas of interest. This elastic system empowers 
minorities with enough bargaining power to cooperate with local institutions and, 
simultaneously, impedes the paralysis of local administration that may stem from the 
exercise of too incisive power. 
At the national level, on the contrary, minorities enjoy veto power in areas of 
their interest. This rigid procedure enables minorities to affect national policies in those 
areas that relate to communal interests. The opportunity to dismiss laws that may violate 
minorities’ rights empowers minority groups with actual bargaining power, in that State 
institutions are more likely to cooperate by pursuing agreement with the General 
Assembly rather than permitting them to vote against proposed legislation. Moreover, in 
cases of lack of cooperation, minorities can defend their rights through veto powers and 
not through mere claims on alternative forms of accommodation. Finally, such a system 
limits this incisive power to those areas of interest to minorities such as culture, 
education, and language use, while other sectors of institutional activity are untouched 
                                                 
364 Ibid., 19-20. 
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by possible inter-communal grievances and State-minority conflicts. Hence, by 
restricting consistent powers of minorities to specific areas of interest, States can pursue 
ethnic-blind politics and act through ethnic-blind institutions, while actual 
accommodation of ethnic interest is guaranteed by special procedures established for 
certain areas and by parallel institutions. 
The Hungarian system is applicable to both consistent and small minorities, and 
to both territorially-concentrated and dispersed minority groups. Moreover, the aim of 
this model is to balance the right to diversity and national stability, by relegating ethnic 
conflict at the local level and by empowering even smaller minority groups with means 
of protection that are not necessarily linked to the territory. Indeed, 
even though some of the national minorities use the system of minority 
local governments in a way that approaches a system of territorial 
autonomy, these local-level territorial autonomies do not in fact come to 
take the form of a parallel societal culture at the national level. Smaller 
groups, not having the opportunity to use the territorialised version of 
minority settlement-level self-governments, can still establish a regular 
minority self-government which will have a say in cultural issues, will 
have an amount of money for organising cultural events but will not take 
over any of the administrative functions of the settlement-level local 
government.365 
This flexible system of accommodation applies to recognized minorities, whereby 
groups are entitled to protection if they meet the requirements established by the law, 
such as numeric consistence and historical presence in the country.  
                                                 
365 Andrea Krizsa, “The Hungarian Minority protection System: A flexible Approach to the Adjudication 
of Ethnic Claims” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 26, n. 2 (2000), 247-62, at 260. 
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3.3.2 Muslim Councils toward Euro-Islam? 
Another model of protection is emerging in Western Europe, which applies mainly to 
the Islamic communities and guarantees political representation of a non-recognized 
minority. The “Conseil Français du Culte Musulman” in France and the “Consulta 
Islamica” in Italy are examples of institutionalized dialogue with a non-recognized 
minority, while the “Comisión Islámica de España” in Spain is a representative body 
that was recognized by statutory law. 
Both in France and in Italy, the Islamic representative bodies conduct 
institutional dialogue with the governments and other institutions in order to spread the 
knowledge about Islam and favor integration. Moreover, they serve as consultative 
bodies on issues regarding Islamic communities, such as religious rituals, religious 
institutions, and the building of mosques. These representative institutions include 
different voices of Islam in terms of belief and nationality, and are active in different 
levels of governance; nevertheless, the difficulty to reach an agreement with the Islamic 
community is due to the lack of a unitary referee, in that these bodies do not represent 
the totality of the Islamic groups. These representative institutions defend the interests 
of Islamic minorities providing, within the weak framework of negotiation, for religious 
education, education of religious leaders, religiously supervised food, and places of 
worship. 
The institutional dialogue started both in France and in Italy in the aftermath of 
9/11 and the birth of an “Islamic question,” whereby problems of integration caused the 
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rise of islamophobic sentiments in Europe. The institutionalization of State-minority 
dialogue has so far served to pursue communal interests in a social and legal void in 
terms of minority protection and communal recognition. In France, where, traditionally, 
minority rights are not recognized, the Islamic Council served as an institution for 
claiming the accommodation of collective rights; whereas, in Italy, where the State has 
not yet concluded an agreement with Islamic organizations, the Islamic Consultative 
Body has so far served as the referee of the variety of Islamic organizations and 
associations active in the country. Most likely, this model of institutionalized dialogue 
will end in the recognition of the group as a minority. 
The Spanish case is an example. The Islamic Commission was recognized by 
Spain in 1992, after separate negotiations of two Islamic representative organizations, 
which have eventually merged into the Islamic Commission. This institution serves as a 
consultative body for issues concerning the Islamic communities and supervises 
religious education in schools, the education of religious leaders, religious rituals, and 
places of worship. In sum, the Islamic Commission has similar competences to the other 
representative bodies, but it gained State’s recognition of the Islamic community as a 
minority.366 
The analysis of these forms of political representation in different European 
legal systems shows that Europe has its own tradition of cultural autonomy that 
guarantees, although through different models, political representation of minorities at 
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both local and national levels. Moreover, Europe has progressively changed its 
approach in recognition: from the inclusion of historical minorities only, many legal 
systems have increasingly included new minorities into their systems of protection. This 
leads to a further question, which considers the system of cultural autonomy as a whole: 
is Europe shifting from territorial to non-territorial autonomy? 
4. Toward a European Millet? 
The analysis of the models for non-territorial protection of minorities highlights the 
necessity for accommodating both dispersed and new minorities. Eastern European 
models of cultural autonomy as well as Western European models for protection of 
religious minorities were introduced to appropriately accommodate the claims of diffuse 
minorities. Other States, such as Belgium, adopted non-territorial arrangements of 
autonomy in order to settle conflicts among ethno-linguistic communities. Again, forms 
of non-territorial autonomy were introduced in many legal systems to tackle with the 
claims of new minorities. 
The claims of diffuse minorities and the quest for protection advanced by new 
minorities are increasingly challenging Western traditional concepts of nation-State and 
individualism. Since the end of the Cold War, the “ethnic question” has dramatically 
gained central importance in both international and domestic conflicts and, at the same 
                                                                                                                                               
366 Joaquín Montecón, Islam in Spain, in: Roberta Aluffi and Giovanna Zincone (eds.), The Legal 
Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuvent: Peeters, 2004), 214-218. 
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time, it has consistently challenged States’ ability to guarantee integration and prevent 
assimilation of ethnic and religious minorities. 
The clash of civilizations theory, formulated by Huntington,367 describes the 
post-modern world as a community divided on ethnic lines. In other words, after the end 
of the war between big ideologies in which collective identities merged in favor of 
macro-areas of identification, ethnicity remains as the micro-area of identification for 
individuals. Although this theory has been strongly criticized with respect to its validity 
in minority issues,368 the importance of ethnicity is demonstrated by its centrality in 
both domestic and international discourses over collective rights and claims. 
Moreover, the discourse over identity is the main focus of new minorities’ 
claims for protection. Migration constitutes the major challenge to the supremacy of 
dominant groups because it questions the validity of ethnic-blind policies in those States 
that pretend to be indifferent to ethnic issues, such as France.369 Similarly, migration 
constitutes a dramatic challenge to those States that adopt promotional policies toward 
minorities but restrict protection to those groups that historically reside in those 
countries, such as Italy. In both cases, the problems of integration stem from different 
traditions of social organization; for instance, the Islamic tradition considers society, 
                                                 
367 Samuel P. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, n. (1993), 22-49. 
368 Jonathan Fox, “Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analyses of 
Huntington’s Thesis,” British Journal of Political Science, vol. 32, n. 3 (July, 2002), 415-434. 
369 Roland Hsu, The Ethnic Question—Premodern Identity for a Post-Modern Europe? in: Roland Hsu 
(ed.), Ethnic Europe: Mobility, Identity, and Conflict in a Globalized World, (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2010). 
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law, and religion as a whole body of social organization, which inevitably affects 
Europe’s societal and institutional practices. 
What both old and new minorities share is the quest for participation in State’s 
politics without blurring their cultural heritage in social life, in other words the 
problematic aspect of Europe’s challenge is to separate identity from politics, to detach 
citizenship rights from national identity, which can be described as the problematic 
transformation of the nation-State into a citizenship-State where multiple identities can 
coexist through groups’ acceptance of shared values and practices and through the 
institutional acceptance of diversity. 
Multi-level governance should combine with multi-area governance. Beyond the 
institutional organization of economics, services, and public goods, States may foster 
identity-oriented governance in areas of ethnic concern, such as education, linguistic 
rights, and religious rights. In this sense, Renner’s model of multi-cultural polities 
implies the conceptualization of the State as a body constituted by territory and people. 
With respect to the territory, multi-level governance would provide citizens for services, 
organize economic life, and arrange administrative tasks. With respect to people, multi-
area governance would guarantee communities the possibility to preserve, practice, and 
develop cultural, linguistic, and religious heritage without affecting State’s governance 
and, simultaneously, preventing assimilation. 
In legal terms, the political debate over multiple identities can be readdressed by 
analyzing the means of constitutional engineering that can serve as instruments for 
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guaranteeing sustainable arrangements in the accommodation of collective rights. Many 
European legal systems have increasingly approached the non-territorial model, by 
recognizing diversity and establishing different forms of non-territorial self-government 
in order to accommodate ethnic claims. The analysis of the different models shows that 
non-territorial autonomy establishes forms of self-government in terms of personal 
autonomy, communal autonomy, and political representation. These three areas of 
autonomy correspond to the three-fold partition of the millet system. 
4.1 Personal autonomy and legal pluralism: the circulation of judicial 
decisions within and from outside Europe 
With respect to personal autonomy, Europe faces a conceptual revival and a practical 
challenge. The novelty introduced by those systems that recognize, although limitedly, 
the principle of personal autonomy is the opposition to the dominant principle of 
territoriality of law. In the West, since modern times, law is linked to a territory and 
binds its residents. On the contrary, personal autonomy is based on the principle of 
“iure suo uti; sua lege vivere,” i.e. to apply its own law, to live according to its own 
legal tradition, which constituted the basic principle of Roman law as for conquered 
people, and that was later adopted by the Franks during the early Middle Ages.370 As a 
consequence, many legal systems coexist in one State and apply to its citizens according 
to their identity, which is the basis of legal pluralism. 
                                                 
370 Johannes Wilhelmus Wessels, History of Roman-Dutch Law, (Clark, NJ: Lawbooks Exchange, 2005), 
45-49, original (Grahamstown, Cape Colony, South Africa: 1908). 
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Legal pluralism poses two main challenges; on the one hand, there exists a 
procedural aspect of co-existence, such as degree of autonomy of the legal systems, 
borders of their jurisdictions, and connection to the general legal system of the State, on 
the other, there is a substantial aspect with regards to the application of the different 
laws, with regards to the respect of fundamental rights recognized by the general 
system. These theoretical issues will be analyzed in the following conclusive chapter, 
but what interests here is the novelty of personal autonomy in European systems. 
Arguably, the concept of territoriality of law is challenged by the rapid 
development of legal changes that were introduced in response to social change. At 
least, two examples can prove the gradual erosion of the territoriality concept. First, the 
circulation of legal models challenges the usual link between territory and State, and, 
secondly, the direct incorporation of different legal traditions into s State’s legal system 
disproves the absolute validity of the territoriality principle. 
Legal systems have dramatically evolved in the last years by the circulation of 
models, mainly because of the developing European law. The EU, as a supranational 
institution, has radically changed the idea of territorial application of the law by 
facilitating the circulation of legal models among the member-States. This holds true 
with reference to any branch of law affected by European integration, and, particularly, 
to family law, whereby a judge, in certain cases, has to apply foreign law. 
Similarly, migration has put European authorities in front of problematic choices 
and solutions when they had to recognize alien legal institutions. The main critique of 
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personal autonomy detractors relies in the consideration that the circulation of models 
leads to question the respect for fundamental rights in other legal systems. For instance, 
when a European judge is asked for recognition of an Islamic divorce, s/he may deny 
recognition on the basis of the fundamental rights argument, whereby the Islamic 
divorce, being a repudiation confirmed by a judge, does not respect the principles of due 
process of law and has negative consequences on the woman, denying her those rights 
that the European legal traditions recognize. 
The fundamental rights argument has a sharable position: a legal system should 
not recognize practices that it considers incompatible with its basic principles. 
However, the same problem is faced within the EU in other terms. For instance, a same-
sex couple that got married in Sweden cannot file a petition for recognition of the 
marriage with an Italian judge, in that the legal institution of same-sex marriage is 
unknown to the Italian legal system, and, in certain ways, disregarded. Thus, the 
fundamental rights argument should be corrected or, at least, developed. 
Moreover, many European legal systems recognized alien institutions such as 
polygamy or repudiation, when celebrated abroad, in order to preserve individual rights, 
on the basis of the argument that in those legal systems there is no other choice for 
individuals, due to religious, social, or legal constraints (a woman cannot refuse 
repudiation, or is obliged to comply with her husband’s decision to take a second wife). 
According to this second argument, which may be defined the freedom argument, 
personal autonomy could create further possibilities to infringe fundamental rights in 
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that people cannot choose among the legal systems. This holds true for those systems 
that do not recognize any opt-put possibility, whereby an individual is obliged to be 
subject to the law of his/her ethno-religious group. 
However, legal systems can foster opt-out and correction mechanisms in order 
to fill in the legal gaps and redress issues mistreated by the religious or traditional legal 
systems. In this sense the Israeli and the British cases are emblematic. Israel recognizes 
the possibility to “correct” the decisions of religious judges when the parties find that 
fundamental rights are infringed by the application of religious law. The UK recognized 
Islamic courts as courts of arbitration and imposed civil judicial supervision over their 
decisions. In this way, people can choose the way they want to be treated, and are given 
further possibilities to opt-out from their group and adhere to the State’s system of right. 
Hence, the fundamental rights argument is tested, in that the legal system recognizes 
ways to correct traditional fallacies, whereas, the freedom argument still clashes with 
this model. 
The degree of individual freedom in one system has to be balanced with the 
necessity to guarantee a certain level of fundamental rights, whereby States have to 
discourage anti-democratic practices. However, the controlled development of 
traditional practices may encourage their democratic development. For instance, the 
supervision of Islamic courts’ decision and their validation by a civil judge may give the 
opportunity for a European development of Islamic law and its democratic-oriented 
interpretation. 
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Given the presence of new minorities and their quest for recognition, Europe 
may follow two ways. It may follow the French example, and consequently deny 
collective rights including personal autonomy, but the evidence of ethnic and religious 
collective violence demonstrates that this option could be inappropriate in terms of 
sustainable integration. The under-consideration for certain situations does not imply 
their termination. On the other side, it may follow the British way and recognize 
diversity by fostering clear borders within a legal framework. 
Ultimately, one cannot be sure about how free individual decisions are. Social 
constraints may push for turning to religious authorities and disregarding civil ones 
against one’s own will, but once the legal system provides citizens for possibilities of 
opt-out, individuals should be let free to decide what is good for them according to their 
beliefs, creed, and faith. 
4.2 Communal autonomy and political representation: the need of a 
European millet 
With respect to communal autonomy, the main problematic aspect is the recognition of 
the collective dimension of rights. The adjudication of collective claims through 
communal self-government implies the recognition of collective rights, and the 
commitment by the State to foster mechanisms that permit groups to find their space in 
the social order. 
Detractors of this approach claim that minority protection endangers individual 
rights and questions the ability of States to face possible growing quests for protection 
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to the detriment of dominant groups. However, the freedom argument test could be 
passed by those systems that guarantee enough balance between collective and 
individual rights. In cases such as Lebanon, where individual rights are enjoyable only 
in virtue of communal membership, it is clear that the overarching communal 
dimension impinges on individual rights. On the contrary, elastic arrangements such as 
the ones adopted by Hungary, Estonia, Italy, and Germany may serve as appropriate 
means for settling ethnic conflict and as valid responses to growing communal claims. 
The simple denial of a collective identity question in Europe does not contribute 
to settling possible conflicts, and the Belgian case is emblematic in this sense. While not 
only violent conflicts are to be considered the only danger for social stability, 
communal conflict may also question States’ ability to keep inter-communal 
confrontational relationships on a low level and to foster tools for settling them. The 
same holds true with respect to political representation, to be considered in strict 
connection with communal autonomy. The more inclusive States’ policies are toward 
the collective dimension of politics, the more groups feel they have an actual say in the 
management of the res publica. To this respect a further consideration arises in 
consideration of elasticity as the basic element for sustainable arrangements that 
regulate ethnic questions. 
In matters of representative arrangements, elasticity should combine with 
rigorous selection of the areas to which representative arrangements apply. In other 
words, if the State adopts mechanisms for including diverse groups in all political areas, 
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the sustainability of the system would be questioned in that constant inter-communal 
conflict would lead to paralyze the political system. 
On the contrary, by guaranteeing representation of diverse groups in those areas 
of communal interest, as the Hungarian case teaches, a two-fold goal would be 
achieved. On the one hand, this would permit groups to directly manage the issues of 
their concern by negotiating directly with State’s institutions; on the other, this would 
exempt other areas from communal affiliation and, consequently, prevent State’s polity 
to be dragged into the spiral of intra- and inter-communal conflicts. 
As previously noticed, many European legal systems have adopted models of 
non-territorial autonomy. Nevertheless, these models are incomplete, or applied to 
tackle with different communal requests and collective needs. In this sense, the millet 
system could serve as a valid model for a comprehensive protection of minority groups 
and collective rights through non-territorial arrangements. A European millet could 
correct the negative potentials of its contemporary versions that are applied in the 
Middle-East. Roughly, one could identify at least three negative potentials pertaining to 
the three aspects of the system. 
Under the aspect of personal autonomy, contemporary millet systems do not 
provide citizens for opting-out opportunities. In this sense, a modernized version of 
personal autonomy, such as the British, could be an appropriate solution. Under the 
aspect of communal autonomy, contemporary millet systems do not guarantee enough 
elasticity in the contact among groups and disfavor mutual knowledge; therefore, a 
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more sustainable arrangement could take into consideration more elastic regulations, 
such as the Hungarian system of minority protection. Under the aspect of political 
representation, the millet system advances questions that pertain to broader debates on 
representation and consociational democracy theory. In this respect, the restriction of 
representative arrangements to specific areas and the development of agreements 
between States and groups through negotiation and constitutional customs could be 
valid solutions for sustainable regulations. 
Due to the increasing importance of non-territorial forms of minority protection, 
the millet system is a model of reference for Europe and it could serve as an example 
for settling European internal conflict and for adjudicating integrative and non-
assimilative claims. Arguably, Europe is developing its own form of millet, but by a 
more attentive analysis of the Middle-Eastern experience, European States could learn 
lessons about diversity management. A “look Eastward” could be useful for Europe to 
acquire further instruments to tackle with diversity and the settlement of communal 
conflicts. The next conclusive chapter will comparatively analyze the different systems 
in order to readdress the various issues covered by this study in terms of constitutional 
theory, and to build an ultimate model of non-territorial protection of groups in terms of 
social and legal sustainability. 
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The traditional instruments for protecting minorities, which link rights to a certain 
territory, inadequately address the claims of non-territorial minorities, create contingent 
minorities in autonomous regions governed by a minority group and inhabited by 
members of the State’s dominant group, reject the claims of new minorities, and 
exacerbate conflict in multi-ethnic areas. The current challenge of Europe is to address 
the demand for recognition and protection of groups that are dispersed and not 
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concentrated in one territory, such as Roma and Sinti; of migrant groups, such as North-
Africans; and of religious communities that are not yet recognized, such as Muslims. A 
further challenge for Europe lies in its capacity to manage inter-ethnic conflicts within 
the territory of the EU, such as in Belgium, and outside, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
A non-territorial option has to be offered as an effective solution for those 
situations in which territory is not a constitutive part of group identity or may even 
cause ethnic mobilization. As Markusse emphasizes, “in general, by utilizing the non-
territorial approach, the inherent problems of the imperfect overlapping of national or 
ethnic identity groups with populations of territories can be effectively avoided.”371 
The demands for non-territorial protection that are currently being advanced 
should be understood in light of the political-historical context in which the State, 
traditionally conceived as the institution that organizes political life, is questioned. 
Specifically, the nation-State conceived as the political result of one people is 
challenged by emerging multi-cultural societies whose members aim to preserve 
diversity by actively defining their social space within a majority culture. 
As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, European States are 
progressively adopting non-territorial models of protection, while there is not yet a clear 
approach regarding the policy of recognition and the degree of autonomy that should be 
guaranteed. Having analyzed contemporary adaptations of the millet system, as models 
                                                 
371 Jan Markusse, Territoriality in National Minority Arrangements: European-Wide Legal Standards and 
Practices, in Gertjan Dijkink and Hans Knippenberg (eds.), The Territorial Factor—Political Geography 
in a Globalising World, (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers, 2001), 151. 
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of reference for self-government arrangements, a general model of non-territorial 
protection can be outlined in terms of personal autonomy, cultural autonomy, and 
political representation. 
1. Personal autonomy and legal pluralism 
The problems of non-European cultural practices by migrants in Europe that include 
legal institutions unknown to the West, as well as the circulation of judicial decisions on 
specific legal institutions that are not recognized by all European States, question the 
capability of the territorial application of law to cope with current conflicts among 
different legal systems. Particularly, the application of family law is problematic, since 
foreign legal institutions, such as polygamy or same-sex marriage, involve moral 
considerations rooted in the fundamental principles of social organization. 
This problem is not a novelty in legal literature, which has analyzed the conflict 
of laws in family law matters in cases of colonial legal systems and their effects on the 
colonized legal practices.372 Neither is this issue a novelty in countries characterized by 
high degree of immigration, where territorialists, who argue in favor of the supremacy 
of the law of the land, oppose internationalists, who, on the contrary, argue in favor of 
partial recognition of foreign institutions. These disputes are based on the conflict of 
laws, which regulates both the place of adjudication and the applicable law, and on the 
notion of public order, whereby States impose restrictions on recognition of foreign 
                                                 
372 See, Michael Barry Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
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legal institutions based on constitutional values and moral considerations (ordre public). 
However, even in the US during 1920s, it has been pointed out that “all problems in the 
Conflict of Laws reduce themselves in the last analysis to the question whether under a 
particular set of circumstances sound policy demands that the forum apply the local or 
some ‘foreign’ rule of law.”373 
Beyond the question of appropriateness stemming from the recognition of legal 
institutions regulating cultural practices considered incompatible with fundamental 
principles, such as polygamy, the problem of individual protection of weak categories 
still remains. What about the children of the second wives in case of succession? What 
about child custody in cases of divorce between same-sex partners? While no general 
approach has been developed, “continental writers have attempted to bring the cases 
arising from polygamy within their general theories concerning the application of 
“foreign” law and their notions of “public order,” but no agreement exists in the results 
reached.” These issues  
cannot be determined by any general formula, but demand a careful 
consideration of the facts of each particular case and of the conflicting 
policies involved, with a view of discovering whether the recognition of 
the “foreign” law can be brought into harmony with the legal order of the 
forum.374 
                                                 
373 E.G.L., “Polygamy and the Conflict of Laws,” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 32, n. 5 (Mar., 1923), 471-
477, at 473. 
374 Ibid., 477. 
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So far, two approaches seem to emerge: direct recognition of foreign legal systems, 
preordained to their integration within the national legal space, and selective recognition 
of foreign legal institutions, preordained to the protection of weak categories. 
1.1 Direct recognition of foreign legal systems: the UK model 
With regard to direct recognition of foreign legal systems, the UK example is 
emblematic. After decades of refusing and then partially recognizing foreign legal 
institutions of family law, the British legal system has increasingly adopted a positive 
approach toward the ethnic minorities of Muslim faith. Both statutory law and 
jurisprudence on immigration issues vacillated over the recognition of polygamous 
marriages, but this has not impeded the Muslim minority from perpetuating legal 
traditions that are considered repugnant to the Western eye. As Shah has shown in 
analyzing the attitude of the British legal system toward polygamy as practiced by 
Muslim immigrants, 
ethnic minorities have not remained passive recipients of official 
dictates. Rather, there is evidence of their reliance on their own cultural 
resources to secure acceptable outcomes for themselves, and they are 
often able to negotiate between different legal levels in order to do so, 
thereby calling into question the claims about the dominance of the 
official legal system.375 
The resistance of ethnic minorities to the banning of certain cultural practices, as well as 
other policy considerations, has led to the decision to integrate Islamic law into the 
British legal system. This situation resembles the cases of Lebanon and Israel, where 
                                                 
375 Prakash A. Shah, “Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law,” International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, vol. 52, n. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 369-400, at 398. 
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ethno-religious communities are autonomous in regulating family law matters according 
to their legal traditions. However, while in Lebanon and Israel religious laws are law of 
the State, in Britain Islamic law operates at the arbitration level. This difference is 
fundamental in considering practical consequences related to the application of religious 
law and the respect of human rights. Moreover, the degree of autonomy accorded to 
groups defines the State as multi-national or multi-ethnic. By recognizing religious 
courts as State courts, all groups are equal members of society in terms of legal parity, 
whereby religious law is the law of the State, which considers the values of the single 
groups as its own values. On the contrary, the minor status of religious law by 
recognizing religious courts as arbitration courts qualifies the State as promotional, but 
the difference between the groups lies in the relationship between the majority, which 
recognizes group autonomy, and the minorities, which enjoy limited autonomy. 
The Lebanese case shows that a high degree of autonomy freezes legal sub-
systems into mono-blocs that are indifferent to any external influence; therefore, 
arrangements based on total autonomy exclude the possibility of the general legal 
system correcting those practices that are incompatible with the fundamental principles 
of the State. In this respect, the Israeli legal system shows that the supervision of a 
higher judicial body that scrutinizes the decisions of religious courts may intervene in 
the infringement of fundamental rights that stems from the application of religious law. 
Moreover, the co-existence of secular and religious laws on family matters provides the 
opportunity to choose which court is considered more convenient to the belief of the 
applicants—secular or religious judges—guarantees the principle of personal autonomy 
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and respect for fundamental rights. Yet, the status of religious courts as States’ court, 
thus of equal rank as civil courts, gives a certain prominence to religious legal systems, 
which is enshrined in the provision that guarantees exclusive jurisdiction to the religious 
judge in matters of marriage and divorce. This prominence may lead to the 
legitimization of those internal restrictions that the secular legal system aims to 
disqualify. Hence, the UK model may be considered an improvement of the cases 
analyzed, since it guarantees supervision by scrutinizing the decision of religious courts, 
and recognizes religious jurisdiction as a pure option by recognizing Islamic courts as 
arbitration courts and not as State courts. 
Such an arrangement would be a general option apt to guarantee the opportunity 
to Islamic minorities to refer to a religious court, and then to perpetuate traditional 
cultural practices; simultaneously, it would guarantee State’s supervision over judicial 
decisions and correct the contradictions of the system in terms of respect for 
fundamental rights. 
The necessity to connect between the religious sub-system and the general legal 
system of the State is confirmed by the development of religious law toward liberal 
standards. The recognition of Islamic courts as arbitration courts is a further step in the 
process of legitimization of Islam in Great Britain, where Islamic law, shari’a, is 
applied in mediation disputes over family law matters. As Pearl and Menski argue, this 
practice has led to the creation of “a new form of shari’a, English Muslim law or 
angrezi shariat” as the result of “individual and community strategies” that “have led to 
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the development of a new hybrid”376 which seeks legal solutions within the Islamic law 
framework that are simultaneously compatible with British social standards.377 
Notwithstanding this tendency to Europeanization, it remains debatable how 
convenient is for European States to open the borders of their jurisdiction to other legal 
traditions. At least three problems stem from this change: the risk to legitimize internal 
restrictions, the scarce degree of familiarity of Islamic judges with European legal 
standards, and the paradox of the multicultural migrant, who re-discovers cultural 
practices often banned in his/her country of origin.378 As for internal restrictions, the 
legal system that accepts different legal traditions has to set clear limits on what it is 
likely to recognize and what it is likely to ban according to its fundamental principles. It 
is impossible to set general standards, since certain practices may conform to human 
rights and consequently permitted, whereas, others may be disregarded as violations of 
fundamental freedoms. A case-to-case approach based on mutual understanding and 
                                                 
376 David Pearl and Werner Menski, Muslim Family Law, (London: Sweet&Maxwell, 1998, 3rd edition), 
58. 
377 This idea fosters the creation of “national versions” of Islamic law, which stem from the adaptation of 
shari’a to the legal systems of the States. In this respect, the local adaptation of Islamic law is a 
consequence of the development of what Bassam Tibi defines Euro-Islam, which combines Islamic 
culture with European tradition and principles. European versions of Islam are developing in different 
countries, and a historical example is Albania, where, in 1923, the Islamic Congress decided to reform 
Islamic principles by banning polygamy and the compulsory use of the veil. See, Bassam Tibi, 
Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: political democracy vs. cultural difference, in: 
Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
378 It is the case, for instance, of Turkish, Tunisians, and Moroccans who re-discover in Europe 
polygamous marriage, an institution of Islamic law that has been banned by national legislations of 
Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco. Indeed, it would be a paradox if migrants could contract polygamous 
marriage in Europe, when the States where they come from do not recognize this institution. It would 
mean that European Islamic law is more radically Islamic than Islamic law practiced in Turkey, Tunisia, 
or Morocco. 
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compromise seems to be the best option in order to adapt new legal traditions to 
Western values and let them re-elaborate cultural practices in a liberal-democratic 
sense. To enable this process, not only States have to define principles for opening their 
jurisdictional frontiers, but also minority leaders have to be acquainted with the culture 
of the State of residence. As for the familiarity of Islamic judges with European legal 
standards, the necessity of educational programs on constitutional and human rights 
laws is confirmed by some State initiative, such as in Spain and Germany. 
Finally, the recognition of Islamic law may lead to the paradox of 
multiculturalism, whereby certain cultural practices, banned in countries where 
migrants come from, are revitalized in Europe in virtue of the right to cultural diversity. 
As Sbai argues, “if we consider what happens in the countries of origin, we notice 
modernization and change, even within the institutions; these novelties clash with the 
traditionalism attached to the past proper of immigrants on the European Continent, 
who are isolated and unaware of the evolution in their countries.”379 
1.2 Non-recognition, is it an available solution? 
The rejection of foreign legal tradition does not imply the conformation to European 
standards by new minorities that are reluctant to abandon their traditions. Furthermore, 
non-recognition may lead to discrimination against those weak categories that are 
oppressed by traditional cultures and not protected by Western legal systems that do not 
recognize the legal nature of the institutions that infringe their fundamental rights, 
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including the succession rights of the second wife, immigration rights of polygamous 
children, and patrimonial rights of repudiated women. As a consequence, 
official bans on social practices such as polygamy are ill-advised and 
drive the phenomenon underground. The risk of abuse here is great, as is 
the potential vulnerability of women and children who may simply be 
abandoned without a divorce recognized under the personal law of the 
parties and without recourse to official legal fora for remedy. If anything, 
the official law exacerbates the weaker legal position of women and 
children, often dividing families across continents by disrespecting their 
choices.380 
If the recognition of traditional legal systems in a model of personal autonomy is not 
desirable for the abovementioned reasons, the situations that result from the legal acts 
produced in different countries or in virtue of different legal traditions cannot be 
disregarded by Western legal systems when this leads to neglect the protection of 
fundamental rights. Hence, non-recognition is not an available solution. 
1.3 Selective recognition of foreign legal institutions: the German model 
With regard to selective recognition of foreign legal institutions, the case-to case 
approach seems to be the most appropriate for protecting weak categories, including 
women, children, and sexual minorities, who risk to be discriminated against even in 
promotional legal systems that do not recognize certain legal institutions of their 
original countries. 
                                                                                                                                               
379 Suad Sbai, L’Inganno—Vittime del Multiculturalismo, (Siena: cantagalli, 2010), 87. 
380 Prakash A. Shah, “Attitudes to Polygamy in English Law,” at 398. 
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As it has been reported, this is the case of Germany, where shari’a is applied by 
civil courts in processes of recognition of foreign judgments and in private law, 
including family law contracts, or commercial contracts.381 Specifically, German civil 
courts do not directly recognize foreign legal institutions, but recognize the factual 
situation that they ensued, in favor of the individuals whose rights are infringed by these 
institutions. For instance, succession rights were recognized to the second wife as well, 
or a second wife was permitted reunion with her husband on humanitarian basis, and a 
man was sentenced to pay a divorce bill on the basis of Shi’i law that regulated the 
matter.382 
This option avoids the problem of legitimization of cultural practices contrary to 
fundamental rights, in that international private law permits to “filter” legal institutions 
compatible with the European legal systems through the notion of public order. 
Simultaneously, the process of recognition of foreign decisions cannot simply disregard 
foreign legal institutions considered as repugnant to European legal culture. The duty to 
respect fundamental rights should also apply to those situations in which the violation 
of human rights originates from foreign legal institutions that European systems do not 
recognize. The higher interest at stake here is the protection of weak categories, such as 
                                                 
381 See the previous chapter on Europe and for a detailed analysis of the application of Islamic law in 
German courts see, Mathias Rohe, The Application of Islamic Family Law in German Courts and Its 
Compatibility with German Public Policy, in: Jürgen Basedow and Nadjma Yassari (eds.), Iranian 
Family and Succession Laws and Their Application in German Courts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 
19-34. Some cases have also reverberated in the press; see, “Familien- und Erbrechtsfälle Deutsche 
Gerichte wenden Scharia an.” Spiegel Online, 9. October 2010. 
382 See, Cosima Schmitt, “Auch die Zweitfrau darf bleiben. Muslimische Zweitfrauen fallen oft durch 
Gesetzeslücken. Denn grundsätzlich wird die Polygamie in Deutschland geächtet. Nun hat ein rheinland-
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women and children, who have to be guaranteed protection even though the legal 
system does not recognize the foreign norms that violated their rights. It is the case of 
polygamous children, or polygamous wives, whereby the simple non-recognition would 
prejudice their already weak position by letting them bereft of any right. Moreover, this 
option would solve the problems that stem from recognition of foreign legal institutions 
within the European legal space, such as same-sex marriages. 
However, this option does not answer the question about the limits of 
recognition and the way recognition is conducted. The judges with whom such petitions 
are filed may not be acquainted with Islamic law or with the implications of their 
possible decisions. Therefore, education on Islamic law and training on this specific 
topic of relation between Islamic and European laws is necessary. Education and 
training on this topic may be carried out in a dialogic perspective with Islamic legal 
experts in Europe. This “task-force” of legal dialogue would increase the possibilities of 
mutual understanding on values and norms and could be the first step that foreshadows 
the institutionalization of Islamic law in religious arbitration courts as in UK. As Rohe 
highlights, 
sharī‛a in Europe would mean to define sharī‛a rules for Muslims here 
in accordance with the indispensable values of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law governing European legal orders. Within the 
framework of these orders, Muslims have to be enabled not only 
theoretically to practice their believes. Thus, all Europeans should 
remember that freedom of religion and therefore religious pluralism is an 
integral part of the liberal European constitutions, and that everybody 
                                                                                                                                               
pfälzisches Gericht einer irakischen Zweitgattin Aufenthaltsrecht zugesprochen - aus humanitären 
Gründen” Tageszeitung, no. 7322, 30 March 2004. 
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who is willing to respect the rule of the land should enjoy this 
freedom.383 
In this sense, legal pluralism has to be considered as a process and not as a defined 
solution to be introduced into European legal orders. Before States are ready to open 
their legal frontiers to different legal systems, they have to be acquainted with the 
foreign values and norms and, particularly, they have to understand the implications of 
such a change. To this respect, a legal dialogue may lead to legal exchange and to the 
institutional legal differentiation within the European systems. The consideration on 
desirability of this radical change is not a question anymore, since the process has 
already started, what, on the contrary, has to be inquired is the way this process is 
developing and the goals to be desirably attained.384 
2. Communal Cultural Autonomy 
The principle of legal dialogue leads to the issue of bridging cultural communities in 
terms of coexistence, compromise, and shared values and principles. In this respect, a 
variety of solutions adopted by European legal systems show that the promotional 
attitude toward minorities prevents political mobilization of groups. Moreover, as the 
Iraqi case shows, this approach can protect minorities from discrimination in situations 
of conflict with the dominant communities. The territorial solutions that have 
traditionally been adopted should be integrated with non-territorial solution. 
                                                 
383 Mathias Rohe, “Application of Sharī‛a Rules in Europe: Scope and Limits” Die Welt des Islams, New 
Series, vol. 44, no. 3, Sharī‛a in Europe (2004), pp. 323-350, at 348. 
384 Felix Ekardt, “Weder Leitkultur noch multikultureller Relativismus—Gerechtigkeit und gutes Leben 
in der Migrationsgesellschaft,” Kritische Justiz, vol. 38, n. 3 (2005), 248-259. 
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The Estonian model of autonomous communities resembles the communal 
cultural autonomy of millet systems, in that communities can act as legal persons in 
order to pursue their interests by a special regulation of their legal personality that 
differs from the one of private associations. The introduction of non-territorial 
instruments for protecting minorities can guarantee appropriate protection of cultural 
communities according to the number of members and financial capabilities. For 
instance, as for educational policies, separate schools may suit large communities, while 
small communities can be accommodated through separate curricula. Again, large 
communities could run their own institutions and support small communities in order to 
guarantee the enjoyment of collective rights. 
The reference to millet legal systems leads to the negative potential of autonomy 
in terms of segregation and incompatibility with the dominant community. Autonomy is 
preordained to the preservation and the development of non-ruling communities, but it 
cannot turn into a means of self-determination of minorities when this is incompatible 
with the existence of the State and with the fundamental values of the ruling 
community. The case of Lebanon clearly shows that an excessive degree of autonomy 
leads to the isolation of communities and creates, as Tibi argues, a multicultural society, 
which not a melting-pot, but the coexistence of different cultures that live parallel and 
separate.385 This lack of connection among groups, Tibi claims, creates instability in 
                                                 
385 Bassam Tibi, Islamische Zuwanderung—Gescheiete Integration, (München: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 2002), 178-181. 
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that communities do not identify themselves with a supra-communal identity that 
constitutes common membership to civil society.386 
The need to protect minorities as a duty of liberal democracy and as a means of 
conflict prevention has to be balanced with the necessity of preserving a neutral public 
space in which communities act as members of a common society. Linguistic, religious, 
ethnic, and cultural specificities cannot be crystallized in identities that are impermeable 
to adaptation. Hence, the promotional attitude of States has to correspond to a genuine 
will of integration on minorities’ side, which pursue the goal of cultural preservation in 
self-governing arrangements, but are ready to share values and principles of the 
dominant community. This mutual compromise on both sides, of the dominant and the 
non-ruling communities, can be attained by an agreement on common values and 
principles that constitute the social pact of the State, which is the result of negotiation 
and dialogue. 
Practically, dialogue means active participation of the State in cultural issues of 
interest to minorities, such as supervision of the Ministry of Education on educational 
curricula in Israel, and the inclusion of minorities into the decision-making process. 
This means that States should guarantee political participation of minorities, the third 
aspect of the millet system. While this issue is the focus of the next section, one more 
question arises regarding negotiation: the involvement of elites and leaders. 
                                                 
386 Ibid. 
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In the negotiation process, minorities are represented by leaders, who advance 
the interests of their groups. In order to conduct effective negotiations among groups, 
leaders should have an in-depth knowledge of the ruling community’s culture, and 
should be acquainted with the constitutional values and principles of the State of 
residence. To this purpose, the educational training of minority leaders and elites is the 
first step toward compromise. In this sense, Germany provides Islamic clerics for 
education in universities,387 so that their knowledge of German constitutional and 
religious cultures may lead to a better mutual understanding and, as a consequence, to 
clarify the limits within Islam can express and develop. 
                                                 
387 See, “Imam-Ausbildung—Uni Frankfurt startet Studiengang für Islam-Gelehrte” Der Spiegel, 21 
October 2010, available at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,724524,00.html; see also 
Anna Reimann, “Erste Deutsche Uni startet Seminare für Imame” Der Spiegel, 7 October 2010, available 
at http://www.spiegel.de/unispiegel/studium/0,1518,721672,00.html. In English see, Tom Heneghan, 
“German Universities to Train Muslim Imams, Teachers” Reuters, 14 October 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE69D36820101014.The training courses aim to develop the 
critical approach in Islamic theological studies. This approach has developed in German faculties of 
theology during the nineteenth century, as a result of rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. This new 
method privileged the critical and rationalisy approaches to study the Bible, in contrast with dogmatic 
theological theories, which ultimately supported Christian supremacy. Moreover, university training is 
thought as a free heaven for those Islamic theologians who already apply this method outside Europe, and 
are persecuted in obscurantist countries under the accusation of modernization, hypocrisy, heresy, and 
apostasy. As Heneghan reports, “the ‘historical-critical method’ of theology emerged in Germany in the 
19th century as a rigorous academic examination of the Bible. It debunked many myths about Christian 
history and doctrine and explained how its holy book was constructed. The few theologians who apply 
this method to Islam keep a low profile because their findings are considered heretical by mainstream 
Muslims. Some have been threatened with violence.” Other attempts to create training curricula for 
imams within European universities, such as in France and in the Netherlands, were unsuccessful because 
the programs were run by Christian theology departments. As a consequence, these educational programs 
were perceived as means for proselytizing, rather than specific programs on Islamic theology. 
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3. Political Representation: multi-level governance and conflict 
subsidiarity 
The analysis of contemporary millet systems (Lebanon, Israel, and Iraq) shows that 
appropriate representation of minority groups is necessary to attain effective protection 
of cultural rights. In other words, the recognition by the State of minority groups is not 
per se sufficient if they do not have an actual say in the management of policies that 
they can influence in order to achieve their goals. The Iraqi system is in this sense 
emblematic, since the constitution recognizes collective rights, but the legal systems 
practically bereaves minorities of rights since they are not guaranteed representation in 
those institutions in charge of implementing policies connected to minority rights. 
The inclusion into the decision-making process can be attained in different 
ways, including ethnic power-sharing, as in Lebanon, or de facto representation and 
particular forms of representation in specific areas of interest, as in Israel. The former 
case shows that non-elastic provisions exacerbate conflict because groups are prone to 
maximize their goals rather than seeking compromise. On the contrary, the latter case 
shows that, although the system of protection guarantees specific representation in areas 
of interest to minorities, including the educational system and the management of 
linguistic and religious affairs, in addition to de facto representation of minorities at the 
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary bodies, this cannot hinder conflict from 
exacerbating if the relationship between minority and majority is confrontational. 
Specifically, representation cannot meet the demands of a minority that does not 
identify with the State, either because it feels the existence of the State incompatible 
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with its national aspirations or because it effectively pursues national goals that are not 
in conformity with the constitutional principles of the State of residence. 
In this respect, the historical model of de-localization of minority councils in 
pre-independent Lebanon resembles the Hungarian model of a representation system 
patterned on Renner’s national cultural autonomy, whereby minorities are guarantees 
representation in institutions through incisive instruments such as power-sharing at the 
local level, whereas, at the central level, they are guaranteed selective representation in 
specific areas of interest. This model is based on the fragmentation of governance 
within the institutional hierarchy,388 which leads to two results in terms of conflict 
management and diversity management. 
3.1 The millet as a means of inter-ethnic conflict management: conflict 
subsidiarity 
With regard to conflict management, the system of multi-level governance can be 
adopted even in the institutional management of conflicts. The division of competences 
in different institutional levels is considered as effective in terms of accountable and 
effective administration. The same could be applied to conflict management, whereby 
conflicts would be fragmented among the institutions so that each level of 
administration can deal with controversial issues that belong to its area of competence. 
For instance, local institutions can deal with practical solutions of educational curricula 
                                                 
388 Armin von Bogdandy, “Die Minderhaitenpolitik der Europäischen Union—Zugleich ein Beitrag zur 
rechtswissenschaftlichen Fassung überstaatlicher Governance,” Kritische Justiz, vol. 40, n. 3 (2007), 224-
239. 
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in schools, use of minority languages in the media and in public offices, symbols of 
collective identity in the public sphere, and religious needs such as particular 
alimentation and festivities. On the contrary, the central level would deal with the 
definition of policies and the principles of implementation. 
The subdivision of conflict in conformity with institutional competences is the 
accomplishment of what I defined as “conflict subsidiarity,” whereby controversial 
issues are managed at different levels of governance, according to each level’s 
administrative competence and legal jurisdiction. If the local level should deal with 
practical solutions to controversial issues, the central level would deal with the general 
relationship between State and minorities, or ruling group and non-ruling groups, which 
leads to the question of diversity management. 
3.2 The millet as a means of diversity management 
With regard to diversity management, various European legal systems have opted for 
the institutionalization of dialogue between States and minorities. In some cases 
institutionalization is formal, and minority representatives negotiate with State’s 
institutions without legal means that guarantee them actual power, such as the Islamic 
Councils in Italy and France. On the contrary, other legal systems have entitled 
minorities with veto powers in areas of vital interest to collective rights, such as in 
Hungary and Slovenia. These veto powers makes it necessary for non- and ruling 
groups to meet and negotiate their interests by pursuing goals that may seem 
incompatible, otherwise veto rights cannot be overcome. The institutionalization of 
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dialogue would lead to mutual knowledge and comprehension, empowering minorities 
to influence central institutions and ruling groups to prevent minorities from pursuing 
goals that are incompatible with coexistence or not conform to the fundamental 
principles of the State. 
This model constitutes an option for minorities that have engaged in 
confrontational relationships with the States of residence. Indeed, such institutions offer 
the possibility to mutually define vital interests and to compromise negotiable positions. 
It is not by chance that Islamic councils have developed in the historical context of 
Islamic mobilization vis-à-vis hosting States.389 In addition, these institutions would 
hinder groups from pursuing autonomously their interests by paralyzing political life. 
The only instrument of dialogue, or the limited powers guaranteed to minority groups 
are incentive to negotiation and avoid the exploitation of legal institutions for pursuing 
communal interests, as in Lebanon and Belgium. 
                                                 
389 A further problem arises with regard to the partner for dialogue. Who should be included in these 
institutions? Should radicals be isolated, or should they be included in the negotiation processes? As 
Tarek Haggy argues, the problems that European States face with their Islamic minorities originate from 
the forms of dialogue they opt for. European States, according to Haggy, turned to a large varierty of 
Islamic associations and Islamic leaders, including the radicals, who are legitimized as representatives of 
Islam. This all-inclusive approach hinders Islamic communities from developing a Europeanized version 
of Islam, in that Europe does not give prominence to moderate representatives, who are more likely to 
negotiate and find compromise. While dialogue is necessary even with those who engage in 
confrontational relationship with hosting States, the institutions for dialogue should be composed for the 
mahority of moderate leaders, so that radicals would be isolated. See the essays by Tarek Heggy available 
at http://www.tarek-heggy.com/index.html On dialogue and the necessity to give prominence to moderate 
leaders, see Tarek Heggy, Le Prigioni della Mente Araba, (Milan: Marietti, 2010) a collection of the 
author’s essays on open society and Islam, integration of Islamic minorities in Europe and democracy. 
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3.3 Institutionalizing dialogue: a solution for negotiating (apparently) 
incompatible interests? 
Still, the focal issue is: why should State be likely to negotiate with minorities that are 
perceived as anti-system groups? Reversely, why should a minority that does not 
identify itself with the State of residence should be likely to dialogue with State’s 
institutions? One answer is, again, conflict subsidiarity: collective rights find actual 
implementation at the local level, which would lead to collective satisfaction, and, 
consequently, would consolidate the disposal to negotiation. Another answer is, again, 
the institutionalization of dialogue: in constitutional terms, the instruments of 
representation constituted the actual exercise of constitutional power, conceived as the 
power to create and revise constitutional acts and facts. The first constitutional fact is 
the social pact, whereby citizens accept to live in a community that guarantees certain 
rights and imposes certain duties. In a post-modern sense, minority representation 
should be considered as the exercise of political participation rights by minorities, 
which can pursue their interest by directly defining the terms of the social contract and, 
consequently, of the societal space (Gesellschaft). 
The empowerment of minorities in terms of defining the constitutional-social 
contract requires, however, a partial modification of the notion that defines a State as 
the institutional expression of one people, and as the homeland, protected by borders, of 
one nation, according to the principle of external self-determination. Particularly, this 
holds true under the current pressure under which borders are, and their consequent 
increasing incapability of defining legal, economic, and political spaces that are 
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detaching themselves from spatial territories causing a progressive process of de-
territorialization. 
4. Conclusion 
The process of de-territorialization is not simply a sociological phenomenon that affects 
economic systems through the migration of workers that created international job 
markets and influences transnational economy; it is also a political and legal process 
that challenges national legal systems by introducing foreign elements into the geo-legal 
spaces of States. This phenomenon surely influences national identities by creating 
undefined social spaces for de-rooted people, who do not identify with the identity of 
the hosting State and preserve their identity by introducing new cultural elements. This 
process of cultural transformation and economic trans-nationalization has affected the 
realm of law as well, in that law is the means through which economic relations are 
defined and that establishes forms of coexistence. 
Specially, the de-territorialization of law is an on-going process in Europe, 
which is affected by two phenomena of de-nationalization. One is migration, whereby 
the presence of migrants challenges the process of cultural re-qualification of original 
cultures within a European framework. Indeed, European States have to find 
appropriate solutions to the problem of recognizing foreign legal cultures which 
challenge the duty of the State to maintain certain legal standards as set by human rights 
law and constitutional law. The other is European integration, which created a novel 
legal system that originates from supra-national institutions and directly affects the 
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national legal systems, within which it is integrated. Moreover, the principle of freedom 
of circulation created a legal European space within which individuals and companies 
act according to the law to which they are subject by virtue of birth and not by virtue of 
residence. 
Therefore, both migration and European integration are constantly challenging 
the principle of territorialization of law. The case of the Italian judge who is compelled 
to apply Austrian law in a divorce case does not differ from the case of the German 
judge who has to apply Islamic law in the process of recognition of a foreign judgment. 
The refusal of the Italian judge to recognize homosexual marriages does not differ from 
the refusal of the French judge to recognize polygamous marriages. Since European 
integration and migration breached the territorial homogeneity of law based on the 
presumed homogeneity of society and nation, autonomy in the law of personal status is 
increasing, whereby the right of individuals to be judged according to their legal system 
is emerging. 
As a consequence, European States face the challenge of regulating the degree 
of autonomy and the relation between the autonomous legal space within which 
individuals live and the legal space of the States where these individuals reside. In other 
words, the problem originates from the integration of foreign institutions within a legal 
system in which they may not be recognized because they are contrary to the basic or 
fundamental principles of the legal space into which they are trying to settle. This 
problem may be solved by non-recognition of foreign institutions or by integration, 
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which implies a mutual process of opening geo-legal frontiers by legal systems and of a 
re-elaboration of traditional legal cultures in accordance with European principles. The 
risks of legitimizing practices contrary to fundamental rights cannot be avoided by 
simple non-recognition, which causes self-segregation. If States reject the possibility of 
recognizing different cultural traditions, including legal institutions, communities 
barricade themselves in order to perpetuate traditional cultural practices and exploit 
individual rights that guarantee basic freedoms to the detriment of weak categories. On 
the contrary, a process of recognition may avoid the creation of separate bodies, but 
both sides have to accept reasonable limits: traditional cultures have to accept that 
certain cultural practices are incompatible with European standards of human rights and 
European States have to actively participate in the process of cultural re-qualification by 
firmly asserting fundamental rights in order to eradicate internal restrictions, and, 
simultaneously, by accepting new diversities into their social and legal spaces. 
The opening of geo-legal frontiers implies the questioning of the nature of States 
as institutional expression of one dominant people—i.e., the concept of nation-State. If 
European integration challenges the organization of nation-States by creating supra-
national institutions that limit States’ sovereignty, minority protection challenges the 
cultural mission of the States that are the homeland of one culture. In this respect, the 
idea of Europe constitutes a life-line for nation-States. As Weiler emphasizes, Europe is 
not about the creation of a new nation; therefore, being European does not imply 
leveling down particular cultures, but rather, creating a new form of aggregation of 
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States and peoples that identify in a common citizenship.390 It is “the decoupling of 
nationality and citizenship” that “opens the possibility, instead, of thinking of co-
existing multiple demoi.”391 The concept of multiple demoi within a European political 
and legal space is conceived in terms of multi-level belonging. In Weiler’s words, 
One view of multiple demoi may consist in what may be called the 
‘concentric circles’ approach. On this approach one feels simultaneously 
that one belongs to and is part of, say, Germany and Europe; or even 
Scotland, Britain and Europe. What characterizes this view is that the 
sense of identity and identification derives from the same sources of 
human attachment, albeit at different levels of intensity. Presumably the 
most intense (which the nation, and state, always claim to be) would and 
should trump any other in normative conflict. The view of multiple 
demoi that I am suggesting, one of truly variable geometry, invites 
individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to two demoi, 
based, critically, on different subjective factors of identification …. On 
this view, the Union demos turns away from its antecedents and 
understanding in the European nation-state.392 
A more effective protection of non-territorial minorities and the recognition of different 
cultural practices do not directly jeopardize the existence of the nation-State, since an 
umbrella of identification exists and is constituted by the European identity.393 A 
                                                 
390 JHH Weiler, Demos, Telos, Ethos and the Maastricht Decision, in Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson, 
The Question of Europe, (London: Verso, 1997) p. 287. Weiler explains that the idea of Europe is not 
about nations but about peoples. The author compares European identity with American Republicanism 
and with Habermas’ notion of constitutional patriotis. On the one hand, European identity differs from 
American Republican identity since the former does not aim to build a melting-pot nation or a new nation 
united by flag or language. On the other, it goes beyond Habermas’ constitutional patriotism since unity 
is not only based on civic values and overarching rights and principles, but also on shared cultural 
practices as well as on common cultural history. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Ibid., 287-8. 
393 On this issue, it is remarkable to highlight that supranational institutions, such as the Council of 
Europe, have coped with the problem of defining the concept of “nation,” “national community,” and 
“ethnic community.” Specifically, the Council of Europe was called to define the concept of nation 
during the debate on the Hungarian LXII Law, named “Hungarian Status Law” or “Law on Hungarians 
Living in Neighboring Countries,” issued on 19 June 2001. The dispute that this adoption caused 
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concerned ethnic-oriented legislation, in that “the law offered certain benefits to ethnic Hungarians living 
in the successor states, like access to the labor market in Hungary and to educational opportunities, on the 
basis of their being ethnically Hungarian. These benefits were offered, therefore, to citizens of countries 
other than Hungary, that being the central controversial proposition, because these people defined 
themselves as ethnically Hungarian.” See George Schöpflin, Citizenship and Ethnicity: The Hungarian 
Status Law, in Zoltán Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, Balázs Vizi, and Iván Halász (eds.), The 
Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection, (Sapporo, Japan: Slavic research 
Center of Hokkaido University, 2004) 93; the content of the entire book is avalable on-line at http://src-
h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4_ses/contents.html. Legally, this dispute was based on the 
argument that this law guaranteed a preferential treatment on ethnic grounds and, consequently 
discriminated against people belonging to other ethnic groups. Politically, the dispute concerned 
nationalist or ethnic policy pursued by Hungary that applied across territorial borders. As Stewart 
emphasizes, “the law expresses a transformation of an older set of concerns to recreate (if only 
symbolically) a homology of demographic distribution and ‘nation,’ and in so doing offers a kind of 
symbolic revision of territorial space.” See Michael Stewart, The Hungarian Status Law: A New 
European Form of Transnational Politics? in Zoltán Kántor, Balázs Majtényi, Osamu Ieda, Balázs Vizi, 
and Iván Halász (eds.), The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection, 122. 
Hungary, by adopting the Status Law, urged the Council of Europe to adopt a series of recommendations 
in order to prevent possible negative developments of nationalist ideology. Recommendation 1735 of 26 
January 2006, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, reports the findings of the 
Legal Committee, requested by the Assembly on an existing common definition of nation within 
European legal and political cultures. The Recommendation points out that there is no common legal 
definition; furthermore, it stresses the impossibility of clearly defining what “nation” is. However, the 
Assembly finds two definitions of “nation” that correspond to two different conceptual frameworks. First, 
there is the concept of “civic nation,” which “is used to indicate citizenship, which is a legal link 
(relation) between a state and an individual, irrespective of the latter’s ethno-cultural origin” (par. 5). 
Secondly, the concept of nation is used, “in some other member states… in order to indicate an organic 
community speaking a certain language and characterized by a set of similar cultural and historic 
traditions, by similar perceptions of its past, similar aspirations for its present and similar visions of its 
future” (par. 5). While some member States base their legislation on one of these concepts, both may 
ground different legislations in virtue of different duties upon the States. As established by various 
international norms, including the ones enshrined in the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (ETS No. 157) and in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
(ETS No. 148), minorities have to be protected by States since they belong to the civic nation of that 
State. In this sense, their rights originate from citizenship, which fosters a common legal ground for all its 
citizens and different legal grounds in the management of diversity (see, par. 11 of the 1732 
Recommendation). Moreover, States fostering protective legislation of minority groups that belong to 
their nation but are not their citizens have to respect neighboring countries’ legislations and internal 
affairs (on this issue, see the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in inter-State 
Relations, adopted by the High Commissioner for National Minorities of OSCE on 2 October 2008). 
What is of interest here is the recognition by the Council of Europe of trans-border legislation concerning 
the protection of minorities. Indeed, it has been recognized that State’s legislation protecting minorities is 
not severely linked to its borders, provided that it aims to create a trans-national legal space for 
minorities, and not to destabilize inter-State relations. The evolution of the nation-State does not imply its 
disappearance, nor does it cause the merging of nations into a new nation. Rather, it means the co-
existence of cultural and ethnic nations in the building of a common legal framework, which represents a 
civic supra-national community. In this supra-national legal space each and every national community 
finds its appropriate location in that its participation is based on citizenship, which guarantees certain 
rights within the States’ legal frameworks. Indeed, these rights “are not territorial or connected to territory 
and their recognition and protection must be legally organized both at the level of each nation-state 
concerned and at transnational (international) level” (par. 10). 
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minority group may have no territory of reference, may be recognized and guaranteed 
autonomy and may still not be identified with one nation, but the general identification 
with Europe remains. As a consequence, this general identification overcomes the 
problem of national identification within States, while it goes beyond the paradigm of 
the nation-State itself. 
In this respect, legal pluralism is the solution to overcome the “nationalist trap,” 
since each group can preserve its cultural traits and, meanwhile, merge into a general 
European identity, while the peculiarity of the nation-State is maintained in terms of 
identification with the dominant culture. Legal pluralism seems to be the key to the 
partial de-nationalization of the Westphalian State, but this does not imply the 
transformation of nation-States into multi-national States according to an 
“ideologization” of pluralism. 
Beyond legal pluralism, the other forms of non-territorial protection of 
minorities—communal cultural autonomy and political representation—guarantee the 
inclusion of minority groups in the society. States may maintain their role as 
“homelands of dominant cultures,” but the breach into the geo-legal spaces in terms of 
non-territorial protection of minorities opens the possibility for diverse communities to 
create their own social space that does not challenge the identification of one State with 
one dominant culture, since, ultimately, both dominant and minority cultures identify 
with one supra-identity. 
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To conclude, I recall the words of Hannah Arendt, who dealt with the 
Minderheitsfrage, the minority question, when Nazism was devastating Europe. 
Speaking of European Jews during the 1940s, and more broadly of all minorities, which 
she called “small peoples,” Arendt eloquently observed: 
Our only chance—indeed the only chance of small peoples—lies in new 
European federal system. Our fate need not and dare not be bound up 
with our status as a minority. That would leave us devoid of all hope. 
Our fate can only be bound up with that of other small European peoples. 
The notion that nations are constituted by settlement within borders and 
are protected by their territory is undergoing a crucial correction. Spaces 
that can truly be maintained economically and politically are constantly 
expanding. There may soon come a time when the idea of belonging to a 
territory is replaced by the idea of belonging to a commonwealth of 
nations whose politics are determined solely by the commonwealth as a 
whole. That means European politics—while at the same time all 
nationalities are maintained. Folkloristics would no longer be a danger 
within such a comprehensive arrangement. Until we have reached that 
stage, it makes no sense for us to return to the issue of minority 
arrangements—if only to prove that nationality does not perish when 
separated from soil.394 
                                                 
394 Hannah Arendt, The Minority Question, in Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (eds.), The Jewish 
Writings—Hannah Arendt, (New York: Schocken, 2007), 129-130. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This study argues that the cultural autonomy model is an effective way to protect 
minorities in a multicultural world beyond the nation-State paradigm. Legally, solutions 
to similar situations have been developed in the Middle-East. Since it is not necessary to 
find novel solutions, but rather it is useful to look at other experiences in order to 
understand how legal solutions can be adapted for other legal systems. This study uses 
the comparative method as the fifth method of legal interpretation beyond the literal, 
analogical, the teleological, and the historical.395 As a legal methodology, comparison 
requires the analysis of different legal systems with two main aims: comparison may 
aim to make different legal systems understandable to lawyers of diverse backgrounds, 
or it may aim to analyze legal institutes for enabling the circulation of models. In the 
former perspective, comparison focuses on the grammar of a legal system,396 while in 
the latter, comparison aims to propose a legal transplant.397 Especially for the first 
purpose, comparative legal methodology may be assisted by historical and political 
analysis.398 
                                                 
395 Peter Häberle, „Grundrechtsgeltung und Grundrechtsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat – Zugleich zur 
Rechtsvergleichung als „fünfter“ Auslegungsmethode,“ Juristenzeitung, 1989, 913 and ff. See also, 
Alessandro Pizzorusso, Comparazione Giuridica e Sistema dell Fonti del Diritto, (Turin: Giappichelli, 
2005). 
396 James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, (Boston: Adamant Media, 2002), 188-189. 
397 Alan Watson, Legal Transplant, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1993). 
398  James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 190-192. 
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This study has both aims. First, the analysis focuses on the mechanisms of 
contemporary millet systems, then on the possible adaptation of this system in Europe. 
The analysis is based on statutory law, jurisprudence, and legal literature on the relevant 
matters to the argument.399 
However, in order to assess the effectiveness of the models that are analyzed and 
their compatibility with liberal democratic standards, this study also uses legal, political, 
sociological, and historical analyses on related matters including multiculturalism, 
minority rights, nationalism, and social cohesion. 
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